Winds of change?
Peace on the subcontinent is an idea whose time has come. But
can Vajpayee and Musharraf – both backed by hardliners – set the process
in motion?
BY ADMIRAL L RAMDAS (WITH LALITA RAMDAS)
Ever since Prime Minister Vajpayee invited General Musharraf
for talks, there has been no dearth of comments, observations, fears, suspicions,
and a host of other opinions articulated on both sides of the border. The
entire print and electronic media has been feverishly engaged in projecting
these views and adding their own ‘edits’.
Not so well published, but no less committed, have been
the statements of various peoples’ groups, like PIPFPD (Pakistan India
Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy), PPC (Pakistan Peace Coalition),
CNDP (Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace), APSA (Association of
Peoples of Asia), KHOJ–AMAN (the South Asia studies and Peacepals programme
working with school children) WIPSA (Women’s Initiative for Peace in South
Asia), and IPSI (India–Pakistan Soldiers’ Initiative for Peace) to name
just a few.
These and other groups, together with their affiliates,
represent all those from among the less visible sections of our societies.
They have worked consistently and quietly, often under the toughest of
circumstances, to change existing perceptions of ‘the other’ and to put
peace on the agendas of the leadership as well as the people in both India
and Pakistan.
A complex combination of factors drew me into a set of
activities which are, by any yardstick unorthodox, for a former chief of
staff. These have evolved from my own convictions and belief in the values
of humanism, secularism and democracy, and also the influences from my
family who were deeply committed to a range of peoples initiatives in education,
gender, environment and social justice. After my retirement as chief of
the naval staff in 1993, we moved to live in a rural area, involved ourselves
with local issues, and joined up with several existing initiatives for
better relations between India and Pakistan.
The transition into this kind of work, after an entire
lifetime in uniform in the Indian navy, has enabled me to learn a lot about
peoples’ views and aspirations on the one hand, while trying to relate
it to the area where I operated for over four decades — namely the various
wings of government on the other. The chasm between these two worlds is
wide indeed and it has been an enormous challenge to straddle both sides
of the spectrum.
Perhaps a service background helps one to understand somewhat
better the possible dynamics of a meeting between a military President
and a civilian Prime Minister. Military minds the world over are but products
of the environment in which they have grown, and therefore it would be
useful to examine the various forms of governance in South Asia. Three
of our closest neighbours — namely Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar — have
had military governments for fairly long periods of time. We also have
two monarchies in this region — namely Nepal and Bhutan.
Even among the remaining three, namely Maldives, Sri Lanka
and India, there are differing systems of democracy. Maldives and Sri Lanka
have a presidential form of government, with powers vested mainly in the
person of the President, whereas India has adopted the ‘Westminster’ model
of parliamentary democracy. The military has had a significant role in
the governance of our neighbouring countries —especially in Myanmar and
Pakistan. The Pakistani military mind therefore has developed on a different
trajectory to that of the Indian Armed Forces. This, as we will see, has
a significant bearing on any interaction with Pakistan.
Despite these trends in the region, the military in India
has continued to honour and respect civil authority and the principle of
democratic rule. Within this framework, however, and while executing the
legitimate decisions of the elected government of the day, it should not
be forgotten that members of the armed forces do also have minds of their
own. Military personnel do cast their votes, and thereby give expression
to their political affiliations.
I have chosen to elaborate this point primarily to illuminate
the subtle combination of factors that have influenced the military mind
in India over the past five decades. This explains the recent phenomenon
of a number of former military personnel joining political parties. Some,
like myself, have opted to act on my political convictions through active
participation in several civil society movements. The Indian military
(both in and out of uniform) is in many ways uniquely positioned to enable
confidence building and improving bilateral relations. These strengths
should be harnessed for furthering Indo–Pak friendship and understanding.
Over a decade ago, during my tenure as chief of the naval
staff, I had advocated a number of initiatives for promoting regional co–operation
– one of which was the path–breaking International Maritime Seminar on
‘Indian Ocean — Challenges and Opportunities’ — organised in Delhi by the
Navy Foundation in September 1992.
