http://www.islamonline.net/iol-english/qadaya/islamic-1/islamic1.asp
Medieval Philosophical Discourse and Muslim-Christian Dialogue
By
Mehdi Aminrazavi
As
pluralistic societies in the West become the norm and the "global
village" becomes a reality, ecumenical dialogues gain prominence.
Ecumenical dialogues, which, like many other discussions, first
began among scholars as an exclusively academic activity, now take
place in churches, communities, and other sociopolitical
organizations. In the United States, in particular, attempts are
being made to introduce educational curricula that are sensitive
to the culture and religious orientations of minorities.
The very feasibility of a Christian-Muslim dialogue should be
called into question. Can the Islamic world enter into a dialogue
with the secular West? Any dialogue or discourse requires a common
language, a shared worldview, and some basic agreement on some of
the fundamental axioms around which a worldview is formed. I fear
that the Islamic world and the West no longer have such a common
language.
In the present discussion, I will offer an analysis and
interpretation of Muslim-Christian dialogue that calls for a
reflection on the readiness of Muslims to have a meaningful
dialogue with the West. I argue that the necessary condition for a
meaningful dialogue between traditional Islam and the secular West
does not exist and, therefore, that any attempt to do so at this
time either will not succeed or will become a superficial survey
of what we have in common, such as the Ten Commandments. To
elucidate, I will first offer a model of a successful dialogue
between Muslims and Christians based on the medieval philosophical
dialogue between Muslim and Christian philosophers. I will then
apply the conclusions drawn from this model to contemporary
attempts at such ecumenical dialogues.
Any
student of medieval philosophy can observe two distinct periods in
the history of medieval philosophy, defined here as early and
later, each of which has distinct characteristics. The early
period belongs to the Church fathers who laid the groundwork for
Christian philosophical and theological frameworks. Early
Christian philosophical writings of such figures as Augustine,
Boethius, John Scotus, St. Anselm, Peter Abaillard, and others
were responses to specific questions of an intellectual nature. Of
course, Greek philosophy and its proponents in Christendom were
clearly there, but, as their works reflect, Christian philosophers
merely adopted certain concepts from Greek philosophers in order
to offer a rational defense of the faith. Early Christian
philosophy, having been influenced by the Greeks alone, dealt with
specific issues and attempted to find solutions to problems that
Christianity was facing. In this regard, the two civilizations,
Greek and Christianity, were engaged in a dialogue that was
immensely beneficial to the enrichment of Christian intellectual
thought.
On
the Islamic side, such early Muslim philosophers as al Kindi and
al Farabi also followed the same pattern, namely, their views,
concerns, and comments were responses to Greek philosophers, in
particular Plato and Aristotle. When reading early Islamic
philosophy, one clearly gets the impression that it too was
engaged only with the Greeks and that their central concerns
became the Muslims' central concerns as well. Clearly, some sort
of dialogue was taking place between Muslims and Greeks on the
philosophical level simply because Muslims needed to learn the
discursive method of the Greek philosophers in order to defend, in
a rational manner, the tenets of the faith. The two cultures
differed profoundly, which made the dialogue both necessary and
fruitful. This was necessary, since the perspective of one culture
(Greek) was intellectually stimulating, and it was fruitful since
it was through this philosophical dialogue that Muslim
philosophers were able to adopt the Greek worldview and
reinterpret it within the Islamic religious universe.
As
examples of this dialogue, we can mention such figures as al
Farabi, Ibn Sina, al Ghazzali, and Suhrawardi, each of whom
confronted the Greek challenge in a different way. Al Farabi, the
founder of logic in the tradition of Islamic philosophy,
elaborated on Aristotle's logic on the one hand and adopted the
neo-Platonic schemes and Plato's concept of archetypes on the
other. This allowed him to engage the Greek philosophical
tradition in a dialogue and yet to Islamicize that tradition. Ibn
Sina, the grand synthesizer, effectively brought together Plato,
Aristotle, and neo-Platonic ideas as well as al Farabi into a
single coherent paradigm. The coherency, consistency and the depth
of Ibn Sina's engagement with Greek philosophy was such that it
became a turning point in the history of Islamic philosophy.
Much can be said about Ibn Sina and his encounter with the Greeks
and other intellectual ideas, but this is beyond the scope of this
work. Suffice it to say that Ibn Sina and the Greeks had a common
language, objectives, and concerns and therefore operated in the
same intellectual universe, although there were major differences
between them. This point is of great significance in our
discussion of a Muslim-Christian dialogue.
Following Ibn Sina, the Muslim philosopher who epitomizes
ecumenical dialogue between the Islamic intellectual tradition and
that of other traditions, such as the Zoroastrian, neo-Platonic,
Greek, and Pythagorean, is none other than Shihab al Din
Suhrawardi. To prove that the inner dimension of all divinely
revealed religions is sacred and a manifestation of the divine,
Suhrawardi synthesized various elements of the above-mentioned
traditions: He adopted Aristotelian logic (which he nevertheless
criticized), Plato's theory of archetypes, elements from the
Pythagoreans, Ibn Sina's ontological hierarchy (which he
modified), and various elements from other traditions.
