Introduction
Myths shattered
The
Maharashtra government’s ‘Memo-randum of Action to be Taken (ATR) by
government’ in response to the report of the Srikrishna Commission of Inquiry,
reiterates the familiar Hindutvawaadi version of the factors responsible for the
riots:
“Mumbai
is the economic and commercial capital of the country and hence inimical forces
were at work, both inside (read Muslims) and outside (read Pakistan’s ISI) the
country, had planned to destroy the economic base of the country by fomenting
trouble (December 1992 and January 1993 riots). This line of reasoning is amply
borne out by the subsequent events of March 1993”. (Pg. 243, para25)
“Anti–national
Muslim forces, within and outside the country, instigated these communal riots,
continued them for a long period and carried out serial bomb blasts on March 12,
1993”. (Pg.242, para 18)
“A
series of stabbings (in January 1993) and these two incidents (the killing of
Mathadi workers on January and the burning to death of a Hindu family in
Radhabai Chawl in Jogeshwari on January 8, 1993) worried the Hindus about their
future and a spontaneous reaction for self–protection followed.” (Pg. 242,
para20)
The
ATR has been submitted by a government led by a party several of whose top
leaders — including the party chief, Bal Thackeray and Chief Minister, Manohar
Joshi — and a large number of whose workers have been indicted for their role
in the violence. It is hardly surprising then that the ATR engages in a
perversion of discourse that is typical of the Shiv Sena — no evidence to
substantiate the prevarications. In keeping with this party’s utter contempt
and disregard for constitutional authority and the judiciary, there is not even
a token attempt to deal with the series of serious cases and instances
enumerated in the report. Instead of applying itself to the issue by issue
findings of the Judge, the ATR merely reiterates the series of generalisations
that the Shiv Sena and Hindutva combine always use to cloud their criminal acts,
generalisations for which neither the party nor the state could offer any
worthwhile evidence before the Commission of Inquiry.
A
significant contribution of the Justice Srikrishna Commission report is that it
debunks the unsubstantiated theory peddled by the Sena–BJP–RSS
combine — and conveniently accepted by the then Congress government and the
administration — that the Mumbai riots in December 1992–January 1993 and the
serial bomb blasts in March 1993 were part of a common design and were the
result of a Pakistan–inspired ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) conspiracy to
de–stabilise India.
This
argument has been used repeatedly to justify acts of venom and violence
unleashed by Sena leaders and their cadres on sections of Bombay’s minorities
on the ground that they were carried out in self–defence and were
“retaliatory” in character. Soon after the violence of December
1992–January 1993, Gopinath Munde, then leader of the Opposition in the state
assembly, and presently the deputy chief minister of Maharashtra (BJP) had
alleged that it was the areas infested by the ‘infiltrators’ from Bangladesh
and Pakistan (read Muslim–dominated areas) that had provoked the violence in
Mumbai. This theory has been conclusively exposed as malicious by the Commission
of Inquiry since no witness, including the Shiv Sena Member of Parliament,
Madhukar Sarpotdar, was able to provide any evidence to substantiate this
spurious version. (Pg. 165, para 21.42). As to how widely prevalent this theory
was is evident from the fact that even the then Governor of Maharashtra, C.
Subramanium, had made an entirely unsubstantiated statement alleging a foreign
hand behind the riots. (Pg. 220, para 1.21 & Pg.222, para 2.13).
In
Chapter VI, Volume 1 of the report that deals with this issue, Justice
Srikrishna has concluded that a causative link is in evidence between the two
riots and the bomb blasts: “Tiger Memon, the key figure in the serial bomb
blasts case, and his family had suffered extensively during the riots and
therefore can be said to have deep–rooted motives for revenge. It would appear
that one of his trusted accomplices, Javed Dawood Tailor alias Javed Chikna, had
also suffered a bullet injury during the riots and therefore he also had a
motive for revenge”.
The
Judge adds: “Apart from these two specific cases, there was a large, amorphous
body of angry, frustrated and desperate Muslims keen to seek revenge for the
perceived injustice done to and atrocities perpetrated on them or to others of
their community and it is this sense of revenge which spawned the conspiracy of
the serial bomb blasts. This body of angry, frustrated and desperate Muslims
provided the material upon which the anti–national and criminal elements
succeeded in building up their conspiracy for the serial bomb blasts.” (Pg.
45, Term No.VII, para iii).
After
the terms of reference of the Srikrishna Commission were expanded to investigate
the “common design” between the riots of 1992–1993 and the serial bomb
blasts of 1993, the Commission by an order dated January 22, 1997 directed the
government of Maharashtra to disclose the material available before it in this
context. By an affidavit of the Additional Chief Secretary (Home) dated February
5, 1997, the Commission was informed that all the material in the possession of
the government on this issue had already been disclosed in the affidavits of
former Mumbai Police Commissioner, Amarjit Singh Samra, former Additional
Commi-ssioner, Mumbai, Vasant Narsingrao Deshmukh, head of investigators, CBI,
Mahesh Narain Singh, former Mumbai Police Commissioner, Satish Sahney and two
other police officers.
