http://www.newint.org/issue345/democracy.htm
New Internationalist May 2002
What’s stopping
democracy from taking root in Muslim countries? Abdelwahab El-Affendi
tackles a thorny issue.
To gain a revealing insight into why many Muslim countries fail
to develop or sustain democratic systems, one has just to follow
the news stories of recent times. Prominent among these was the
vigorous campaign by Britain and its allies against Zimbabwean
President Robert Mugabe as he appeared increasingly intent on
rigging the March general elections. Mugabe was vociferously
criticized and threatened with sanctions, while the media seemed
about to run out of loathsome epithets to bestow on the would-be
dictator.
During the
same period, however, Muslim leaders, whom nobody elected and
compared to whom Mugabe is a saint, continue to be fêted in
Western capitals or wooed in their own. Syrian President Bashar
Asad even offered visiting American dignitaries the opportunity
to ‘benefit from the Syrian experience in combating terrorism’,
while the Tunisian Foreign Minister asked France during a recent
visit to hand over ‘terrorists’ who have been given political
asylum in Europe. These despots may thus be excused for seeing
in the ruins of the World Trade Centre the reverse of what
others saw in the collapse of the Berlin Wall: a vindication of
their autocratic, even genocidal, methods for hanging on to
power at any price.
Western
leaders have been effortlessly converted to the despots’ view
that Muslims neither need nor deserve democracy. Intellectual
analyses have emerged with a glorified recasting of common
prejudices as ‘scientific’ revelations about why the Muslims
were anti-democratic, have always been so and will forever
remain thus. Instead of highlighting the brutality sustaining
the incumbent regimes in power, these analysts blame the
victims.
The
weakness of civil society in Muslim countries is ascribed by
some to cultural factors, rather than to the sheer ruthlessness
of regimes that did not permit society any room to manoeuvre: no
free trade unions, no real opposition, no free press, no
tolerance of even a hint of dissent. What is rarely highlighted
is the miracle of a stubborn civil society in countries like
Indonesia where, after over 30 years of brutal military rule
underwritten by generous external economic and diplomatic
support, the determination of courageous pro-democracy activists
succeeded in restoring democracy against heavy odds.
The fact
that the world loves Muslim despots is no doubt a major factor
in sustaining the anti-democratic regimes in the Muslim world.
Take the recent civil unrest in Argentina that accompanied its
economic collapse. The idea of a military take-over to restore
order was unthinkable. But in Pakistan, a minor crisis was
exploited by the military to step into power. Both Argentina and
Pakistan are heavily dependent on international support for
their economy, which makes international backing for any
military dictatorship absolutely crucial. This support was not
forthcoming in the case of Argentina, but became readily
available for Pakistan.
It is easy
to exaggerate the international factor. Regimes such as those of
in Iraq, Libya, Syria or Sudan maintain their ruthless hold on
power without foreign support. But even in the face of sustained
attempts at destabilization from abroad, foreign connections
still play a role. Rentier states cannot survive if they
do not find someone to sell oil to. The West, which has imposed
sanctions on Iraq as ruthless as its regime, continues to buy
Iraqi oil and has never stopped buying Libyan crude. More
important, though, is the fact that the West did turn a blind
eye to unbelievable atrocities in Iraq – including the use of
chemical weapons against civilians and systematic liquidation of
opponents – and Syria, guilty of genocidal destruction of entire
cities and repeated massacres of civilians.
But why
does the outside world not support democracy in Muslim
countries?
There are
some easy answers, especially in relation to the Middle East.
Industrialized nations’ interests in cheap oil and the survival
of Israel are better served by authoritarian regimes which will
resist demands for a fairer share of oil revenues or for a fair
deal for the Palestinians.
In other
parts of the world, countries like Pakistan or Indonesia were
more useful as Cold War allies under despotic regimes.
There are
other factors at play, however. The Muslim world is deeply
divided. The main divide is between those seeking a more central
role for religion in public life and those opposed to this. The
rising support for Islamists, and the divisions within Islamist
trends, coupled with the capture of power by some Islamist
groups in Iran, Sudan and Afghanistan, has worsened the tensions
and increased the worries of the dominant secular regimes. Since
the Algerian democratic experiment of 1988-91 came within a
whisker of putting Islamists in power through the ballot box,
democracy became a dirty word in Arab political circles. The
West swung decisively behind the autocrats, pleading concern for
human rights and democracy’s long-term prospects.
High and dry
Such bitter internal divisions within societies are hindering
democracy. This serves as a reminder that although democracy in
its normative sense has a long history as an ideal, democratic
modes of governance have been notoriously unstable. In former
times, including Classical Greece and Rome, consensual
government could only really be maintained within small areas
where face-to-face communication was the norm.
In modern
times it has become possible to stabilize democracies thanks to
a number of factors including: improved communications, economic
and educational empowerment of the masses and the development of
effective institutions of governance and representation.
But the
wave of democratization that has swept over many parts of the
world during the past two decades has left the Muslim world high
and dry. It is the only region where despotism appears to
thrive. Some analysts search for ‘cultural’ reasons for this
anomaly. Democracy, some argue, is ‘alien to the Muslim mind’.