Suhrawardi's vast synthesis of philosophical and mystical elements
resulted in the formation of a new philosophical paradigm that is
both profoundly Islamic and ecumenical in nature. What allowed him
to borrow and synthesize philosophical concepts from other
traditions was that he felt at home with the spiritual and
intellectual message of these other schools of thought and
religious traditions.
Let
us now proceed and consider later medieval Christian philosophy in
order to examine the extent to which Islamic and Christian
philosophers have influenced each other. St. Thomas Aquinas
presents a perfect picture of a philosopher whose works are not
only influenced by Greek philosophy but also by Islamic
philosophy. He learned much from al Farabi's logical treatise and
borrowed much of Ibn Sina's ontological scheme. His Summa
Theologica bears the influence and the impact of Islamic
philosophy upon him, although he expressed repeatedly that he
detested Islam as a religion. With the influence of Islamic
philosophical thought on much of Aquinas's writings, the picture
that emerges is that of a person who, despite vast religious
differences with Islam nevertheless shared with it a sacred
universe and a common language. Thus, he was able to use the
findings of such a religious adversary as Ibn Sina. To this
equation, one can even add Moses Maimonides, who
shared this sacred worldview and language, as his writings bear
testament.
A brief glance at the history of medieval intellectual thought
reveals an ecumenical dialogue between East and West that
communicated with each other because they shared a common
language. It is precisely this common language that allowed two
distinct traditions to communicate with one another.
The
common sacred language and universe of the Islamic-Christian
religious universe broke down following the end of the medieval
period in Europe. With the Reformation and the Renaissance, Europe
marginalized religion and thereby determined the social direction
toward which Europe would begin its intellectual journey. With the
Renaissance, Europe ended its common language with Islam and
thereafter made a concerted effort to shift the focus of its
civilization from theos to anthropos. This shift was a return to
the Greek intellectual world in which man is the only measure of
things, and thus the West began to criticize itself through Greek
eyes. What is noteworthy and apparent in this deconstructionist
effort of the Enlightenment is the reliance on the humanistic
secularism of the Greeks. This time, however, it was not used to
construct a dialogue between Greek thought and the Christian
worldview, but rather to "deconstruct," "demythologize,"
"de-mystify," and, finally, to destroy Christianity.
Following the Renaissance, the West chose a different intellectual
paradigm. It also changed the language with which it had
communicated with other civilizations as well as with its own
past. The changing of a common language between this secular and
newly converted West and other civilizations that had retained God
as the center of its universe resulted in the end of
communication. Perhaps nowhere was the impact of this profound
change more drastic than on Islamic civilization, which remained
staunchly theocentric. It is a symbolic coincidence that René
Descartes, the father of modern Western philosophy who introduced
the notion of "doubting anything that can be doubted," is a
contemporary of the grand metaphysician of Islam, Sadr al Din
Shirazi (Mulla Sadra), who advocated the attainment of certainty
through intellectual intuition.
It
would not be unreasonable to say that since the Renaissance, Islam
and the West have found no common language with which to
communicate. Even throughout the medieval period, which often
symbolizes the conflicts between Islam and Christianity, a
traditional Muslim and a Christian would have found very little
about which to disagree, particularly regarding moral rights and
wrongs. In the post-Renaissance era, however, Muslims and
Westerners find very little to agree upon, a condition that has
produced a great deal of tension, as noted by S. Huntington in his
article "The Clash of Civilizations.
This brings us to a problem that we face in our contemporary
attempts to have an ecumenical dialogue with the West, in general,
and the Christian West, in particular. The West has a greater
degree of tolerance for accepting "the other" precisely because it
has undergone the experiences of Reformation and Renaissance. Such
a metamorphosis has made the West value-free and therefore more
accepting of the new "isms" than the Islamic Weltanschaaung, which
is divided strictly along the sacred and the profane. How can the
Islamic world, which has gone in a different direction during the
last four centuries, communicate with the modern West, which has
abandoned the sacred and thereby eliminated that which was held in
common? In fact, the modern secular West is not any more capable
of having a discourse with its own fundamentalists and defenders
of God than it is of having a discourse with Muslims.
An objection that is often raised
to such a thesis cites the nonmonolithic nature of Western
societies as evidence. The United States, in particular, has one
of the highest rates of church attendance, and the "moral
majority" is alive and well. While it is true that there are
practicing Christians in the West, one can question the intention
and the purpose of a dialogue among those who, esentially, are in
agreement and share a common set of moral principles. One motive
for such a dialogue is to arrive at a theological middle ground.
In fact, the theological differences between Christianity and
Islam are insoluble, and any attempt to bridge the gap becomes an
attempt at conversion. The other motive for a dialogue with the
Christian West would be for its utility, namely, world peace. Such
noble concepts as peace and tranquillity are sufficiently
meritorious in themselves that one can, and should, do everything
possible to actualize them. If, however, the understanding of one
another and world peace is facilitated by an understanding of one
another's faith, then such a dialogue is prudent and should be
pursued.