The
deposition of Srikant Bapat — Police Commissioner of Mumbai during the riots
of December 1992–January 1993 who has been directly and indirectly implicated
for his inability in firmly putting down the violence — has been
systematically examined and dissected by the Judge, especially with relation to
his reluctance both in his affidavit and in court to dub the Shiv Sena as a
communal organisation. This officer was also specifically examined by the
Commission on the issue of an ISI
hand in the two riots. According to his affidavit on oath, the ISI was a factor
that contributed to the violence.
However,
while in the witness box, Bapat could give no evidence to show that the
disturbances which took place on December 6, 1992 “was the result of a
tactical plan executed by the ISI, nor was there any material to show that the
ISI was responsible for the disturbances in January 1993. All that Bapat has
been able to say, in the true fashion of a trained intelligence officer, is that
the de–stabilising activities of the ISI were going on for quite some time,
but there was no material elicited from the interrogation of the accused in the
riot–related cases to establish a link between such cases and ISI agents or
destabilisers.” (Pg. 197, para2.10).
In
this context, the evidence of then Additional Commissioner, Mumbai, V.N.
Deshmukh bears mention. This
officer gave a singularly courageous testimony that has not only exposed the
Sena–BJP combine after it came to power but has candidly admitted to a growing
anti–Muslim bias in the Mumbai police force. When examined by the Commission
on the ISI and its role, Deshmukh stated that there was “no material to
suggest that Pakistani elements were supplying arms and ammunition to Muslims in
Bombay to engineer communal riots in December 1992 and January 1993, though a
general intelligence input was given by the ministry of Home Affairs, Government
of India, that a band of commandos were likely to infiltrate into India to
avenge the demolition of the Babri Masjid”. But,
Deshmukh, “had not come across any information from any of the police
stations that they had been able to identify such commandos amongst the accused
rounded up preventively or in substantive offences, nor had he come across
material suggesting that any of the accused had been motivated by Pakistani
elements”. (Pg. 200, para 4.2).
The
Commission also issued a public notice in newspapers calling upon all members of
the public to disclose on affidavit any information that they may have in
connection with this term of reference. The only affidavit filed in response to
this notice was one filed by Prabhakar V. Pradhan dated August 2,1995. No
further evidence in support of this “common design” theory, repeatedly
peddled by the Sena and its partners, was forwarded before the Commission.
Neither the Sena, nor the police, nor any other section of government or the
public has been able to convincingly substantiate this theory.
The
Judge, while commenting on this affidavit says that the affidavit filed by
Prabhakar V. Pradhan “appears to be based on rumours and does not really
indicate any concrete material which would be of use to the Commission. All that
he says is that he had casually bumped into someone who claimed that the serial
bomb blasts were the handiwork of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of USA and
not the outcome of revenge of Muslims because of the demolition of the Babri
Masjid or the riots of December 1992–January 1993”.
“The
Commission feels that the contents of the affidavit appear to be sheerly
speculative.”(Pg. 43, Term No.VI, para–i).
No
further evidence was led by the proponents of the Pakistan–ISI
mega–conspiracy theory to substantiate it. The evidence of senior police
officers doesn’t provide further insight. Neither the earlier Congress(I)
government, nor the Shiv Sena either as a party or as the senior partner in
government since March 1995, has been able to offer the Commission any proof of
allegations of an ISI–inspired mega–conspiracy. Enough time was provided by
the Commission to furnish any evidence that may have existed. The solitary
affidavit submitted from advocate Prabhakar Pradhan has been debunked by Justice
Srikrishna on the grounds that it is based on hearsay. Yet, in the ATR, the
government reiterates the role of the ISI of Pakistan in instigating the riots
and cites “increasing fundamentalism” as a cause of the riots. This is in
keeping with the sustained policy of communal organisations to peddle theories
that cannot be substantiated through either intelligence reports or other
evidence. The Judge has clearly ruled against the state’s version of a
conspiracy theory while remarking on the causative link
— embittered Muslims seeking revenge — between the December 1992 and
January 1993 violence and the serial bomb blasts. The ATR twists this
observation of the Commission to claim that the Judge has accepted the
conspiracy theory and common design. (Pg.
247).
