Why Muslim men should apologise to
Muslim women
Examining gender inequality in the Koranic context
BY FARID ESACK
I saw a woman hanging from her hair [and] her brain was boiling because she
had not covered her hair. I saw a woman who had been hanged from her tongue and
hell’s water was being poured into her throat because she had annoyed her
husband. I saw a woman in a furnace of fire, hanging from her feet because she
had left home without her husband’s permission…"
– Sayings attributed to Prophet Muhammad
1. Reflecting on the topic
…I am a Muslim male, the youngest of six sons and one daughter (the
latter’s "illegitimate" existence discovered more than 10 years after the death
of my mother), the son of a mother who died in her early fifties as quite
literally a victim of apartheid, patriarchy and capitalism, and of a father who
abandoned his family when I was three weeks old.
As a young South African student of Islamic theology in (a madrassa in)
Pakistan, with bitter memories as a victim of apartheid, I saw the remarkable
similarities between the oppression of blacks in South Africa and of women in
Muslim society. Later, in my years as a Muslim liberation
theologian-cum-activist in the struggle against apartheid, I deepened my
awareness of the relationship between the struggle of women for gender justice
and that of all oppressed South Africans for national liberation…
I shall not attempt to deal here with the question in all its complexities.
To begin with, I do not have the courage to do so. Furthermore, as a socially
engaged theologian, I extend the maxim attributed to Ali ibn Abi Talib, a cousin
of Muhammad, to "address people at the level of their comprehension". I thus
focus on the possible while never losing sight of the necessarily unthinkable –
the equality of all people and the freedom of all people to respond to the
voices of their own consciences, what the Quakers call "that of god in
everyone".
In answering the question I shall thus confine myself to what I, as a male
Muslim liberation theologian, believe men owe to most Muslim women. In doing so
I shall attempt to provide a response that is sufficiently inclusive to embrace
all manifestations of debt to the other.
2. Gender equality in contemporary Islam: Between text and context: An
overview
The issue of gender equality in contemporary Islam, more specifically,
the position of women, has been extensively dealt with in Muslim scholarship.
This ranges from the explicitly misogynistic confessional (Ragie, 1995) to the
more gentle and apologetic (Iqbal, 1989; Siddiqi, 1988; et al) to the serious
scholarly which implicitly or explicitly argue the case for gender justice
(Ahmad, 1984; El Saadawi, 1980; Mernissi, 1975; Wadud-Muhsin; Yamani, 1996; et
al).
Numerous women from Muslim backgrounds consciously avoid any attempt to
locate their ideas in a rethought Islam. In a reversal of fundamentalism with
its "Islam is the answer", these thinkers and/or activists often engage in an
identical essentialising of religion with their "Islam is the problem". Both
move from the rather dubious assumption that religion is a disembowelled entity
that emerged from beyond time and space and, having landed in the middle of
nowhere, can be just as easily transplanted to another piece of time and space.
Many others concerned with gender justice are confessional Muslims desperate
to live in fidelity to both the basis of Islamic thought and practice (the Koran
and the Sunnah – Muhammad’s prophetic precedent) and their commitment to their
own liberation from gender oppression. Much of what has emerged from the latter
group, though, is apologetic and unwilling to address fundamental questions of
the essentially patriarchal nature of the Koran’s text and essential audience
and indeed of the Koranic portrayal of the transcendent.
Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988), one of the great modernist Muslim thinkers, reflects
this kind of apologia in translation of and reflections on a Koranic text widely
discussed in any discourse on gender equality in Islam. He renders verse
Q. 2:228 as follows: "And for women there are rights [over against men]
commensurate with the duties they owe but men are one degree higher." He
furthermore argues that "it is certain that in general the Koran envisages
division of labour and a difference in function […]".
The question is whether the verse quoted is one of inherent inequality. We
are told (by Rahman) that men are in charge of women because god has given some
humans excellence over others and because men have the liability of expenditure
[on women]. This shows that men have a functional, not an inherent, superiority
over women, for they are charged with earning money and spending it on women.
[…] If a woman becomes economically sufficient, say by inheritance or by earning
wealth, and contributes to the household expenditure, the male superiority would
be to that extent reduced since as a human he has no superiority over his
wife. Religiously speaking, men and women have absolute parity: "Whoever does
good deeds, whether male or female, while being believers, they shall enter
paradise" (Q. 4:128, 40:40, 16:97).
A more literal translation is given further below. Looking at his reflections
though, a number of questions remain unanswered. If the excellence is as a
result of god’s grace and not economic activity then how does a shift in
patterns of income alter that excellence? Is spending a criterion of excellence?
