Wages of intolerence

Bishop John Joseph’s self-annihilation highlights the predicament of the entire Christian community and the freedom allowed to obscurantists in Pakistan

Bishop Dr. John Joseph was widely respected for his peaceful nature and commitment to his convictions.

What went through his mind when he decided to end his life is impossible to imagine. That it was an act of extreme desperation is obvious. But it could not have been wholly in response to the awarding of death sentence to Ayub Masih on a blasphemy charge.

The verdict in the Ayub Masih case did upset the late Bishop because he believed that a man he considered innocent faced execution. More upsetting was the environment in which he found everything working against the members of his community.

When it came to a blasphemy charge he believed a Christian had little hope of receiving a fair deal from the police or from the system of justice. Witnesses who know that an accused is innocent are afraid to testify in his defence and lawyers are afraid to appear for him. Anyone in such straits could be driven to the limits of despair.

It was also not possible for him to look at blasphemy cases in isolation from other matters affecting his community. The imposition of separate electorates on the religious minorities, first without their having demanded it and then despite their calls for its abandonment, had become a festering sore.

The arbitrary change in the version of the Objectives Resolution that Zia made into a substantive part of the Constitution indicated a resolve to curtail the minorities’ religious rights.The failure to restore taken–over educational institutions and their property despite solemn pledges had confirmed bad faith on the part of the state. The proposal to insert a religious column in the national identity card, though deferred after a sustained protest, presented a potential threat of discrimination.

And, finally, the blasphemy law had created an environment in which hopes of justice had all but vanished. Surely, Dr. John Joseph’s mind was weighed down by much more than the Ayub Masih case and it would be wrong to believe that he was the only Pakistani Christian in that frame of mind.

Thus, what Bishop John Joseph’s act of self–annihilation should focus the Pakistan people’s attention on is, firstly, the predicament of the whole Christian community, and, secondly, on the climate of intolerance created by the freedom allowed to the obscurantists to deny the rights of fellow human beings, Muslim as well as non–Muslim.

The roots of minority communities’ frustration lie in their perception that they live in the midst of a majority that decides their fate according to its own will and which is so obsessed with self–righteousness that reason is of no avail against it. This perception is good neither for a religious minority nor for the majority. It will create a situation, if this has not already happened, in which prejudice and hate will drive groups of people to senseless strife.

Sanity, humanitarianism and Pakistan’s interest as a civilised state demand that the whole question of the state’s meddling in the field of religious and the treatment of minorities should be examined with an open mind. In the present situation the exercise cannot but begin with a critical look at the blasphemy law.

It is sometimes said that the idea of blasphemy laws was started by the colonial rulers when they drafted the Penal Code over 150 years ago. This is not entirely correct. Lord Macaulay and his associates acknowledged the multi–religious composition of their colony’s population and identified certain offences against religion under sections 295, 296, 297 and 298, such as defiling of places of worship, disturbing of religious assembly, trespassing on places of burial, and use of words or sounds that hurt anyone’s religious feelings, and prescribed punishments for upto two years’ imprisonment and/or fine.

Another provision (295–A) was added in the twenties after the Ghazi Ilmuddin episode, making insult to the religious beliefs of any class an offense. Two features of these provisions need to be noted. First, protection was provided for all religious groups on equal basis. Secondly, conviction depended on proof that an offender deliberately intended to injure or insult anyone’s religious feelings.

No change was made in these laws after independence until Zia–ul–Haq introduced a number of amendments and sections 295–B, 295–C, 298–A, 298–B, and 298–C were added to the Pakistan Penal Code. The target of sections 298–B, and 298–C are exclusively Ahmadis while 295–B, 295–C, and 298–A can be applied to Muslims and non–Muslims alike.

All these new provisions violate the two criteria even the colonial law–makers could not ignore. They protect the religious feelings of Muslims only and not of people subscribing to other religions and conviction is possible without proof of deliberate intent on the part of the offender. It is because of these flaws that the Zia–made laws in the PPC chapter on offences against religion violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The principal blasphemy provision (Sec 295–C) suffers the most from the flaws.

The provision inserted by Act III of 1986 said: “Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.” The provision was assailed on several grounds. It was pointed that the word “defiles” had been taken from the colonial–period draft of Sec 295 where it had been used for a physical object (place of worship) and its application to a holy personage was impossible.

This made the law extremely vague, violating the cardinal principle that all laws must be specific. Also, absence of any reference to deliberate intent to cause offence arbitrarily restricted the scope for legitimate defence. While these issues were still being debated, the Federal Shariat Court ruled that the provision of alternative punishment (life imprisonment) was contrary to injunctions of Islam and hence invalid.

When the matter of making the deletion ordered by the Shariat Court came up before Parliament, the National Assembly passed the relevant bill without questioning, but the Senate Standing Committee made three significant observations. First, it noted that the section was vague. Secondly, that it was necessary to refer the matter to the Council of Islamic ideology and, thirdly, it was desirable to find out what practice was followed in other Muslim countries. Promises were made that these points would be considered after the bill had been adopted. That was in 1991.

Limited though in nature the Senate Committee’s queries were, some of the subsequent troubles could have been avoided if government had realised the need to address itself to the law’s imperfection.The flaws in the section as it stands is its vagueness, its being discriminatory, and non–reference to intent have been further confirmed by experience.