The
importance of Justice Srikrishna’s report however, goes far beyond debunking
the ISI–conspiracy theory. The report details how, nationwide and in Mumbai
particularly, the Shiv Sena–RSS–BJP combine kept the atmosphere on the boil
through provocative and incendiary speeches from July 1992 onwards in
preparation for the demolition in Ayodhya on December 6, 1992. Following these
preparations, it was Hindus led by the Shiv Sena who first came out on the
streets on December 6, 1992 to celebrate their “victory”. During the
processions and celebrations, provocative and threatening anti–Muslim slogans
were shouted. The Mumbai police allowed this to happen before, on and after
December 6, 1992 unchecked.
This
is the second element of consistent distortion, surrounding communal discourse
in general and the Mumbai riots in particular that the report exposes. The
report thoroughly investigates,
documents and thereafter passes judicial comment upon the manner in which
communal sentiments were kept on
the boil by the BJP and its allies in the sangh parivar for six months prior to
the demolition of the mosque at Ayodhya on December 6, 1992.
At
the national level, BJP leader L.K. Advani, and his rath yatra that left a trail
of bloody riots in its wake all over India, is held responsible by the Judge for
the divisive and polarised atmosphere. (Pg. 4, para 2.3).
Within
Mumbai, it was the local leaders of the saffron combine who from July 1992 to
December 1992, systematically held street and community–level meets whose sole
aim was to spit venom and ire against the Muslim community while the ostensible
campaign was the building of a Ram temple at Ayodhya. (Pg. 4, para 2.4). An
indifferent government and an equally callous administration failed to act
decisively to prevent these attempts at deliberate and systematic provocation.
In
both Chapter I and Chapter II, Volume I of the report, the Judge elucidates how
particularly from July 1992 onwards these obviously political campaigns were
charged by slogans like, “Is desh me rahana hoga, to Vande Mataram bolna hoga”.
Frequently, Ram Paduka proces-sions and Ghantanaad ceremonies (mobilisation
rallies and victory celebrations) were used by Hindutvawaadi parties to polarise
sections of the Hindu community on the issue. In both these sections, the report
has also commented in some detail on the communal activities by Muslim
organisations in response to the Ramjanmabhoomi movement that vitiated the
atmosphere further. In this context the Student’s Islamic Movement of India
(SIMI) and the Bombay Muslim Action Committee have been mentioned. ( Pg. 8, para
1.2–i).
V.N.
Deshmukh’s evidence offers a senior police officer’s perspective on the
communal tension that surrounded the kar seva. Deshmukh admitted that “from
the day kar seva in Ayodhya was announced, though the police were expecting
trouble, they had no idea as to the exact nature of the trouble. From July 1992
there was an undercurrent leading to communal tension on account of several
activities being organised to propagate the rival views on the Babri Masjid–Ram
Janmabhoomi dispute”. (Pg. 200, para 4.3).
In
several of the religious activities organised by the Bharatiya Janata Party
and Shiv Sena, even long before December 6, 1992, slogans like “Garv se
kaho hum Hindu hain” and “Hindustan Hinduonka, nahi kisike baap ka”
were shouted and saffron and green flags were displayed prominently at
different places. Deshmukh also stated that during this period of July to
November 1992, “some of the speeches made by the leaders of Shiv Sena in
public meetings which were well attended, particularly by young people, were
abusive towards Muslims”. (Pg. 200, para 4.3).
This
understanding of the motives and functioning of communal parties and
organisations is particularly critical given the historical specificity and
timing of the report. Not only does the party held responsible for igniting the
communal cauldron nationwide head a coalition government at the Centre, the
Union Home Minister, L.K. Advani, has been named as an agent provocateur by the
Judge (Pg 4, para 2.3). Locally, units of the Sena, BJP, VHP and Bajrang Dal do
not escape the Judge’s censure. Sena chief, Bal Thackeray, and MP Madhukar
Sarpotdar, apart from middle–rung Sena leaders stand similarly indicted.
The
image of angry and violent Muslims inviting state wrath after December 6, 1992
has been fairly deeply ingrained in the psyche of a section of Mumbaiites. In
the section that deals with the causes behind the two phases of riots, the
report says that as far as the first phase in December is concerned, the
immediate causes were, “the demolition of the Babri Masjid”, “the
aggravation of Muslim sentiments by the Hindus with their celebration rallies”
and, “the insensitive and harsh approach of the police while handling the
protesting mobs which initially were not violent”. (Pg. 20, para 1.26)
But
at 2.30 p.m. on December 6, 1992, the first communal incident that took place in
Mumbai after the demolition of the mosque at Ayodhya was in Dharavi, where it
was not angry Muslims but rampaging Shiv Sainiks led by Sena leaders Baburao
Mane and Ramkrishna Keni who caused the first provocation. The local police
allowed Shiv Sainiks to conduct a cycle rally of 200–300 persons. The rally
passed through several communally–sensitive, Muslim–dominated areas in
Dharavi and terminated at Kala Killa, where a meeting was held and addressed by
the local activists of the Shiv Sena. Provocative speeches were made at this
meeting. (Pgs. 7, 94 & 197)
Besides,
Dharavi was kept simmering by the local wings of both the Bharatiya Janata Party
and the Shiv Sena through Ram Paduka Poojan Karyakrams and chowk sabhas between
July and December 1992. Two Muslim organisations, the Tanzeem–Allah–o–Akbar
and the Dalit–Muslim Suraksha Sangh, also organised meetings in the period of
the run–up to the kar seva.