In my valedictory address, I outlined my basic vision,
envisaging a future where “amity and co–operation will replace adversarial
postures, and countries of this region will become the arbiters of their
own destiny without external interference or pressures. As a cohesive entity,
the regional states will have a greater say in world affairs, and possibly
greater bargaining power in commerce and trade.” In this context I had
proposed the formation of `an Indian Ocean Panchayat’ and I quote:
“My proposal is for countries of the region to come together and evolve
an Indian Ocean Panchayat whose aim would be to foster regional co–operation
on a wide range of issues for mutual benefit of the member states. The
Panchayat would also ensure the avoidance of mutual interference in many
areas and thus prevent conflict.” The seeds of the evolution of the organisation
of Indian Ocean Rim Countries perhaps lay here.
On retirement therefore, I did not find it contradictory
in any way to become what some loosely call a ‘peace–nik’ — although I
prefer the word ‘Peace maker’.
My oft–articulated and well-known stand against nuclear
weapons is also a logical development of my larger vision of peace and
development, primarily of our region, and the world as a whole. It is within
this broad framework that I will examine the forthcoming summit and flag
some key factors which are likely to influence this meeting:
Ø Historical Background,
and Perceptions of each other.
ØImpact of nuclear
weapon-isation of India and Pakistan.
Ø Regional security
issues.
Ø Jammu and Kashmir.
Ø Implementation
of agreements.
Ø Current scenario
and imperatives for the summit.
Historical background and perceptions of each other:
Seeds of continuing discord and animosity between our
two newly independent countries dates back to the partition of India into
two separate nation states by Britain, without any reference to ‘the people
‘ or their wishes. This situation is not very different from what is being
faced today by the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Since 1947, India and Pakistan
have fought three-and-a-half wars — 1948, 1965, 1971; the most recent one
being in Kargil in 1999. They have all proved to be totally counter–productive.
The emergence of the new nation of Bangladesh from the erstwhile eastern
wing of Pakistan in 1971, had dealt a severe blow to the Pakistani psyche
as a whole, and to the armed forces in particular. Pakistan has not forgotten
the role played by India in this development.
Kargil, which happened within months of signing of the
Lahore Declaration in February 1999, has likewise generated a feeling of
betrayal by Pakistan, in the Indian psyche. General Musharraf, now the
President of Pakistan, has been identified as the mastermind behind Kargil,
and therefore held in deep suspicion by the Indians. Given this background,
the initiative and courage displayed by the Indian Prime Minister in inviting
the general for the forthcoming summit talks is indeed noteworthy.
Impact of nuclear weaponisation in India and Pakistan:
An entirely new and dangerous dimension was created by
India’s Pokhran II nuclear tests in May 1998, followed by Pakistan’s response
in Chagai. This was followed by India’s announcement of its intent to acquire
and deploy nuclear weapons as a ‘security imperative’ against China and
Pakistan.
Predictably, similar ‘security concerns’ were echoed
by Pakistan soon thereafter in respect of India. In any future discussions
with Pakistan regarding regional security, one will have to address India’s
concerns regarding the ‘Chinese nuclear threat’. Given the track record
of wars between our two countries, it would be reasonable to expect that
the military option may be exercised again. However, this time, the risks
that both nations run, due to the possession of nuclear weapons, is very
high indeed, with potentially disastrous results. The imperative for the
two leaders during this summit is to come to an understanding regarding
nuclear weapons, their management and safety.
The minimum requirement would be to freeze all activities
related to nuclear weapons with the final objective of complete nuclear
disarmament both at the regional and the global levels. This is an area
where certainly both India and Pakistan can jointly take some new and bold
initiatives for revitalising the global nuclear disarmament programme and
thereby furthering the cause of regional security.
Regional security issues:
To be able to better understand regional security matters,
it would also be useful to examine the broad ‘military security’ concerns
of the main players in this arena–namely China, India and Pakistan. The
United States as a global power has an overarching influence in the entire
region. Whilst Pakistan’s concerns of military security are primarily India
specific, India’s concerns include both China and Pakistan. India is also
conscious of the US naval presence in the Arabian Sea and in the Pacific
and this therefore gets factored into India’s security calculus.
