Badge of honour
"If observance of Truth was a bed of roses, if Truth cost one
nothing and was all happiness and ease, there would be no beauty about
it."
– Mahatma Gandhi, Harijan, September 26, 1936.
In the weeks following the Godhra arson it became increasingly evident
that the Gujarat genocide had been crafted in minute detail, meticulous
orchestration and planning that resulted in the widespread bestiality
witnessed during the carnage. Militias numbering several thousand persons,
trained to disseminate rumour, barter on hate and fuel frenzy, erupted
into countless streets across the state. Their venom spread through major
cities like Ahmedabad, Vadodara and Bhavnagar, and swept through several
districts, Kheda, Panchmahal, Dahod, Mehsana, Anand and elsewhere in
Gujarat.
Newspaper reports as well as Communalism Combat’s special issue,
"Genocide – Gujarat 2002" (March-April 2002), traced numerous efforts by
individuals in the highest echelons of the state government and
bureaucracy to prevent the functioning of the law and order machinery and
administration. Officers who did their jobs sincerely were punished. Those
who danced to the tunes of Narendra Modi’s Machiavellian flute all
flourished.
Amidst this bloody landscape, a silent operation was afoot, conducted
by some of the finest in the police force. The Nanavati-Shah Commission
opened a window of opportunity for the honest officer to play his card.
From mid-2002 onwards a handful of police officers have placed a wealth of
scandalous material before the commission to document, in detail, the
execution of the gory genocide.
On July 6, 2002, the then additional director general of police (ADGP)-intelligence,
RB Sreekumar filed his first affidavit before the commission. The
affidavit was deemed a privileged document until the commission released
it two years later. (After the BJP and its allies were ousted from power
at the Centre, the Modi government in Gujarat moved stealthily to expand
the enquiry commission’s terms of reference to include investigation into
the role of the chief minister and senior officers in the post-Godhra
violence. The obvious intention was to pre-empt the newly formed UPA
government at the Centre from appointing another commission of enquiry
covering all aspects of the genocide.)
Thereafter, RB Sreekumar filed three more affidavits before the
Nanavati-Shah Commission, on October 6, 2004, on April 9, 2005 and on
October 27, 2005. His submissions before the commission reveal a startling
pattern of state complicity and duplicity in the events related to the
Gujarat genocide of 2002 and the government’s continuing efforts to
subvert the process of law and justice. But his insistence on the truth in
the face of such persistent and powerful adversity proved costly. In early
2005, barely a few months after he had filed his second affidavit before
the commission in October 2004, Sreekumar was superseded for promotion to
the post of director general of police (DGP), a post he richly deserved.
In his third affidavit dated April 9, 2005 filed before the commission,
Sreekumar narrates the state government’s efforts to browbeat him into
obscuring the truth. A tape recording and transcripts of a conversation
that took place between Sreekumar and the undersecretary of the home
department, Dinesh Kapadia, on August 21, 2004, form an annexure to this
affidavit. With Sreekumar’s deposition before the commission due on August
31, 2004, Kapadia tried to persuade Sreekumar to depose in favour of the
state government. Three days later, on August 24, 2004, GC Murmu,
secretary (law & order), home department, and Arvind Pandya, government
pleader before the Nanavati-Shah Commission, did their best to further
browbeat Sreekumar regarding his deposition. This conversation was also
taped and the tape recording and transcripts were submitted to the
commission. These are crucial documents that record the pressure being
exerted on Sreekumar by Murmu and other officials, including a lawyer
appearing for the state government, to conceal the truth from the Nanavati-Shah
Commission.
These were not the only attempts made to restrain an honest police
officer. To his third affidavit, Sreekumar also annexes a copy of a
personal register maintained by him between April 16 and September 19,
2002. Cross-signed by OP Mathur, the then inspector general of police (IGP)
(administration & security), the 207-page register contains a telling
narrative of repeated efforts by the chief minister and top bureaucrats to
coerce an upright officer who was proving to be a serious thorn in the
flesh for the state government.