The
speeches made by Hindutvawaadi speakers at one particular meeting held in
Dharavi on October 18, 1992 have been held by the Judge to be “communally
provocative in their militant exhortation to Hindus that they were insecure at
the hands of outsiders (Muslims). The police appear to have condoned it on the
ground that there was nothing objectionable in those speeches per se as no
problem of law and order entailed”.
“A
pamphlet was circulated in Tamil on October 12, 1992 in which it was emphasised
that Muslims had an ancestry of invaders who had come to this country with the
sole purpose of plundering it and expanding their religious interests. Neither
the local police nor the SB–I, CID seems to have taken such things
seriously”. (Pg 92, para 10.5)
The
ATR has dismissed the first communal incident that took place in Dharavi saying
that “the said rally was not to celebrate the demolition of the Babri mosque
but a pre–scheduled rally for construction of Ram temple” without addressing
the findings in the report of the criminal actions undertaken during this rally.
The fact that such mobilisations were used as occasions to spit venom and raise
provocative slogans against the Muslim minority as documented by the report in
the sections referred to above, in which the Shiv Sena, BJP, RSS, VHP and
Bajrang Dal actively participated, have escaped any comment by the state
government. (Pg. 240)
A
detailed reading of Volume II of the report reveals important instances about
similarly provocative rallies, meets and processions held in various parts of
Mumbai on December 6, 1992 by the saffron combine after the demolition at
Ayodhya. Given the surcharged atmosphere, these were nothing short of
provocative. The police administration and the state government committed a
fatal error by failing to act decisively against the organisers even at this
late stage.
To
cite a few of these instances:
Byculla:
Between
August and December 1992, constant programmes of Ram Paduka Poojans and
Ghantanaad ceremonies were organised by the BJP and the VHP to focus attention
of Hindus on the Ramjanma-bhoomi issue. (Pg. 67, para 5.33).
Dongri
: Not just a communally sensitive area but also a part of south Mumbai,
notorious for housing sections of the underworld. Dongri saw a Lalkar Ghantanaad
Karyakaram organised by the VHP on December 6, 1992. Preceded by a chowk sabha
organised by the VHP a day earlier. This “victory celebration” was also not
dispersed by the Senior Inspector of Police. The reason he gave the Commission
for his conduct was that it was a religious procession exempted from the order
banning assembly and processions. (Pgs. 106–107).
Jogeshwari:
A communally–sensitive zone in north Mumbai. The period between October to
December 1992 saw hectic activities on the part of both communally–mobilised
Hindus and Muslims, extolling their respective points of view on the
Ramjanmabhoomi movement. Many activities like Ram Paduka processions and corner
meetings, organised by the BJP, VHP and the Bajrang Dal, were held appealing to
Hindus to participate in the kar seva at Ayodhya. A victory ghantanaad ceremony
was also held here on December 6, 1992. (Pg. 125, para 14.4).
Pydhonie:
A section of south Mumbai that has a strong element of the both Hindu communal
parties and the Muslim League. Between July–December 1992, Hindutva-waadi
parties like the Bharatiya Janata Party, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), Bajrang
Dal and Shiv Sena stepped up their campaign in support of the construction of a
Ram temple at the spot where the Babri Masjid stood. Though the police
maintained that the peace in the area was very fragile, it appeared to have
moved no muscle to prevent such activities on the facile ground that these were
harmless “religious activities”. In one such activitiy, organised on 23rd
October 1992, a Shri Ram Paduka procession was taken out by the VHP. Dnyaneshwar
Thorat of VHP and the local Shiv Sena Shakha Pramukh Hemant Koli and others
accompanied the procession which wended its way through Muslim–dominated
areas. At its termination a speech was given by one Praful Desai during the
course of which he emphasised that the procession was not “a shobha yatra”
but was intended to bring out the Ram which was concealed in the minds of the
people and Ramdrohis should not be allowed to go alive. “No action appears to
have been taken by the police in respect of the speech delivered by Praful
Desai. There cannot be any doubt that the said speech was communally
provocative, the implication being that people who obstructed the construction
of a Ram temple at Ayodhya were Ramdrohis and, therefore, they should not be
allowed to live. (Pg. 171, para 23.5).