If it is then what about the economic value of the labour that women bring to
the relationship where the husband is the key breadwinner? Is male expenditure
on women purely a question of liability and/or social responsibility or is it
more a manifestation of power? (The phenomenon of frustration, aggression by
unemployed or low-salaried husbands married to employed or high-salaried wives
is not an unknown one.) Why should financial expenditure by any two partners in
a relationship necessarily impact on the question of equality as Rahman seems to
imply when he says, "if a woman […] contributes to the household expenditure,
the male superiority would be to that extent reduced"? What does it mean for
women who are marginalised and oppressed in all spheres of daily existence to
have "absolute parity" "religiously speaking"?
The Koran and the Sunnah are pivotal to Muslim theological thinking and legal
practice. However problematic one may find these in regard to issues of gender
justice, they have to be negotiated for as long as one locates oneself within
this community or views this community as one’s essential audience.
In the context of seventh century Arabia, the personal example of Muhammad,
also regarded as a source of law in Islam, was exemplary in encouraging a sense
of gender justice and compassion towards all victims of oppression, including
women. "The best of you is he who behaves best with his wives." "Listen, treat
women well!" "I hold the rights of two weak types of persons sacred; the right
of an orphan and that of a wife."
Similarly, the Koran contains a number of exhortations which potentially have
the same effect. "And women shall have rights similar to the rights against
them, according to what is equitable" (Q. 2:118). "Believers, men and women, are
protectors, one of another: they enjoin what is just and forbid what is evil"
(Q. 9:71).
Despite these, both the Islamic theological-cum-legal tradition and Muslim
cultural life are deeply rooted in various forms of gender injustice ranging
from explicit misogyny to paternalism under the guise of kindness. In part this
reflects on the ambiguity of and limitations to the text itself – both that of
the Koran and Sunnah, the pliability of all texts as contested terrain and the
resilient nature of patriarchy among the audience of these texts – the Muslims.
Many Muslims acknowledge the reality of gender oppression in Muslim society
but hasten to attribute this to the inadequacies of that society or the
inability/refusal of Muslims to live alongside the dictates of Islam (Wadud-Muhsin,
1992: 94-104; Hassan, 1996: 25-27, 89-103). While common, the notion of Islam
and gender as distinct from Muslims and gender is an untenable one. There are
also limits to which one can pursue the distinction between the text and its
interpretation. Meaning, as Richard Martin says, cannot avoid "the
interpretation of meaning" (Martin, 1982: 363) because exegesis is not an
interpretation but rather an extension of the symbol and must itself be
interpreted; even if these exegetical additions belong to the phase of
redaction, they are not quite exterior to the text but belong to its
productivity (Martin, 1982: 369).
Whatever else Islam, as any other religion, may be, it is also that which is
interpreted, lived out, aspired towards, ignored and debated among ordinary
individuals and communities. It is thus equally valid to examine the
sociopolitical context of Muslims as a determinant of responses to the question
of what men owe to women.
No Muslim state can escape factoring the Shariah in any matter pertaining to
gender. The myth of an essentialist ahistorical Islam and Shariah is however
evidenced by the fact that each of these societies and their numerous substrata
have arrived at a range of different positions and diverse practices, all of
them seemingly legitimated by or rooted in the Shariah.
This is reflected in the varying positions of Muslim states towards the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and
in the diversity of Muslim personal law systems in these countries. Responses to
CEDAW ranged from the outright Saudi Arabian refusal to sign it, to Egypt
arguing that Article 16 dealing with the equality of men and women in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations should be implemented without
prejudice to the Shariah provisions in this regard, to the then Democratic
Republic of Yemen merely stating that it would not be bound by the article
"relating to the settlement of disputes which may arise concerning the
application or interpretation of the convention" (UN, 1985, g7).
The wide array of interpretations and application of Muslim personal law in
Muslim countries, the way these were influenced by the sociopolitical struggles
against colonialism and modernity as well as the interminable attempts to
reconcile Muslim personal law with their constitutional requirements of gender
equality are detailed in Nadia Hijab (1989: 9-37).
Given the centrality of women in the maintenance of the family as an
institution and as the essential transmitters of cultural and religious
traditions, traditional Muslim societies have a very genuine fear that "if women
allow their key role in the family to be overtaken by other roles then the whole
social system will fall apart" (ibid: 13). The traditional social system is, of
course, already besieged under a host of socio-economic and political forces
that are loosely described as "the West".
"The West" and its putative hegemonic designs are for most Muslims but an
extension of the crusades and later, colonialism. The insistence on retaining
tradition, including the traditional role of women, thus becomes an important
aspect of the struggle for dignity and survival. Using the example of Algeria,
Nadia Hijab explains that: "[…] a major aim of the revolution against the French
occupation for both men and women had been to restore the Algerian way of life
which the occupier had sought to fragment. In order to preserve their cultural
identity from the French onslaught on their language and traditions, the
Algerians had clung even more closely to Islam and Islam-based traditions"
(ibid: 27).