On April 19, 2005, Sreekumar also moved the Central Administrative
Tribunal (CAT) challenging his supersession for the post of DGP. In
September 2005 (after he had filed three affidavits exposing the state’s
complicity in the post-Godhra violence) the Gujarat government ordered a
departmental enquiry against Sreekumar on the basis of a charge sheet
issued by the state, which, in effect, questions the facts he has placed
before the Nanavati-Shah Commission. After several hurdles the CAT finally
delivered an order in Sreekumar’s favour on the day he retired from
service i.e. February 28, 2007. The order is yet to be implemented. The
state government has challenged the CAT order through an appeal filed in
the Gujarat High Court. Sreekumar’s challenge to the charge sheet is a
matter still pending before the tribunal.
Analysis of the register
It is the duty of a competent officer in the intelligence department to
collect data from various sources of which he then maintains a record.
Sreekumar was issued what he interpreted as unconstitutional directives
from the top man in the state. He not only resisted these verbal orders,
which he clearly saw as illegal, he did more. He maintained a record of
these orders for the future. Not directed by his superiors, this personal
register is a contemporaneous document maintained by an officer who
grasped the wider motives at work and decided to provide a detailed record
of those moments.
Sreekumar’s register consisted of three columns. The first recorded the
date and the time when each instruction was given, the second recorded the
nature and source of the instructions that were issued and the third
recorded the nature of action taken. The contents of this register provide
invaluable information about the workings of the Modi regime.
Sreekumar makes his first entry on April 16, 2002. He notes that the
chief minister, Narendra Modi called a meeting attended by his principal
secretary, PK Mishra, the then DGP, K. Chakravarti, and Sreekumar himself.
Modi claimed that some Congress leaders were responsible for the
continuing communal incidents in Ahmedabad. As head of the State
Intelligence Bureau (SIB), Sreekumar said that he did not have any
information to this effect. Nevertheless, Modi asked him to immediately
start tapping state Congress president, Shankarsinh Waghela’s telephone
lines. The chief minister’s principal secretary also tried to persuade
Sreekumar in this regard. Sreekumar replied that it was neither legal nor
ethical to do this since they had received no information about Waghela’s
involvement in any crime. A terse comment contained in the third column of
Sreekumar’s register states: "The chief minister’s instruction, being
illegal and immoral, not complied with."
At two separate meetings held on April 22, 2002 some officers,
including Sreekumar and a few others, brought up the question of the
Muslim community’s severe disenchantment with the police for its failure
to register FIRs and conduct proper investigations into incidents of
communal violence. At the first meeting, which was convened by the chief
secretary, G. Subbarao, and where Ashok Narayan, additional chief
secretary (home), and the Ahmedabad municipal commissioner were also
present, Sreekumar brought up the issue of the Muslim community’s lack of
faith in the state administration vis-à-vis arrests of perpetrators and
recommended that action be taken. The chief secretary said such action
(against Hindu perpetrators) was not immediately possible as it went
against government policy. At the second meeting too, the chief secretary
evaded the issue of arrests. Sreekumar’s register reads: "This response of
the chief secretary was reflective of government policy of evading,
delaying or soft-pedalling the issue of arrests of accused persons
belonging to Hindu organisations."
On April 30, 2002, ADGP RB Sreekumar received another illegal
instruction from the chief minister routed via DGP K. Chakravarti. The DGP
informed Sreekumar that the chief minister had instructed him to book
Congress leaders for their alleged involvement in instigating Muslims to
boycott and obstruct the ongoing Class XII examinations and that he (the
DGP) had told the chief minister that action could only be taken on the
basis of specific complaints. The next day, on May 1, the DGP told
Sreekumar that the chief secretary was being persuaded to create a policy
that would allow the ‘elimination’ of ‘Muslim extremists’ disturbing
communal peace in Ahmedabad. Sreekumar records his reply that this would
be cold-blooded and premeditated murder with which the DGP concurred. The
emergent picture exposes Modi’s plans to script yet another saga of
unlawful state driven violence and the chief secretary and additional
chief secretary’s willingness to go along with this. The DGP emerges as a
man caught in the throes of a battle with his conscience, prompted by a
little help from RB Sreekumar.