The
ATR is completely silent on this incident and similar actions of certain sections that include the Shiv Sena, BJP,
Bajrang Dal and VHP in leading provocative mobilisations prior to December 6,
1992 that contributed to a heightening of communal temper all over Mumbai.
“The
police appear to be either naive, gullible or partisan in ignoring the dangerous
implications of speeches of this kind. That this kind of propaganda was carried
out from July to October 1992 is not in dispute. It is obvious that the
atmosphere in the Pydhonie area became communally charged on account of the
continuous barrage of propagandist processions, meetings, speeches and other
activities of the Hindutvawaadi parties. This resulted in the atmosphere being
so charged that it needed but a spark to ignite and explode”. (Pg.171–172,
para 23.5).
R.A.K. Marg: In central Mumbai, this area that experienced brutal violence in both December 1992 and January 1993 had also been held to ransom by communally proactive elements led by the BJP and VHP. Right from July that year they held repeated Ram Paduka programmes, corner sabhas, cycle rallies. Even on December 6, 1992 a ghantanaad ceremony was held to celebrate the demolition of the mosque. (Pg. 177, para 24.7).
Myth
of the Hindu backlash
The
third malicious element of commu-nal propaganda visible in Mumbai during
the relevant period has been the theory of “a Hindu backlash in retaliation”
in response to heinous acts against Hindus, like the burning alive of a family
in a Jogeshwari slum (Radhabai Chawl incident) preceded by the murder of Mathadi
workers (also see later sections). This theory of
“Hindu retaliation”, led by “Hinduhriday-samrat”
Bal Thackeray, that gained wide sway and currency during and after the violence
in Mumbai is rooted in Hindu communal discourse of yore. An examination of all
judicial Commission reports in post–Independence India since the first major
riot in Jabalpur in 1961, shows that the perverted discourse around “Who cast
the first stone?” has been maliciously used by Hindu communal organisations
— be it the RSS, Jana Sangh, the Sena or the BJP — to justify their
blatantly aggressive acts. In every communal riot situation, this discourse
points to violent acts of Muslims as being the flashpoint for that violence.
This selective discourse conceals the systematic and deliberate provocation of
the minority community —
through hate–writing, provocative slogans and incendiary and insulting
allegations for weeks and sometimes even months preceding the outbreak of
violence.
The
reason why the spurious theory of a “backlash” gained such wide currency
during Mumbai riots was simply because even a Congress(I) Chief Minister,
Sudhakarrao Naik and Mumbai Police Commissioner, Srikant Bapat, bought this
theory and responded to the violence based not on an appreciation of the ground
reality but on a deliberately misinterpreted representation of events.
Justice
Srikrishna, commenting on the second phase of riots in January 1993,
categorically rejects that it was merely a backlash of the Hindus because
of the cases of stabbing, the murder of Mathadi workers and the Radhabai Chawl
incident. He observes: “The events which took place between the period 12th
December 1992 and 5th January 1993 indicate that there were attacks going on
against the Muslims and their properties in different areas”. (Pg. 20,
para 1.27–ii).
l
On
December 20, 1993, two Muslims were locked in a room and the room set alight
within the Goregaon jurisdiction; due to the severe burns suffered one of the
victims died.
l
On
the night of December 24–25, 1992 one Mathadi worker was killed; though
subsequent police investigations revealed the identity of the criminal to be an
alchoholic, the communal atmosphere and communal outfits interpreted that the
killing was done by a Muslim.
l
The Mahaartis launched by the
Sena-BJP combine from December 26, 1992 added to the communal tension,
endangering the fragile peace which had been established. Some of the Mahaartis
were later used as occasions for delivering communally–inciting speeches; the
crowds dispersing from the Mahaartis indulging in damage, looting and arson of
Muslim establishments on the way. The Mahaartis continued unabated with no
restriction on them being imposed by the police throughout January 1993 and came
to an end only by the first week of February 1993.
l
There were also several stabbing incidents carried out by professional criminals
in different areas of the city, with the intention of whipping up communal
frenzy, in which the majority of the victims happened to be Hindus The stabbings
appeared to be executed with professional accuracy intended to kill the victims.
The killers had not been then identified in several cases, though it was
presumed, at least in the cases where the Hindus were victims, that the killers
were Muslims. The motive for the stabbings appears to have been to whip up
communal frenzy between Hindus and Muslims. Some of the Muslim criminal elements
operating in South Bombay, like Salim Rampuri and Firoz Konkani, have been
identified as the brains behind the stabbing incidents. That they were criminals
was underplayed by Hindus; that they were Muslims was all that mattered, and a
cry went up that the Muslims were bent upon a second round of riots.
l
On January 1, 1993, an article appeared in the Shiv Sena organ edited by
Bal Thackeray, Saamna, under the heading “Hindunni Akramak Vhayala Have”
(Hindus must become aggressors), openly inciting Hindus to violence.