Much of the dominant discourse on gender equality or inequality in
Muslim-majority countries is thus intrinsically connected to questions of
national identity and cultural loyalty. In the words of Leila Ahmed, the Middle
Eastern feminist is really "caught between two opposing loyalties" [her sexual
identity and her religio-cultural identity], "forced almost to choose between
betrayal and betrayal" (1984: 122). Fatima Mernissi has also detailed the
psychological impact of colonialist intervention in Muslim identity and how this
has resulted in the transformation of the Shariah into a symbol of Muslim
identity and the ummah’s integrity. "Modern changes were identified as the
enemy’s subtle tools for carrying out the destruction of Islam" (1975: xix).
Given the undeniable historicity of the question of gender equality in Islam
and Muslim society, there is equal validity for those who come from contexts
free from the sociopolitical and cultural factors that impact on traditional
Muslim-majority societies to have their own approaches to the question, informed
by their own experiences. In other words, I am as free to have a post-apartheid
South African Muslim appreciation of gender as what the post-colonial Algerian
or Moroccan Muslim is entitled to.
3. The debt to women
What is it then that I owe to women?
In brief, two responsibilities: First, to call for forgiveness and second, to
centre liberation, justice and compassion in my theology and in my pastoral
praxis.
3.1. The call for forgiveness
Each adherent of a religious tradition is simultaneously a shaper of that
tradition and while one cannot assume personal responsibility for all the crimes
or achievements of that tradition, there is nevertheless a sense in which each
adherent shares in the shame or glory.
In Islam, as in most other world religions, males are the key managers and
interpreters of the sacred. As a male Muslim theologian committed to gender
justice, I thus have two reasons to ask for forgiveness. Firstly, as part of the
privileged gender that has consistently denied the full humanity of the gendered
other even as I was being nurtured and sustained by it. Secondly, for my own
role – even if only by identification – in a theological tradition which fosters
and sustains images of women and practices by men that deny women their full
worth as human beings created by god and as carriers of the spirit of god.
This call for forgiveness is for what the totality of Islamic traditions has
done or failed to do and for our inability and/or unwillingness to effectively
challenge and eliminate the misogynistic traits within our tradition.
3.2. The centring of liberation, justice and compassion
This centring of liberation, justice and compassion in one’s theology is more
subversive of orthodoxy than what may appear to be the case from a superficial
perusal. Every single dogma is subject to interrogation by the standards of
gender justice and compassion and every text is read through these lenses. Every
text that does not withstand this scrutiny may be subject to a host of
hermeneutical devices ranging from contextualisation and reinterpretation to
abrogation in order to arrive at an interpretation that serves the ends of
justice.
Does this not constitute violence towards the text? First, none of these
devices are unknown to the world of traditional Islam; the only difference is
the starkness with which they are spelt out and the definitiveness of the
criteria employed. Second, if a choice has to be made between violence towards
the text and textual legitimisation of violence against real people then I would
be comfortable to plead guilty to charges of violence against the text.
What does the centring of gender justice and compassion say about the
centrality of god, for isn’t theology essentially about god? Yes, it is about
god but my theology is about a god that is essentially just and compassionate.
4. The Koran as legitimation for gender injustice
In general, one discerns a strong egalitarian trend whenever the Koran deals
with the ethico-religious responsibilities and recompense of the believers and a
discriminatory trend when it deals with the social and legal obligations of
women. With regard to both of these aspects, though, there are two further
trends: a) General statements are also made which both affirm and deny gender
equality, and b) When specific injunctions are made then they are generally
discriminatory towards women.
The following texts affirm the notion of equality in ethico-religious
responsibilities and recompense:
"Muslim men and women, believing men and women, obedient men and obedient
women […] for them god has prepared forgiveness and a handsome reward" (Q.
23:35).
"And whosoever does good deeds, whether male or female and he [or she] they
shall enter the garden and shall not be dealt with unjustly."
In the following four verses, frequently invoked by Muslims committed to some
form of gender equality, we see how equality in a generalised manner is only
seemingly affirmed. My own brief comment on the limited usefulness of invoking
them for gender equality follows each verse:
1) "They [women] have rights similar to those against them" (Q. 2:228). Here
we note that ‘similar’ is left undefined and, as conservatives correctly argue,
is not synonymous with ‘equal’.
2) "To men a share of what their parents and kinsmen leave and to women a
share of what parents and relatives leave" (Q. 4:7). "A share" is left undefined
and when another verse elsewhere does define it then it becomes clear that it is
an unequal share.
3) "To the adulteress and the adulterer, whip each one of them a hundred
lashes […]" (Q. 24:2). The fact of the inequality in the burden of proof in
adultery is ignored. Pregnancy in the case of an unmarried woman is automatic
proof of extramarital relations while naming the male partner in the absence of
witnesses to the act is tantamount to slander.
4) "Say to the faithful men that they should cast down their eyes and guard
their modesty; that is pure for them. And say to the faithful women that they
cast down their eyes and guard their modesty" (Q. 24:30-31). The succeeding
verses, usually unmentioned in apologetic works, add an array of further
specific injunctions regarding the social behaviour of women. While one may
argue that men are not absolved from these, women are the ones singled out.