Islam emphasizes conformity and obedience, and Muslim societies
have failed to develop civil society institutions. Muslim
societies remain excessively patriarchical and rigid, while
Islam has proved ‘secularization-resistant’. Secularization is
seen by these theorists as essential for democratisation. Others
point to economic and social factors, such as low literacy
rates, the state’s economic independence from society, and the
weakness of civil organizations and of the middle class.
Whatever
the ‘Muslim mind’ dictates, the fact is that the overwhelming
majority of Muslims are actively demanding democracy. And while
it is true that economic, political and social factors make the
fight for democracy a steep uphill struggle, yet in many Muslim
countries courageous individuals have emerged to challenge, at
great risk to themselves, the monopoly of power by dominant
cliques.
In Syria,
a burgeoning civil society movement is fighting to establish
itself against heavy odds. In Egypt, members of the moderate
Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as
human-rights activists and journalists, are routinely hauled
before military tribunals and summarily jailed. Political
prisoners in Egypt are estimated to be as high as 30,000, down
from double this figure in the mid-1990’s, and torture is
routinely used.
Turkey is
often cited as the only genuine democracy in the Muslim world.
However, even if specifically Western models are adopted, it
would be difficult to regard Turkey as a full democracy.
Discrimination against ethnic minorities is both systematic and
brutal, extending to denial of basic cultural rights, something
which even Israel or apartheid South Africa did not do. Like
Iran, Turkey imposes a state ideology which impinges on the most
personal freedoms, such as what names individuals may choose for
their children, what they could wear and what they could say in
private or public.
A more
credible contender could be Malaysia, which has strong social
movements, Islamist parties and a vibrant multi-cultural
society. In spite of its recent slide towards autocracy, it has
remained a democracy since independence and appears to show how
the Islamist-secular divide could be bridged.
Tunisia
offers another example where the promise of democratization is
apparent. Over the past few months, a vigorous and courageous
democracy movement has emerged there, representing a broad and
loose coalition of human-rights activists, media personalities,
opposition politicians, and at least one senior judge.
Protesters paid a heavy price for challenging the ruthless
regime of General Zine El-Abine ben Ali, who came to power in a
military coup in November 1987. Activists were sacked
from jobs, banned from travel, imprisoned on trumped-up charges,
harassed, denied medical treatment and had their phones
disconnected. Some were beaten up or saw their families
assaulted and harassed.
But
Tunisia represents an important test case due to the emergence
of a genuine pro-democracy movement, transcending the divisions
within civil society between Islamist and secularist, Left and
Right, men and women. All are agreed on one thing: they want
pluralist democracy and they want it now.
Tunisia
thus looks increasingly like the first Arab country where the
democratic movement has achieved maturity and become
unstoppable. Ironically, this is an indirect result of the
success of the Government in achieving stability and relative
economic prosperity. The highly educated and prosperous middle
class in Tunisia could no longer tolerate leaders who have a
tendency to treat them as children or colonized people.
To varying
degrees Malaysia, Indonesia and Tunisia show how democracy could
come to the Muslim world. In all these countries a broad
alliance of democratic forces, which do not exclude Islamists or
anyone else, has emerged to champion democratic reforms. Success
is conditional on reaching and sustaining a democratic
consensus, based on inclusion for all. And of central importance
will be resolving the role of Islam in the public arena.
Abdelwahab El-Affendi
is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of
Democracy, University of Westminster.
KEY MOMENTS
of Islamic civilization
continued...
1050-1100
Intellectual war breaks out between theologians, philosophers
and Muslim mystics or Sufis. Thinker and theologian, Al-Ghazali
laments the decline of Muslim civilisation, publishes The
Revival of Religious Sciences in Islam and launches a
monumental attack on Greek philosophy, The Incoherence of the
Philosophers. Iraqi political scientist, Al-Mawardi,
publishes his Rules of Sovereignty in the Governance of an
Islamic Community and Libyan scientist Al-Ajdabi publishes
his great work on meteorology, Seasonal Periods and
Atmospherics. The Crusades, a series of Christian wars
against the Muslims, begin with the first crusade in 1095.
1100-1150
Sicilian geographer Al-Idrisi produces his map of the world and
Sufi psychologist Ibn Bajja publishes psychological masterpiece,
The Knowledge of the Self. Spanish philosopher Ibn Tufail
publishes The Life of Hayy, a philosophical novel and
prototype of Robinson Crusoe; and Moorish physician Ibn Zuhr
brings out The Book of Practical Treatments and Precautionary
Measures. Mutazalite philosopher Ibn Rushd answers Al-Ghazali
with an equally monumental defence of philosophy, The
Incoherence of the Incoherence.
1150-1200
Timbuktu is established as a great centre of learning and book
production. It’s the furthest point of the Muslim Empire and
home of Sankore University.
Geographer
Yaqut al-Hamawi publishes his great Geographical Dictionary
and Spanish horticulturist Ibn Al-Awwam brings out The Book
of Agriculture. Iraqi engineer Al-Jazari publishes his great
illustrated work on mechanics, Integration Between Theory and
Practice in the Application of Mechanics.
The
Kurdish Salahuddin Ayyubi (’Saladin’) takes on the Crusaders.