l
On January 2, 1993 a number of Muslim hutments in M.P. Mill compound
within the Tardeo jurisdiction of south Mumbai were set on fire. On the same
day, there was an incident in Dharavi where two Muslims were assaulted with iron
rods.
l
On January 3, 1993 there was an attack on a Muslim in Dharavi
jurisdiction with a knife. On the same day, several persons claiming to be
officials of MHADA, and alleged to be Shiv Sainiks, went around Pratiksha Nagar
in Antop Hill jurisdiction surveying the residences of Muslims there.
l
On January 4, 1993 a big mob of Hindus, led by Shri Gajanan Kirtikar,
Shri Ramesh More and other Shiv Sena activists, took a morcha to the Jogeshwari
Police Station complaining of lack of security for Hindus. Some of the people in
the morcha attacked Chacha Nagar Masjid and the Muslims in the vicinity and
injured them. Several Muslim huts in Magdum Nagar in Mahim jurisdiction were set
on fire by Hindus.
l
On the night of January 5, 1993 a Mathadi worker employed in the godown
of Vijay Transport Company who was sleeping in the godown went to the street to
relieve himself. Suddenly, he was set upon by miscreants who stabbed him to
death. Three more Mathadi workers who came out of the godown to help him were
also stabbed to death. The murders of the Mathadi workers created tremendous
tension in the area. The Mathadi Workers’ Union called for a bandh. Huge
meetings were held which were addressed by leaders of Mathadi Unions. Speeches
were made during this meeting to condemn the police and Government for their
ineffectiveness with exhortations that Hindus might have to pick up swords to
defend themselves if the police failed to protect them. At the time when these
murders of Mathadi workers took place, neither the police, nor the public, had a
clue as to the identity of the killers, which came to be established much later.
Nonetheless, the Hindus spearheaded by the Shiv Sena kicked up a furore that the
murders had been committed by Muslims, virtually giving a call for arms. On
January 5 –6, 1993 the Mathadi workers gave a call for bandh of wholesale
markets, which also gave immense publicity to the murders of the Mathadis,
allegedly by Muslims.
l
On January 6, 1993, the
situation in Mahim went out of control at 9 p.m. Hindus attacked Muslims in
Muslim pockets in Mahim area led by Shiv Sena Corporator, Milind Vaidya, and a
police constable, Sanjay Gawade, openly carrying a sword. There were serious
riots in which frenzied mobs of Hindus and Muslims attacked each other.
Which
incident among the list of horrors listed above was worse than the other? Should
the Radhabai Chawl incident be elevated to a special category? The only thing
that can be said for such selective projections that elevate one tragedy above
others and relegate others to mere statistic is that it is poor comment indeed
on the times that we live in. When the injury to a victim is measured by whether
he/she is Hindu or Muslim and the veracities of testimonies are similarly upheld
or dismissed.
Commenting
on Bapat’s affidavit and testimony, the Judge remarks: “Even the state
government and the police were sold on the theory that the Hindu backlash came
on account of the said gruesome incidents. Though Bapat has been quick to point
out these incidents in his affidavit, he claimed total ignorance with regard to
several equally gruesome incidents in which Muslims were victims, which were put
to him in his cross–examination.” (Pg. 197, Para 2.14).
“For
example, he seemed either not to recollect, or be unaware, of the arson of a
timber mart in Ghatkopar jurisdiction on December 15, 1992 resulting in four
Muslims being burnt alive, an arson in Goregaon jurisdiction on December 20,
1992 in which one of the Muslims was burnt and killed, of the attack on Muslim
hutments in M.P. Mill compound on January 2,1993 and large–scale arson of
Muslim hutments on January 4, 1993
in Mahim jurisdiction and the morcha led by Shiv Sena leaders Shri Ramesh More
and Shri Gajanan Kirtikar to Jogeshwari police station, en route causing havoc
in Chacha Nagar and damaging the Chacha Nagar Masjid, of the arson of a taxi
carrying two Muslims which was burnt causing their death on January
7,1993 in Antop Hill jurisdiction and the Devipada incident of January
12, 1994 in which two Muslim ladies were stripped naked and attacked by a mob
and one lady and her uncle were murdered and burnt.” (Pg. 197, para 2.14).
The
Judge further observes: “There is legitimate grievance made by the Muslims
that the memory and information of Shri Bapat is either selective or that he had
been selectively fed with only such material to be placed before the Commission
as would suit a particular theory being advanced by the State Government and the
police. Bapat also claimed not to know that Shiv Sainiks under the leadership of
local Shiv Sena leaders Baburao Mane and Ramkrishna Keni had taken out a
celebration cycle rally in Dharavi jurisdictional area (on December 6, 1992)
which went around the Muslim areas shouting abusive and provoking slogans
during which a stone was thrown at a local Mosque, though he claimed that, if
such an incident had happened and reported to him, he would have certainly shown
it as the first in the series of incidents referred to in paragraph 42 of his
affidavit. Despite the material on record in the concerned case (C.R.No.718 of
1992) showing clearly that the celebration rally/procession had been organised
by Shiv Sena, to deny, as Bapat did, the role of Shiv Sena in the riots, is
ignoring the obvious.” (Pg. 197, para 2.15).