In social and legal matters, it is very difficult to avoid the impression
that the Koran provides a set of injunctions and exhortations where women in
general are infantilised "to be protected and economically provided for by men
but admonished and punished if they are disobedient" (Karmi, 1996: 79). The
following are a few examples of this:
a) Men marry their spouses while women are "given in marriage" by their
fathers or eldest brother though they may have a say in the choice of a partner.
b) The groom purchases her sexual favours though she may have a choice in the
amount. Here we also observe the implicit notion of a one-sided duty to fulfil
the sexual needs of her husband.
c) In the matter of divorce, the right of males is automatic while that of
females is to be negotiated, contracted and decided upon by male judges.
d) The male may take up to four spouses though he may be compelled to treat
them with equity and the first wife may leave him if the marriage contract
proscribes him from taking additional wives.
e) Muslim men may marry women from among the people of the Book but Muslim
women may not (Q. 2:220).
Verse Q. 4:34 is a text which most starkly represents the strand in Koranic
morality that seemingly sanctions discrimination and, according to most
interpretations, also violence against women and marital rape. Reflections on
this text, I believe, will bring to the fore the tensions between text and
context and the difficulties presented to the progressive theologian who seeks
to centre justice for the marginalised in his or her hermeneutic.
Men are qawwamun (the protectors and maintainers) of/over (ala)
women because god has faddala (preferred) some of them over others and
because they support them from their means. Therefore the salihat
(righteous) women are qanitat (devoutly obedient) and guard in their
husbands’ absence what god would have them guard.
"As to those women on whose part you fear nushuz
(misconduct/disobedience)
Admonish them, refuse to share their beds and beat them
But if they return again to obedience, seek not means against them
For god is the most high, great above you."
In trying to understand any text one has to address a number of key issues:
Who is the author? What is the nature of the text? What was the particular
personal and general social context that first witnessed or gave birth to the
text and its reception? Who subsequently interpreted it and thus contributed to
the text by their own mediation? What were the tools used in unlocking its
meaning and how effective were these tools?
I will attempt to briefly look at some of these questions and their
implications for a gender-just rethinking of the meaning of the aforementioned
text.
4.1. Who is the author?
Muslims believe that the author of the Koran is god who is eternal, the
utterly beyond, who exists outside history. This transcendent is neither male
nor female although the Koran employs the masculine form of the personal pronoun
(huwa) when referring to god and the analogy of god as a patriarchal
ruler is regularly invoked in Hadith literature. The limits which this
Koranically rooted patriarchal portrayal of the transcendent places on the
development of a truly feminist theology becomes obvious in our consideration of
the following question.
4.2. What is the nature of the text?
For Muslims the ‘eternal and uncreated Koran’ is the ipsissima verba of god.
It is god speaking, not merely to Muhammad in seventh century Arabia but for all
eternity and to all humankind… When the question of the genesis of a text is
regarded as that of god then the problem with such seemingly gender-unjust
messages as those contained in the verses under discussion is obvious. First,
there is no possibility of developing any notion of god as "she" and all its
implications for a feminist theology, for this would be tantamount to spurning
the Koranic "he". Second, there is no way that one can ascribe ‘discriminatory’
texts to a misogynistic Paul or a well-meaning but time bound David. Third, if
this all-powerful creator explicitly states that men are qawwamun over
women because of what he had bestowed upon them then what right does the
creation have to demand equality as inherent and inalienable? (cf. Prozesky,
1989).
4.3. Who is the essential audience of the text?
The Koran’s essential audience is males. While there are numerous
exhortations to kindness and justice towards men and even texts explicitly
affirming the complementarity of women, the latter are essentially subjects
being dealt with – however kindly – rather than being directly addressed. Women
addressed directly are exceptions to the nearly all-pervading rule…
The problem of the essential audience of the Koran ought to present a
significant problem for scholars committed to gender justice despite the scant
attention, or even absence of any attention, that it receives in such
writings. How can one be content with a transcendent who speaks about you and
rarely to you? What does it say about his relationship to you and about where
you fit into his scheme of things? How would a girl respond to a parent who in
general addresses her brother, advising and cajoling him into kindness towards
her, but rarely speaks to her directly and never asks her to rise up to defend
her rights? Is the end product not necessarily one of perpetually divinely
sanctioned minority status?
In some ways this issue is partially addressed by the following question.
4.4. What is the context of the text?
…The Koran, wherever else it may have emerged from, as a whole has a context
wherein it was revealed, as has every specific verse or set of verses. In the
words of Kenneth Cragg, "the eternal cannot enter time without a time when it
enters. Revelation to history cannot occur outside it. A prophet cannot arise
except in a generation and a native land, directives from heaven cannot impinge
upon an earthly vacuum" (Cragg, 1971: 112).