China’s security concerns are largely centred on the
USA, to a lesser degree with Russia, and even less with India. India and
China have shared a conflict free relationship in almost five thousand
years of history. The only exception was the India–China border conflict
in 1962 — and this too was due primarily to the artificial boundaries etched
by the British. Despite China having possessed nuclear weapons since 1964,
it has to date never threatened India with it.
The huge military expenditures incurred by all the players
are currently being justified based on the threat perceptions outlined
above. The persistent and sinister role of the military industrial complex
to push sales of weapons and equipment is another factor worth noting.
Clearly the security requirements of China, India and Pakistan are closely
linked and should logically therefore lead to a tri–lateral discussion
and the emergence of a strategic partnership.
Whilst this concept may seem a little far–fetched at this
stage, it is a pre-requisite to the establishment of a stable security
environment in the Asian region. Asian genius must find its own answers
to its security concerns. Hopefully some thought will be given to this
as well during the forthcoming summit, since this critical dimension is
not often addressed.
Jammu & Kashmir:
Ever since the military intervention by Pakistan in Jammu
and Kashmir in 1947 there have been many acts of omission and commission
committed by both governments of India and Pakistan which need not be re–stated
at this stage.
Much water has flown under the bridge since then — which
has brought us to the present day impasse. Events may never have unfolded
this way had the UN directions been implemented immediately and faithfully
by both sides in 1948. The resultant hostility has permeated and vitiated
the entire atmosphere of Indo–Pak relations and continues to this day.
The Indo–Pak war of 1971 dealt a body blow to the Pakistani
military psyche. This was followed shortly thereafter by India’s ‘peaceful
nuclear explosion’ in Pokhran, in 1974. Both these developments contributed
significantly to the concept of a ‘proxy war’ in the Valley. The situation
in both parts of Kashmir has deteriorated over the last decade due to the
unimaginative way in which the government of India has handled things —
namely by inducting more and more security forces only to accentuate and
worsen the existing alienation among the people. Pakistan meanwhile has
been unable to provide any form of stable civilian democratic rule within
Pakistan, and also in Kashmir under their control.
The tragic events in Afghanistan gave rise to the Taliban
movement which was the joint creation of both the United States of America
and Pakistan. This genie which has been let out of the bottle, is proving
to be dangerous and uncontrollable, and therefore needs to be tackled jointly
by both India and Pakistan as a potential security threat to the region.
Implementation of agreements:
India and Pakistan, have however, despite this continuing
face–off, managed to conclude various agreements and treaties over the
years. Some of these are listed below:
Ø The Indus Water
Treaty – 1960.
Ø The Tashkent Declaration
– 1966.
Ø The Shimla Agreement
– 1972.
Ø The Lahore Declaration
– 1999.
Whilst some of these agreements continue to work well,
Tashkent, Shimla and Lahore agreements/declarations have failed because
neither side honoured its commitments made therein. The lesson to be learnt
is that there should be a monitoring and implementing agency which would,
in my view, provide the requisite checks and balances to ensure proper
and timely actions by both countries. The initial rejection of the Lahore
Declaration by the general soon after he took over in October 1999, was
an additional factor which widened the gulf between our two countries.
Leadership changes should not be used as an excuse for non-compliance with
agreements entered into by two sovereign states. Hopefully this issue will
be addressed in the forthcoming Agra Summit.
Current scenario and imperatives for the summit:
There is always a symbiotic relationship between domestic
compulsions and constraints and foreign policy. More often than not, leaders
and governments tend to divert domestic attention in times of crisis by
raising the bogey of an external threat. This is particularly so when the
socio–economic conditions are bad, or when the political leadership feels
insecure. Both in India and Pakistan today, strange as it may sound, there
is a fair amount of similarity in the rather fragile political situation
that prevails. Whilst in Pakistan the General is trying desperately to
legitimise his usurpation of power; the National Democratic Alliance in
India is ‘creaking’.
The Jammu and Kashmir situation is indeed of great concern
and importance to both countries because this has meant huge social, economic,
and human costs to both our countries. There is clearly a realisation that
the continued spiralling of expenditure on defence cannot be sustained
for very much longer — perhaps more evident right now in Pakistan because
of their current economic crunch. This feeling of insecurity was noticeable
in Pakistan during my recent visits.