Shiv
Sena MP, Madhukar Sarpotdar had in his deposition before the Commission defended
his party’s philosophy of retaliation even saying that “when incidents
against Hindus took place in one part of Mumbai, acts of retaliation against
innocent Muslims in other parts was justified.” Sarpotdar had also said that
as a senior leader of the Shiv Sena he could say that this was the philosophy of
his party as well.
A
significant section of the ATR is devoted to the murder of the Mathadi workers
and the Radhabai Chawl incident. The ATR reiterates the retaliation theory:
“when action and reaction are taking place rapidly, it is difficult to
investigate as to where they started.” The ATR also supports Bal Thackeray’s
rejection of the interview given to Time magazine but makes no attempt to deal
with the provocative and incendiary writings of Thackeray in his mouthpiece, the
Saamna, that have been relied upon by the Judge in his indictment of the Sena
chief.
No attention has been paid to the incidents listed by the Judge (mentioned above) that prove that right from December 20, 1992 till January 5, 1993, stray but gruesome incidents of violence continued unabated where members of both communities were victims. The government is utterly silent on specific instances of brutality that by their very chronology explode the theory that it was the selective targeting of Hindus on January 5–6 and on January 8, 1993 that were responsible for the Hindu backlash. The attitude of the government as reflected in the ATR is uncaring of the enormous loss of life and property that took place during the riots since it merely limits itself to justifying the Shiv Sena’s own role in the violence.
Mahaartis
Another misconception
surrounds the motives behind the launching of the Mahaarti programme launched by
the Sena–BJP combine in the midst of the December 1992 and January 1993 phase
of riots. A close look at how this misconception took firm root in the minds of
a large section of the people illustrates how communal propaganda plays upon
real or assumed aggravations, irritations,
and images of the ‘Other’ and then, at the critical time of a riot, misuses
this aggravation by locating it in the current crisis which is an inflamed
street atmosphere and again, garners widespread support for that
misinterpretation of events.
The
issue of Friday prayers, Jumma ki namaaz, taking place on public roads, often
blocking road traffic or access of railway commuters to local train stations was
here the aggravation. The reason for the spilling over of worshippers into the
street was the lack of adequate permission (extra FSI) to build more floors atop
mosques. Using this issue as their raison d’etre, the Hindutvawaadis chose a
raw and communally–tense Mumbai to launch their programme of Mahaartis that
far from being religious incantations were in fact part of the dangerous, Tu-tu,
mein-mein (‘Us’ versus ‘Them’) syndrome. The Mahaartis were cynically
used as launching pads to attack Muslim homes and establishments after violent
and provocative slogans against ‘laandyas’
(an abusive term for a circumcised person) had been raised.
The
Shiv Sena–BJP combine chose December 26, 1992, to launch this programme when
Mumbai was still tense, still reeling from the ghastly memories of early
December.The police remained complacent as the mobs went on the rampage.
However, a similar attempt to misuse the programme of Mahaartis was nipped in
the bud in Nashik in north Maharashtra (around 200 kms. from Mumbai) where the
Police Commissioner banned the programmes outright. (Pgs. 12 , para 1.7–iii & Pg. 222, para 2.14).
The
Srikrishna Commission report documents in detail this ploy of the Sena–BJP
combine in Mumbai aided by an acquiescent state and police administration:
l
Bhoiwada Police Station: Interrogation of many of the accused Shiv
Sainiks from central Mumbai suggests that after the crowd dispersed from the
Mahaarti held on January 7, 1993 at
Parel T.T, the dispersing crowd indulged in systematic stone–throwing at
Muslim establishments along the lane. The Hindu accused stated during
interrogation that the crowd returning from Mahaarti held on January 9, 1993 at
7.30 p.m. at Hanuman Mandir on Dadasaheb Phalke Road had attacked the Muslim
establishments (C.R.No.34 of 1993). (Pg. 61, para 4.11).
l
Byculla Police Station: This is another area where the Mahaartis led to
violence on January 9, 1993 when participants in the Mahaarti after dispersing
indulged in burning and looting Muslim homes and shops. The local police
resisted admitting this before the Judge despite evidence that two of the five
Mahaartis had been permitted during curfew hours. This is another example of the
local police station under the influence and sway of local Shiv Sainiks failing
to act against them. (Pg. 70).
l
D.B. Marg Police Station: Eleven Mahaartis were held within this
jurisdiction between December 1992 and January 1993 but the one held at the
Kabirwadi Hanuman Mandir on January 9, 1993 has received special mention by the
Judge. The Mill Diary of the police for that day records how the crowds
dispersing from the Mahaarti turned violent and looted and burnt Muslim shops
and establishments but the Senior Inspector Bhakare refused to admit the
veracity of police records and record anything that is damaging to the Shiv Sena.