4.4.1. The historical context wherein the scripture was first
revealed, heard and interpreted
"The Koran was revealed in seventh century Arabia at a time of enormous
socio-anthropological flux in the region in general and, more specifically,
Hijaz. While Arabian society had a number of distinct matriarchal features,
these were now giving way to a wholly patriarchal system" (Karmi, 1996: 77).
Muslims generally hold that this was a period when women were regarded as not
only socially inferior but "as slaves and cattle" (Siddiqi, 1972: 16). It was a
time when women "basically inherited nothing but were themselves inherited…" (Rajavi,
1996: 25)…
4.4.2. The place of this text within the larger text
This text (verse Q. 4:34) is not regarded as having any legal significance
and must be viewed within a broader scriptural context that facilitates a
gentler attitude towards women and the promise of greater legal standing than
hitherto enjoyed in Arabian society…
4.4.3. The immediate occasion of revelation
Most of the classical exegetes believe that this text was occasioned by the
prophet’s response to an incident of marital violence… (A woman complained to
the prophet of having been slapped by her husband.) On hearing this, the prophet
is said to have condoned her departure from her husband and advised her against
returning, and to be patient. Following the revelation of the text in question,
the prophet is reported to have said: "We [i.e. himself] wanted something and
god wanted something else and what god wants is best."…
It is evident from the above that whatever else the Koranic text may be or
wherever else it may have originated from, for people it is essentially a
historical document revealed in a particular time and place and often dealing
with particular events in the lives of specific individuals. It is only when one
embraces this as a given that it becomes possible to make sense of the seemingly
contradictory Koranic texts dealing with a host of different issues, including
gender justice.
5. …
6. Reading and meaning: For whom and what?
There is considerable diversity among exegetes regarding the interpretation
of verse Q. 4:34 and the views of several of these have been dealt with
extensively by Shaikh Sa’diyya. The text deals with three interrelated notions:
The qiwamah (superiority) of men over women, the righteous women (by
implication, subservient) and the disobedient (by implication, "unrighteous")
women. The following may be said to be the most salient features of their
interpretation:
6.1.
Qiwamah: Superiority
…The text specifically states that this preference, however it is premised –
economic, social, biological or ontological, is based on bima faddalallah
(what Allah had bestowed). In different ways the classical exegetes have argued
a) that men are superior, b) that this superiority is both functional and
essential to their maleness, and c) that while it is not intrinsic to their
beings, it is nonetheless a gift from god. Liberal Muslim scholars such as Abul
Kalam Azad, Muhammad Asad, Amina Wadud-Muhsin and Riffat Hassan have emphasised
the caring and social responsibility dimensions to qiwamah and suggest
that this verse is in the first instance a statement of the social facts as they
existed in seventh century Arabia.
In the context of this text, there is no real difference in social terms
between gender relationships whether this putative superiority is intrinsic to
their biological beings, gifts of physical prowess or adequate financial
resources. God had decided to bestow it on men in a seemingly generalised ("Men
are qawwamun over women") manner despite the fact that only some men have
been given grace above some other (baduhum ala bad) – the second ‘other’
is unspecified and gender neutral.
Rather than suggesting that the text is liberating because it implies that
the qiwamah is tied to an economic relationship that may change with
time, the text ought to present two additional problems. The first is the idea
that a specific gender can acquire advantage as a group over another by virtue
of some of its members possessing some grace or virtue (even if only
economical). The second is the notion that wealth – and therefore also poverty –
comes from god and that changes in the economic relationships between men and
women may in fact be in violation of god’s will for humankind.
6.2.
As-Salihat wa-l-Qanitat: The righteous and obedient women
There is agreement that the general meaning of the term "salihat"
(literally, "righteous"), as the upholders of the precepts of religion in a
general sense, is also applicable to this verse. While liberal readers insist
that the second characteristic, "qanitat" (literally, "the obedient"),
refers to obedience to god (Engineer, 1994: 2), most of the traditional
interpreters have viewed this as obedience to the wishes of the husband and
suggest that obedience to one’s husband is in fact an extension – even a
condition – of righteousness. In the words of Shaikh, "it is a relationship of
obedience of female to male and thus condones marital hierarchy at a religious
level. The idea of sacralised male authority and marital hierarchy becomes
foregrounded in the relationship between female believer and god […]."
The general tone of the verse though, as well as the following more specific
requirement of the righteous/obedient/subservient wife, makes it fairly obvious
that the traditional exegetes are nearer to the truth in their fusion of duty to
god and to husband: The righteous wives are those who "guard in their husbands’
absence what god would have them guard".
Descriptions of "what god would have them guard" include one or more of the
following: a) the wife’s sexuality, b) her husband’s wealth, c) her husband’s
house from impropriety, and d) her husband’s secrets. Sexual fidelity is thus
portrayed as a combined duty to husband and god and while fidelity may also be a
duty of the husband, the wife is singled out and her sexuality is joined to the
husband’s property. In the process she and her sexuality are further objectified
and notions of women as owned commodities are underlined.