The
real dialogue, however, which is essential if Muslims are to
function in the contemporary world, is with modernity and the
culture it has engendered. By and large, Christianity has embraced
modernity and, to a great extent, has adopted its dictums, whereas
Islam remains defiant with respect to modernity and refuses to
accept it. This defiance of modernity should not be mistaken with
the rejection of technology; it is a rejections of the culture
that comes with modernity.
A
dialogue between Islam and the modern world is indeed a short one.
Part of this brevity has to do with Islam's rejection of modernity
as evil and decadent. The fact that Islam has a strong legal side
and that the Shari'ah defines the permissibility and the limits of
human activity leaves no room for a gray area in which a dialogue
can occur. To elaborate further on the nature of a dialogue
between traditional Islam and the modern world, let us consider a
hypothetical conversation between a traditional Muslim (M)
and a secular Westerner (W):
W: What do you think about the
West?
M: The West is morally corrupt,
decadent, and the culture of "sex, drugs, and rock and roll" that
it advocates is demonic.
W: What do you think about
democracy?
M: Democracy, in the sense of
allowing individuals to be free so they can be decadent, is not
allowed in Islam.
W: What about the inalienable
right of individuals, such as the right to choose one's lifestyle,
how to dress, and so on?
M: God, through the Shari'ah, has
determined the limits of such rights. In Islam, all rights belong
to God.
W: Are boys and girls allowed to
mingle?
M: No, the shari'ah does not allow
this.
W: Are homosexuals allowed to
adhere to their sexual orientation?
M: No, according to the Shari'ah
they should be put to death.
C: What are your views on media and
what they broadcast?
M: The media should only broadcast
what is consistent with the Shariah.
End of discussion between traditional Islam and the modern West!
For a Muslim, the Shari'ah has determined right from wrong and
true from false. Therefore, there is no room for a discourse with
a world that thrives on change, holds the view that "anything
goes," and argues for relativity in various domains, especially as
regards ethics and epistemology. Islam and the modern West neither
share a common worldview nor adhere to the same norms; therefore,
the possibility of a meaningful dialogue between them does not
exist. This presents us with a complex situation that is of the
utmost significance if Muslims, in general, and those living in
the West are to survive and not live marginally on the fringes of
society.
The
absence of a common language through which Muslims can understand
and be understood by the West has manifested itself in the rise of
two different groups of Muslims. There are those who, because of
the existing problems, reject "the West" entirely and, as a
reaction to it, stand at opposite pole. These "born-again
Muslims," to borrow a term from Christianity (whom the media calls
"fundamentalists"), are an alien and new concept in Islam. The
moral chaos in the West so frightens them that they consider the
Shari'ah to be the absolute and perennial law of Islam. From this
comes a total rejection of modernity, which replaces "truth" with
"truths" and produces hostility to the West as a civilization
within which modernity harbors and prospers.
The
second group of Muslims are those who become conformists and
integrate fully into the mainstream Western lifestyle. This group
is convinced that religion is a thing of the past, is inconsistent
with reason and rationality, and is a cause for embarrassment
among the more educated and academically oriented people.
Certainly, mainline academics view persons with truly religious
convictions as a species whose survival defies evolution! This
group of Muslims embraces the West and the culture of modernity
with open arms, as a substitute for religious despotism, and
considers Promethean freedom to be possible only in the death of
the sacred.
Neither the first nor the second group is interested in a dialogue
with the West. The central question for Muslims in the beginning
of the third millennium is how should a third group, one that is
interested in preserving its religious heritage and yet remaining
part of modern society, live? What should the intellectual
foundations of this group be? What is to be tolerated, and how can
the Shari'ah be reinterpreted to make it possible for the
emergence of Muslims who can function in a modern setting? To this
end, jurists (fuqaha') bear most of the responsibility, for their
extensive use and reliance upon ijtihad can provide the tools with
which Muslims can cope and come to terms with modernity. The
search for a niche within which Muslims can take refuge and stay
unaffected by the modern world has failed. As those who have tried
to create various versions of an Islamic state have found out,
modernity is not a passive phenomenon; on the contrary, it is
aggressive and challenges traditional values.
A
middle ground must be found, one where Muslims, in general, and
Muslims living in the West, in particular, can remain within the
pale of Islam and come to terms with modernity. Otherwise, we will
suffer the same fate as our medieval ancestors did in
Andalusia-conversion or expulsion. This time, however, we are not
asked to convert to Christianity but to modernity and secularism,
and there is nowhere to be expelled to where modernity does not
exist
Mehdi Aminrazavai is assistant professor of philosophy and
religion in the Department of Classics, Philosophy, and Religion
at Mary Washington College, Fredricksburg, VA.
Footnotes
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1
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I will confine this discussion to Sunni Islamic
thought. Shi'i Muslims, some 12-15 percent of the world's
Muslim population, maintain a different theory.
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