On May 2, 2002, former DGP, Punjab, KPS Gill took charge as special
security adviser to Narendra Modi. Two days later i.e. on May 4, he called
a meeting of senior officers for an informal briefing. DGP K. Chakravarti,
the commissioner of police (CP), Ahmedabad city, PC Pande, the ADGP (law &
order), Maniram, the joint commissioner of police (JCP), Ahmedabad, MK
Tandon, the deputy inspector general of police (DIGP)-CRPF, Sharma, and
ADGP Sreekumar were all present.
While PC Pande, the then CP, Ahmedabad (and currently DGP, Gujarat),
tried to paint a positive picture about the situation, ADGP Maniram
provided his frank assessment that the police force in Gujarat, and
particularly in Ahmedabad city, was extremely demoralised and the
situation demanded that there should be a change of (police) leadership at
every level, from the CP, Ahmedabad, downward. Maniram also stated that
police officers had become subservient to political leaders and in matters
of law and order, crime, investigation, etc, they carried out the
instructions of political masters because these individuals, local BJP
legislators or sangh parivar leaders, had a lot of clout. Political
leaders arranged police postings and ensured continuance in choice
executive posts. Maniram pleaded for the restoration of sanity and
professionalism in the police force.
Sreekumar endorsed Maniram’s assessment and informed Gill that for the
past five or six years the BJP government had been pursuing a policy of
(1) saffronisation/communalisation, (2) de-professionalisation and (3)
subversion of the system. He explained the subtle methodology adopted by
the BJP government to persuade, cajole and even intimidate police
personnel at the ground level. Sreekumar gave Gill a copy of his report on
the prevailing situation in Ahmedabad. He also told Gill of the Muslims’
loss of faith in the criminal justice system and suggested remedial
measures. Gill, however, did not respond to these suggestions. In his
register Sreekumar notes: "It is felt that Shri Gill has come with a brief
from Shri LK Advani, union home minister. So he will carry out the agenda
of Shri Narendra Modi, the chief minister."
On the afternoon of May 7, 2002, the chief minister, Narendra Modi
summoned Sreekumar for a meeting where he asked the ADGP for his
assessment of the continuing violence in Ahmedabad. Sreekumar promptly
referred to his note on the prevailing communal situation whereupon Modi
said that he had read the note but believed Sreekumar had drawn the wrong
conclusions. The chief minister argued that the violence in Gujarat did
not necessitate such elaborate analysis – it was a natural uncontrollable
reaction to the incident in Godhra. He then asked Sreekumar to concentrate
on Muslim militants. Sreekumar pointed out that it was not Muslims who
were on the offensive. Moreover, he urged the chief minister to reach out
and build confidence within the minority community. Modi was visibly
annoyed at Sreekumar’s suggestions.
Quoting statistics of heavy casualties among Muslims due to police
firing, Sreekumar appealed to Modi to see reason and to acknowledge that
it was Hindus who were on the offensive. The chief minister instructed him
not to concentrate on the sangh parivar since they were not doing anything
illegal. Sreekumar replied that it was his duty to report accurately on
every situation and "provide actionable, preventive, real time
intelligence having a bearing on the order, unity and integrity of India".
The very next day, on May 8, 2002, the DGP informed Sreekumar that at a
meeting with Gill the latter had told the DGP that (1) The police should
not try to reform politicians (which meant that the BJP and the sangh
parivar could continue to suppress, terrorise and attack Muslims even as
the police took no action) (2) There was no need to take action against
the vernacular press (who were publishing communally incendiary writing
that fanned violence against the minorities) (3) The police should begin
to play an active role in getting rid of the inmates of relief camps.
Sreekumar told the DGP that the police should not be party to the forcible
eviction of Muslim inmates of relief camps and the DGP agreed with him.
On June 7, 2002, the chief minister’s principal secretary, PK Mishra
asked Sreekumar to find out which minister from the Modi cabinet had met a
citizens’ enquiry tribunal (looking into the Godhra and post-Godhra
violence) of which retired supreme court judge, VR Krishna Iyer, was a
panel member. Mishra told Sreekumar that minister of state for revenue,
Haren Pandya, was suspected to be the man concerned. He also gave
Sreekumar the number of a mobile phone (No. 98240 30629) and asked him to
trace details of this meeting through telephone records. On June 12, 2002,
Mishra reiterated that Haren Pandya was believed to be the minister
concerned. In his register, Sreekumar states that he had stressed that the
matter was a sensitive one and outside the SIB’s charter of duties. Call
details of the above mobile phone were however handed over to Mishra
through IGP OP Mathur.