6.3.
Al-Nashizat: The disobedient women
Having elaborated on the righteous and obedient wife, the text proceeds to
deal with the way the disobedient wife has to be dealt with.
"As to those women on whose part you fear nushuz
(disloyalty/misconduct/ rebellion/disobedience)
Admonish them, refuse to share their beds and beat them
But if they return again to obedience, seek not means against them
For god is the most high, great above you."
The Koran actually has a word for female disobedience, "nushuz" – "n-sh-z".
Ghazali explains that the word nushuz means "that which tries to elevate
itself above the ground" and defines nushuz as "confronting the husband
in act or word". Ibn Manzur, the most reputable classic Arabic lexicographer,
defines nushuz in the following manner: "To protrude, to project, a
hillock, in the fourth form – to lift up". He describes nushuz in the
marital relationship as "one detests and dislikes the other" and says that in
the case of the woman this occurs when she elevates herself above her husband,
that she disobeys him, angers him and withdraws from him.
Classical exegetes have confined their interpretation of nushuz to
women. Tabari, for example, defines it as "when the woman rises above her
husband or removes herself out of his bed, disagrees with him regarding her
obedience and is confrontational to her husband". Razi cites Idris al-Shafi as
defining nushuz as "that which is disruptive in the wife’s behaviour at
either the verbal or practical level".
Several liberal scholars such as Asad and Parvez have argued against the
mono-gendered nature of nushuz and have suggested that the remedial
and/or punitive measures to be taken are equally applicable to the man and that
in both cases the implementing agent is the state. While Asad says that
nushuz includes "mental cruelty" of the husband as well as ill treatment in
the physical sense towards his wife, he nevertheless acknowledges that this
verse refers to "a wife’s ‘ill will’ [which] implies a deliberate, persistent
breach of her marital obligations" (Asad, 1980: 109).
Whatever the desire of liberal scholars, from the text it is evident that it
is the male’s recourse to attaining his will that is the subject matter of this
text. Three steps are suggested/prescribed for dealing with the nashizah
(disobedient women): a) Admonish them, b) refuse to share their beds, and c)
beat them. While there has been much discussion on the first two
suggestions/prescriptions, I wish to focus on the last one.
The overwhelming majority of exegetes – liberal and traditional – accept the
translation of "darab" – "d-r-b" as physical chastisement and
restrict the debate to advisability or otherwise, intensity, form and
implementing agency without questioning the legitimacy of physical chastisement
itself. The way in which these issues are addressed seems to suggest that
despite the inevitability of rendering darab as ‘beating’, that scholars
of all persuasions were cognisant of its essentially detestable nature as a
means of resolving marital conflict and desperate to find ways of limiting its
negativity. One can in fact argue that given the many limitations which these
scholars placed on the enactment of this bit of advice, that had they had
recourse to any linguistic device to render darab as anything but
‘beating’, they would have found a way to do so.
Before dealing with the seeds for a gender-just approach to the Koran that
goes beyond liberal apologetics a few comments about this text and its
interpretation:
a) The Koran does sanction violence against women. However, it does so as a
last resort, to subjugate the wife within a culture of violence against women
where this was often the first resort.
b) The immediate context that occasioned this verse is still a problematic
one: The prophet had seemingly defended the right of women to be free from
physical abuse and god had seemingly condoned it.
c) In the text we find a reflection of what Shaikh describes as "a
three-tiered spiritual hierarchy". (She adds "in interpretations [of this
text]". The truth is that this hierarchy is evident in the text itself.) "Allah
occupies the pinnacle of this hierarchy, man comes next as primary believer
addressed in the Tafsir (even in terms of the language, which addresses men
directly as "you") and then the bottom echelons are occupied by women, who are
seen in relationship to men and then in relationship to god. In terms of the
language of the Tafsir [Koranic exegesis], women are referred to as
"they", the third party, the other."
d) While this verse legitimises violence against women, in classical and
contemporary societies where violence against women is the norm it does appear
to be placing limitations on the abuser. Here Shaikh draws attention to the
reminder at the end of the text that "god is above you" and argues that this was
"actually an attempt to instil accountability, to reduce the sense of power that
men enjoyed both psychologically and practically, to deflate their god complexes
in relation to women."
It is evident from the above that any privileging of the text over gender
justice is a rather problematic knot for those committed to gender justice. The
confessional rhetoric of gender-sensitive scholars that the Koran is a Magna
Carta of gender justice or that "the Koran has been more than fair to women"
(Engineer, 1994: 1) does not withstand the scrutiny of critical scholarship.
There is a need to firmly locate the text in its sociohistorical environment, to
consciously depart from the letter of the text and to focus on its core values
as seen through the lenses of the marginalised.