I have been to Pakistan three times since 1998. The first
visit was as chairperson of the Indian Chapter, to attend the fourth joint
convention of the Pakistan–India Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy
in Peshawar (November 1998). The second, in May 2000, was to Islamabad
and Karachi, to deliver the first Eqbal Ahmad Memorial Lecture. The latest
was as leader of the delegation of retired armed forces personnel. There
was one common factor which was evident in each of these visits — namely,
an abundance of goodwill and genuine desire for peace at the peoples’ level.
During our recent visit in February 2001, I had the opportunity to meet
General Musharraf together with Miss Nirmala Deshpande and Lt General Moti
Dar (retd.) Each one of us, quite independently and separately, came away
with the feeling that here was a thorough professional, and one who was
genuinely committed to finding a peaceful solution to our bilateral problems.
This was certainly quite different from the image painted
of him by the media and many analysts, especially after Kargil.
The Pakistan army, however, continues to enjoy a position
of overarching influence in the political affairs of Pakistan — whether
in or outside the government. It is also perhaps the only organised force
which can contain extreme right-wing elements like the ‘jehadis’ and the
‘Taliban’ as evidenced in certain recent actions by President Musharraf.
Likewise, the BJP has demonstrated the ability to contain and to carry
the extreme right-wing elements in India. This combination therefore is
perhaps the ideal one for crafting a sustainable and broadly acceptable
agreement between our two countries. Politically, strategically and realistically
speaking, one can therefore place greater hopes in the outcome of this
summit as compared to earlier ones.
Hopes, expectations and likely outcomes:
The announcement of the summit has raised the hopes and
expectations of people in India and Pakistan and especially in Jammu and
Kashmir on both sides of the border. These have ranged from ‘finding an
immediate solution to all issues —including J&K’ — to one of cynicism
about any positive outcome. Clearly one can expect an Agra Declaration
to lie somewhere in between these two extremes. Being familiar with the
way in which declarations at these levels evolve, it would be reasonable
to surmise that a draft of the Declaration would already have been exchanged.
Hopefully, the final document would be influenced by the cumulative inputs
provided by numerous Track II, Track III and other initiatives of peoples
of India, Pakistan, and Jammu and Kashmir.
Whilst the entire negotiating process at the forthcoming
summit would be very challenging, one hopes that statesmanship and vision
will provide the requisite energy to set aside traditional mindsets and
bureaucratic red–tape, and evolve instead a truly imaginative and yet pragmatic
way ahead.
Let me outline in conclusion, what commitments we could
expect from an ideal Summit Declaration and which are listed below:
Ø To cease all military
operations along the line of control and end all forms of violence in Jammu
& Kashmir.
Ø To keep the bilateral
dialogue process alive by activating standing committees — both civil and
military — at various levels, who must meet regularly under all circumstances.
Ø To agree to a
process for resolving the Kashmir issue with due regard for the wishes
of the people.
Ø To agree to mutually
balanced force reductions, especially in J&K.
Ø To finalise a
nuclear protocol keeping in mind regional security imperatives
Ø To take a joint
initiative for global nuclear disarmament.
Ø To relax the existing
stringent visa regulations and encourage free movement between our peoples.
Likewise, Kashmiris should be permitted to move freely across the Line
of Control.
Ø To agree to stop
all forms of negative and ‘hate’ propaganda against each other projected
in electronic, cyber and print media.
Ø To set up joint
action teams to address common problems like disaster management, drug
trafficking, smuggling, piracy at sea, and several other subjects.
Ø To open up sports,
educational and cultural, commercial and trade links at all levels.
Ø To immediately
free all prisoners held in captivity by both sides.
Ø To reactivate
at the earliest the SAARC and SAPTA processes.
Ø To agree to the
setting up of a Joint Implementation and Monitoring Team [JIM team] to
ensure implementation of all bilateral agreements. (This should include
members from SAARC countries).
Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf have indeed
an awesome task before them. It calls for statesmanship and vision of a
very unique kind to be able to rise above our strongly held views of each
other over the past half a century. This alone can give the peoples of
this subcontinent a fair chance to realise the promise of peace, justice
and real freedom which have been denied them for so long. Should these
two be able to achieve even a few constructive steps along the path to
establishing a relationship of trust and reconciliation, they would certainly
be deserving of a special place in history.
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