On June 25, 2002 the chief minister convened a meeting of senior
officers to enforce the law according to their (Modi’s) reading of the
situation. Sreekumar writes: "It is… unethical and illegal advice
because the police department has to work as per law and not according to
the political atmosphere prevailing in the state. He (Modi) also asked
police not to be influenced by the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) brand
of secularism. The indirect thrust of the chief minister was that police
officers should become committed to the policies of the ruling party so
that law enforcement can be done smoothly."
Battle lines were further drawn on June 28, 2002 when at a meeting
convened by the chief secretary, G. Subbarao, to discuss the chief
minister’s proposed gaurav yatra (march of pride) in September,
Sreekumar proposed that in light of the prevailing tension the annual
Jagannath rath yatra in July 2002 should be cancelled. The CP,
Ahmedabad, endorsed this view while a few others suggested a change in the
parade route. The chief secretary then informed the group that there was
no question of such a cancellation or even a change of route. After the
meeting, the chief secretary took Sreekumar aside to tell him that anyone
trying to disrupt the rath yatra should ‘be eliminated’, adding
that this was ‘the well-considered decision of the chief minister’.
Sreekumar told Subbarao that such an action would be totally illegal and
unethical. The chief secretary maintained that it could be justified in
terms of ‘situational logic’. Sreekumar replied that the police had to
function in accordance with the law. The chief secretary then promptly
watered down his request and asked Sreekumar to keep an eye on the plans
of anti-social elements.
On July 1, 2002 Narendra Modi himself convened a meeting to review the
law and order situation in view of the proposed gaurav yatra in
September and the annual Jagannath rath yatra scheduled to take
place that month. At this meeting Sreekumar provided intelligence inputs
of ‘high voltage threats’ from pan-Islamic elements who would use such
occasions and elicit support from those damaged and scarred by the recent
violence. He advised that the rath yatra should be
cancelled. His personal register notes: "The chief minister said that the
rath yatra will not, repeat, will not, be cancelled." Eight days
later, describing a follow-up meeting organised by the chief secretary on
July 9, 2002 where precautionary measures were discussed, Sreekumar’s
register entry states that "The chief secretary informed (the meeting)
that anybody trying to disturb the rath yatra should be shot dead."
On August 6, 2002 DGP Chakravarti informed Sreekumar that the
additional chief secretary (home), Ashok Narayan was not too happy with
the data on communal incidents that the ADGP’s office had provided to the
home department. In his register, Sreekumar writes: "I responded that my
office has been providing correct information and the ADGP (int.)’s office
cannot do any manipulation of data for safeguarding the political
interests of the Narendra Modi government."
Sreekumar’s register notes that on August 5, 2002 the additional chief
secretary had expressed his annoyance and displeasure at the SIB’s
presentation of data on the communal situation. Narayan noted that it did
not conform to LK Advani’s reply in parliament on the Gujarat question! He
felt that every incident that occurred was being labelled a communal one,
thus presenting a misleading picture of the law and order situation in
Gujarat, especially to the Chief Election Commission (CEC). (This was the
period when the Gujarat government was trying to push ahead with early
assembly elections claiming that ‘normalcy’ had returned to the state and
the CEC was due to visit Gujarat for an independent assessment.) Sreekumar
asked Narayan to define the yardstick for assessment of affected areas but
received no satisfactory response. The same afternoon, the home secretary,
K. Nityanandam instructed the ADGP’s office that they should not send any
data on communal incidents whereupon Sreekumar informed him that the data
could not be manipulated to serve the interests of the Modi government. By
this time it was evident that with elections around the corner the higher
bureaucracy was apprehensive about any information that could embarrass
the government.
On August 8, 2002, Ashok Narayan informed Sreekumar and others present
that the next day (i.e. August 9) the election commission, consisting of
chief election commissioner (CEC), James Lyngdoh, and two other members,
would be holding a meeting which Sreekumar should also attend. The
additional chief secretary also told Sreekumar that he "should not make
any comments or presentation which would go against the formal
presentation prepared by (home secretary) Shri K. Nityanandam". Sreekumar
replied that he would "present the truth and my assessment based on
facts".