7. The seeds for gender justice
Despite my own critique of the apologetic approaches to the Koran in general
and, more specifically, to those texts affirming gender inequality as
interpreted by many liberal and modernist gender-sensitive scholars, I identify
with and invoke many of the seeds for gender justice that they have articulated
for so long.
I believe that while the Koran is far from the human rights or gender
equality document that Muslim apologists make it out to be, it nevertheless
contains sufficient seeds for those committed to human rights and gender justice
to live in fidelity to its underlying ethos. The following four approaches need
to be cultivated by gender activists for both our intellectual and theological
integrity as well as for advancing the cause of gender equality: a) to god, b)
to humankind, c) to the text and revelation, and d) to interpretation.
7.1. Approaches to god
The Koran affirms the centrality of god in a believer’s life and not the law
that is the contextual means of achieving the pleasure of god. This affirmation
is both explicit in the text, the meaning of the word "Shariah", and implicit in
the attention being given to god in the Koran rather than to the law. Here I
want to address three aspects of the nature of god and relate them to the quest
for gender justice: tawheed (divine unity), rububiyyat (lordship)
and subhaniyyat (transcendence).
7.1.1. Tawheed: Divine unity
Tawheed is usually understood to refer to god’s absolute unicity.
However, a number of scholars are increasingly reflecting on the implications of
that unicity for humankind in particular and for creation in general. For those
committed to progressive values it has also come to mean a principle of holism
that permeates all of creation and a struggle to repair the wholeness of
creation destroyed by racism, environmental mismanagement, economic exploitation
and sexism. A belief in the unity of god can only become meaningful if we
display a concern for the way in which manifestations of it are being damaged.
Sexism and discrimination against women fly in the face of the holism of
tawheed which is in direct contrast to the misogynistic world view where man
replaces god for a woman and where a male-female relationship is expected to
mirror that between males and god. There is thus no place for putative sayings
of the prophet such as "if prostration were permitted for any of god’s creations
then women would have been ordered to prostrate before their husbands."
7.1.2. Subhaniyyat: Transcendence
While we acknowledge that all of creation is a reflection of Allah’s presence
and nature, we also believe that he is beyond whatever is ascribed to him. Allah
is above that community which, perhaps necessarily, limits him by their
preconceptions and socio-religio-political horizons. Ultimately, he is even
above Islam. Hasan Askari has pointed out how this principle of Allah’s
transcendence prevents the implicit tendencies in religious traditions from
absolutising themselves and claiming total equation between what they believe
(‘say’) about Allah and Allah himself.
This god is Akbar – the eternally greater than, the eternally transcendent.
In the words of the Koran, "God is free from what they ascribe unto him." For
our present purposes this has two implications: god is greater than the law and
to elevate the law to the level of the divine and the immutable is in fact to
associate others with god, the antithesis of tawheed. Secondly, god is
greater than any gender construction or the inescapably human device of
language. Patriarchal portrayals of god are thus also a negation of god’s
subhaniyyat.
This means that every expression of the law, including Muslim personal law,
must be subject to the requirements of justice and compassion. Because the law,
wherever it may originate from, is always approached and interpreted by
historical human beings, it must be interpreted in terms of the ever
approximating and developing notions of justice and compassion.
7.1.3. Rububiyyat: Lordship
This god is rabb al-nas, the rabb of humankind. Rabb is
"that being who brings into life and nurtures until perfection". This rabb
is just, compassionate and gracious and has prescribed mercy upon himself (Q.
2:243; 10:60; 12:38; 13:6). While this rabb does prescribe some laws,
very few in relation to the contents of the Koran, he is not a lawyer. On the
contrary, we get the impression of a being who is essentially concerned with
taking society from a given point and wants to take them further along the path
of self-actualisation and recognition of his all-pervading presence. The law,
dynamic even in the limited period of revelation, is there to serve as a means (shariah)
to reach him in their lifetimes.
7.2. Approaches to humankind
The Koran places humankind in a "world of tawheed where god, people
and nature display meaningful and purposeful harmony" (Shari’ati, 1980: 86).
According to the Koran, the spirit of god covers all of humankind and gives them
a permanent sanctity (e.g. Q. 15:29, 17:22, 70, 21:91). Despite the regular
reminders of the inevitable return to god, the spiritualising of human
existence, which regards earthly life as incidental, is unfounded in the Koranic
view of humankind. The human body, being a carrier of a person’s inner core and
of the spirit of god, is viewed as sacred and physical concerns are therefore
not viewed as incidental to the Koran.
In the context of gender relations, two inviolable elements are of specific
concern: the intrinsic dignity (karamah) of all people, including women,
and that of justice (adalah). Both concepts are firmly rooted in the
Koran while the law is a means to facilitate their actualisation. When the law
fails to do this then it must be reinterpreted, amended or abandoned in order to
fulfil this objective, for people, as the repositories of god’s spirit, precede
the law.