The largest group of people against whom this provision has been applied comprises Ahmadis (over 300 of them) but none has been sentenced to death. Cases have been pending for years. Obviously, in most cases the law has become an instrument of harassment and persecution in the hands of professional Ahmadi–baiters. Cases under this section have been instituted against ten Muslims; only one was sentenced to death by the sessions but was acquitted by the High Court. Cases against all others were dropped at different stages of prosecution. In one case a Hafiz was killed and his body burnt before the matter was taken cognizance of. Twelve Christians have been seriously accused of offence under this section. One of them was killed by a young Muslim before any proceedings started, two died in police custody, one died in jail; of the four sentenced to death by the trial court, three were acquitted by the High Court, and the appeal of the fourth has just been filed, one was given seven years under a reduced charge, and only one was acquitted by the trial court. Those acquitted by the high court could not stay in the country.

This survey of the cases so far alone is sufficient to reveal how the blasphemy law operates.But the subject of blasphemy has been made so greatly emotional that fair trial, particularly at the level of subordinate judiciary, has become impossible.

To begin with, witnesses are afraid of testifying to the innocence of the accused. For instance, Anwar Masih, who was recently awarded seven–years’ imprisonment after the sessions judge, finding that he could not be convicted under Sec 295-C, decided to sentence him under Section 295-A, had two defence witnesses who had filed their testimony in the form of affidavits.

When cross–examined for their averments in affidavits, they declined to say anything, pleading fear of attacks by conservative elements as the reason. The murder of Manzoor Masih of the Salamat Masih case is still fresh in people’s mind.

The accused cannot find lawyers to defend them. Salamat Masih and his co–accused did find lawyers in Gujranwala but they gave up under threats. When the matter became known to the Lahore High Court, it referred it to the president of the local bar but that had no effect. It was only as a last resort that the case was taken up by Asma Jahangir.The courts are under pressure. There have been demonstrations inside and outside the courts and judges have been subjected to extraordinary pressure. Their fears were aggravated by the murder of Justice (retd) Arif Iqbal Bhatti.

The difficulties courts have faced in dealing with blasphemy cases are fully illustrated by the case of Arshad Javed, the only Muslim who was sentenced to death by the trial court. He was arrested in February 1989.A few months later, a relative filed a petition to the effect that Arshad was not sane and should be treated as such. The additional sessions judge referred the matter to the medical superintendent of B.V. Hospital, Bahawalpur, for opinion.

The answer was that the accused was insane. The judge decided to examine the psychiatrist on whose findings the MS had given his opinion. The psychiatrist reiterated his findings whereupon the judge referred the matter to Nishtar Hospital, Multan, but there the professor of psychiatry was on leave. The judge then referred the matter to the Mental Hospital, Lahore. The latter in one report upheld the finding of insanity and disagreed in a subsequent report.

Meanwhile, hearing was adjourned 29 times between September 1989 and July 1991. Eventually Arshad Javed was sentenced to death by the court of sessions. The Lahore Court quashed the conviction on the ground that a mentally unsound person could not be prosecuted, and expressed dismay over the fact that the trial court had failed to take notice of the relevant record on the accused’s insanity. The only conclusion possible from this case is obvious.

Worst of all, a climate has been created in which a rational debate on the matter has become impossible. The Benazir Bhutto government did indicate plans to improve the law but its suggestions were far from perfect and in any case it was quickly forced to retreat. Unfortunately, the issue has been totally confused. Nobody in Pakistan, regardless of their personal belief, can think of insulting the Holy Prophet of Islam (PBUH).

There is something to be said for showing due respect to the sensibilities of any religious group. But respect for the Prophet (PBUH) is being utterly wrongly confused with the vires of the blasphemy law. Anyone pointing out that this law is defective is promptly proclaimed guilty of tauheen-i-risalat. The matter is further complicated by the fact that conservative Muslims and Christians are deriving their arguments from two different sets of values.

The Christians base their arguments on a culture in which despite blasphemy laws (which our spokespersons always use as a justification for their half–backed pleas) and references to religion in ancient texts, freedom of expression takes precedence to one’s belief while Muslim defenders of the existing law refer to a context in which enforcement of the majority’s belief overrides all fundamental rights.

If nothing is done to bridge the gap in this discourse, not only will the minorities face increasing hazards, the Pakistani Muslims will also suffer greatly as a result of growing intolerance. Respect for religious sensibilities or any civilised values cannot be enforced by laws, they are realised by any society through education and understanding of human behaviours. The government of Pakistan and the zealots whose pressure it dreads may pay heed to what the UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Abdelfatah Amor, had to say in 1995 about Pakistan’s discriminatory laws:

“More generally speaking, blasphemy as an offence against belief may be subject to special legislation. However, such legislation should not be discriminatory and should not give rise to abuse. Nor should it be so vague as to jeopardise human rights, especially those of minorities. If offences against belief are made punishable under ordinary laws, then procedural guarantees must be introduced and a balanced attitude must be maintained. While protecting freedom of conscience and freedom of worship is clearly a necessity, applying the death penalty for blasphemy appears disproportionate and even unacceptable, especially in view of the fact that blasphemy is very often the reflection of a very low standard of education and culture for which the blasphemer is never solely to blame.” (The only thing one would wish to add to his finding is that the reaction to reports of blasphemy too is often the reflection of a very low standard of education and culture, for which the person/group is not solely to blame.)

Radical opinion will not wholly agree with Mr. Amor’s reasoning, but anyone wishing to seek workable answers to the present situation could find a secure line of approach in his suggestion. The choice before the leaders of Pakistan is clear and it demands immediate answers: whether the intellectually and culturally inadequate elements that are found in all communities will be allowed to destroy the social fabric or whether those in command will intervene to meet the demands of justice and tolerance. What is at stake is not only the rights and feelings of minorities but also the health and values of the majority, of Pakistan society as a whole.

I.A. Rehman
(The writer is vice–president, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. This article was first published by the Lahore-based weekly, ‘The News on Sunday’).

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