At the time, the Gujarat bureaucracy had planned two presentations to
be made before the CEC, one by the home secretary and another by the
relief commissioner, CK Koshy. In an informal chat with his officers on
August 9, 2002, chief secretary, G. Subbarao said that his men should
present a picture of normalcy so that the CEC would have no reason to
postpone the Gujarat elections. The CEC met the higher bureaucracy the
same day. James Lyngdoh intervened at the start to say that he was not
interested in presentations. The chief secretary carried on regardless,
saying that "total normalcy was restored in the entire state and no
tension was prevailing anywhere". Sounding both annoyed and incredulous,
Lyngdoh observed that the commission had just visited affected areas where
victims had made numerous complaints. He cited reports of a recently
constructed wall barring right of passage to minority members in a
particular locality of Ahmedabad. Undeterred, the chief secretary replied
that rehabilitation was virtually complete and that most riot victims had
returned home. A visibly angry Lyngdoh then asked the chief secretary how
he had the ‘temerity to claim normalcy’ given the quantum and scale of the
complaints. Lyngdoh insisted that the Gujarat government provide data
along standard lines about the number of FIRs filed, the number of
perpetrators arrested, the number of accused released on bail, the number
of displaced persons, the compensation paid, and so on.
DGP K. Chakravarti then abruptly steered the discussion to the need for
extra paramilitary forces during the forthcoming gaurav yatra.
Sreekumar reiterated this point. Here, the CEC intervened to point out the
contradiction between the chief secretary’s claims of normalcy and
officers’ demands for additional forces. Lyngdoh then asked Sreekumar to
elaborate on his claim for more forces. Sreekumar made his presentation
(which included data on the number of deaths, property losses, the
districts and villages affected and the overall plight of victims),
arguing that tension still prevailed in 993 villages and 151 towns that
had witnessed riots between February 27 and July 31, 2002. The affected
area, he said, covered 284 police stations and 154 out of 182 assembly
constituencies. On being asked to estimate the number of additional forces
required, the DGP said that they would need at least 202 extra companies.
After all the other officers had left, the chief secretary summoned
Sreekumar and shouted, "You have let us down badly! What was the need for
you to project all those statistics about displaced people?" Sreekumar
told him that he had presented the facts. Later, as Sreekumar was waiting
for another meeting, additional chief secretary, Ashok Narayan came into
the room along with the DGP and asked Sreekumar why he had made a
statement contrary to the government’s ‘perception’. Narayan also asked
Sreekumar whether as a disciplined officer he accepted the DGP’s
authority. Sreekumar told him that the question was best answered by the
DGP himself. Refraining from comment, the DGP (perhaps to avoid a
confrontation) said that there was no point in pursuing the discussion.
DGP Chakravarti later told Sreekumar that his assessment, particularly of
manpower requirements, was accurate.
This was not all. On September 10, 2002, the National Commission for
Minorities (NCM) faxed a message to the Gujarat home department requesting
a verbatim copy of the chief minister’s speech made at Becharaji, a temple
town in Mehsana district, on September 9, 2002. Modi’s hate speech formed
part of the overall message of his gaurav yatra. Keen to block such
information, the home department got the DGP to endorse that Sreekumar’s
department, the ADGP (int.)’s office, was not required to provide such a
report. Sreekumar, however, felt duty bound to comply with the request.
Risking the wrath of his superiors, Sreekumar obtained a copy of the
speech and forwarded this to the commission. Sreekumar’s action, his
sending a copy of Modi’s speech to the NCM, was the proverbial last straw
on the official camel’s back. He was immediately transferred from the post
of ADGP (intelligence) and made ADGP (police reforms), a position empty of
content.
Following protocol, Sreekumar then called on the chief secretary, G.
Subbarao. The chief secretary told him that he should not have spoken up
in contravention of state policy. Sreekumar responded that as a government
functionary his oath was to the Constitution and "If the chief minister’s
policies are in contravention of the letter, spirit and ethos of the
Constitution of India, no government officer is bound to follow such
policies." Visibly annoyed, the chief secretary brought the meeting to an
abrupt end. RB Sreekumar’s personal register ends with this episode.
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