I acknowledge that both of these concepts are not uncontested. Indeed many
Muslim misogynists often seek refuge in the concept of the dignity for women as
a means to support an ideology that regards women as minors who have to be
eternally protected from themselves and from the naturally predatory behaviour
of males. I however use these terms within a broader context of progressive
values where people make – and have the freedom to do so – informed decisions
about their lives and bodies based on the availability of knowledge and options.
In some ways this severely limits much of what has been written above for the
vast majority of women who live in conditions of abject poverty, ill health,
illiteracy and political repression. In these conditions a benign male
guardianship behind chaadar aur chaardiwari (the cloak and four walls)
may even be the preferred option of many women rather than gender equality
amidst starvation. This only serves to underline the interconnectedness of the
quest for dignity and justice. There is no gender justice without access to the
economic resources and political freedom that enable it.
The point however that I seek to make here is that humankind, rather than a
canon or a set of laws, is the repository of the spirit of god. How we seek to
actualise this truth for women will vary from one society to another.
7.3. Approaches to the text and revelation
The sociohistorical and linguistic milieu of the Koranic revelation is
reflected in the contents, style, objectives and language of the Koran. This
contextualism is also evident from the distinction made between the Meccan and
Medinan verses and from the way its supposedly miraculous nature is located in
the ‘purity of its Arabic’, its ‘eloquence’ and its ‘unique rhetorical style’.
The Koran is not unique in the relationship between the revelatory process,
language and contents on the one hand, and the community which received it on
the other; revelation is always a commentary on a particular society. Muslims,
like others, believe that a reality, which transcends history, has communicated
with them. This communication, supposed or real, took place within history and
was conditioned by it. Even a casual perusal of the Koran will indicate that
notwithstanding its claim to be "a guide for humankind" (Q. 2:175) revealed by
"the sustainer of the universe" (Q. 1:1), it is generally addressed to the
people of the Hijaz who lived during the period of its revelation.
The picture that the Koran portrays of the transcendent is one of god
actively engaged in the affairs of this world and of humankind. One of the ways
in which this constant concern for all of creation is shown is the sending of
prophets as instruments of his progressive revelation. Translating this divine
concern and intervention into concrete moral and legal guidelines requires
understanding of the contexts of these interventions. The principle of tadrij,
whereby injunctions are understood to have been revealed gradually, best
reflects the creative interaction between the will of god, realities on the
ground and the needs of the community being spoken to. The Koran, despite its
inner coherence, was never formulated as a connected whole but was revealed in
response to the demands of concrete situations.
It is understandable that gender activists who continue to locate themselves
within the religious community of Muslims (as distinct from the faith community
of Islam) find it difficult to confront the inherent difficulties which notions
of an ahistorical text present. However, those who place gender justice at the
core of their concerns – rather than scripture – cannot but be cognisant of the
severe limitations which such notions place on them.
7.4. Approaches to interpretation
The principle of progressive revelation reflects the notion of the presence
of a divine entity who manifests his will in terms of the circumstances of his
people, who speaks to them in terms of their reality and whose word is shaped by
those realities. This word of god thus remains alive because its universality is
recognised in the middle of an ongoing struggle to rediscover meaning in it. The
challenge for every generation of believers is to discover their own moment of
revelation, their own intermission in revelation, their own frustrations with
god, joy with his consoling grace and their own being guided by the principle of
progressive revelation.
The meaning assigned to a text by any exegete cannot exist independently of
his/her personality and environment. There is therefore no plausible reason why
any particular generation should be the intellectual hostages of another, for
even the classical exegetes did not consider themselves irrevocably tied to the
work of their previous generation. Interpreters are people who carry the
inescapable baggage and conviviality of the human condition. Indeed each and
every generation of Muslims since the time of Muhammad, carrying its peculiar
synthesis of the human condition, has produced its own commentaries of the Koran
(and various kinds of interpretations with every generation). The present
generation of Muslims, like the many preceding ones, faces the option of
reproducing meaning intended for earlier generations or of critically and
selectively appropriating traditional understandings to reinterpret the Koran as
part of the task of reconstructing society.
The inevitable active participation of the interpreter in producing meaning
actually implies that receiving a text and extracting meaning from it do not
exist on their own. Reception and interpretation, and therefore meaning, are
thus always partial. Every interpreter enters the process of interpretation with
some pre-understanding of the questions addressed by the text – even of its
silences – and brings with him or her certain conceptions as presuppositions of
his or her exegesis. Meaning, wherever else it may be located, is also in the
remarkable structure of understanding itself. "There is no innocent
interpretation, no innocent interpreter, no innocent text" (Tracy, 1987: 79).
n
(Farid Esack is a Muslim liberation theologian, writer, political activist
and former commissioner for gender equality in South Africa. This piece
is excerpted from Esack’s paper, ‘What Do Men Owe to Women? Islam & Gender
Justice: Beyond Simplistic Apologia’. The full paper can be accessed from his
website: http://uk.geocities.com/faridesack/fewhatdomenowe.html.)
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