(Pgs. 78-79).
l
Gamdevi Police Station: Nine Mahaartis were held in this area, all
organised by the Shiv Sena and the BJP, and all during curfew hours. The
Commission has noted first, the extreme reluctance of the Senior Police
Inspector, Madhukar Ghorpade, to admit who the organisers were. Communal
incidents took place after each Mahaarti, yet no action was taken even after, in
one instance, 86 establishments were ransacked and looted. (Pg. 119, para 12.4).
l
L.T. Marg Police Station: Eighteen Mahaartis were held between January 8
and 18, 1993. After the Radhabai Chawl incident in Jogeshwari, exaggerated and
incendiary rumours were spread and after the Mahaartis were launched, there were
repeated incidents of Hindu mobs roaming on the streets, looting and ransacking
shops and setting goods on fire. (Pg. 145–146).
l
Mahim Police Station: On January 9, 1993, a Mahaarti was held blocking
all road traffic and yet no action was taken by the local police to stop it.
Prakash Ayare, the local corporator of the Shiv Sena gave a speech after this
Mahaarti. He said that the programme of Mahaartis was being held under the
directions of Balasaheb Thackeray and that, because the government was partial
to one particular community, Mahaartis would be held to continue to draw
attention to the government. The Judge remarks, “Surprisingly, even against
the background of acute communal tension prevalent on January 9, 1993, this type
of speech was being allowed by the police and not being considered communally
provocative. (Pg. 153–154).
l
Tardeo Police Station: On January 9, 1993, a Mahaarti was held at the
Hanuman Mandir organised by the BJP and the Shiv Sena, with the VHP and the
Bajrang Dal in the background. It was admitted by all police officers who gave
evidence that despite there being tension in the area and the existence of a
source report issued by SB–I CID, that the persons returning from the
Mahaartis were likely to damage Muslim homes and establishments and homes while
dispersing, there was no attempt by the police to stop the Mahaarti from taking
place. (Pgs. 189–190).
Senior
leaders of the Shiv Sena, including Maharashtra Chief Minister, Manohar Joshi
(Pg. 228) and MP, Madhukar Sarpotdar participated in the Mahaartis that were
provocative mobilisations. The report also documents the state and police
attitude towards Mahaartis as exposed through the evidence recorded of then
chief minister Sudhakarrao Naik and then Police Commissioner Bapat:
l
Naik said on oath before the Judge that he considered the programme of
Mahaartis an entirely religious affair and therefore he could not ban them.
Subsequently he admitted that the political content of the Mahaartis that
started as a religious activity increased as they gained momentum. (Pg. 218,
para 1.7).
l
“Bapat’s attempt to equate the problem created during Namaaz on
public streets to the problems created by Mahaartis organised by the Hindutva
parties, was amusing. It is nobody’s case that the practice of Namaaz on the
streets was started recently or that Namaaz on the streets was being carried out
deliberately with a view to gain political benefits; with the Mahaartis, the
avowed and declared object was to pressurise the Government to force the Muslims
to stop calling Azaan on the loudspeakers and to stop doing Namaaz on the public
streets. That the Mahaartis which
started off with such clear political objectives could have been considered to
be “per se religious” and exempted from the operation of the ban orders by
the Commissioner, strains credulity. Bapat realised that the occasions of
Mahaartis were being used for making provocative speeches and shouting
provocative slogans and appealed to the Government to solve the problem.
However, the Government dilly–dallied till it was too late.” (Pg. 198, para
2.18).
Here
again, the ATR restricts itself to reiterating the Sena–BJP’s official
position that the Mahaartis were a
“natural and spontaneous response of Hindus who were inconvenienced and
irritated by the actions of Muslims in reading the Namaaz on
the streets. The ATR has nothing to say to refute the conclusions put out by the
Judge in the report that details instances of the Mahaartis
leading to abusive and terrorising slogans, followed by acts of arson and the
looting of Muslim homes and establishments. All this evidence has been garnered
by the Judge through a perusal of the police records, testimonies of policemen
and the evidence of ordinary witnesses. Shiv Sena leaders in general, and
Prakash Ayare from Mahim in particular, have been named as guilty. Yet, except
the general defence of Mahaartis, the
government has offered no comment
on these indictments. The mala fide intent of the ATR becomes clear when on page
after page it offers no explanation for the specific indictments.