Disturbing Trends:
Police System
1.1. The
Tribunal has looked at a lot of evidence on trends in police behaviour
especially related to communal riots.
1.2.
Findings and recommendations of several officially appointed judicial
commissions of inquiry appointed by various state and central
governments to probe into communal violence, the report of the National
Integration Council and the sixth report of the National Police
Commission have all indicted the police for partisan behaviour towards
religious minorities and Dalits in particular and have made
recommendations to check this disturbing fact.
1.3. This
disturbing trend has become more acute in recent years thanks to the
unchecked politics of intolerance pursued by the Sangh Parivar.
1.3.1.
Justice Shiv Dayal Srivastava’s report on the riots in Jabalpur, Sagar,
Damoh and Narasinhapur (MP), February 1961, comments adversely on the
laxity in investigation. (See Detailed
Annexures, Volume III).
1.3.2. The
Justice Raghubar Dayal Commission of Inquiry into the 1967 riots in
Ranchi, Sholapur, Malegaon, Ahmednagar, Sursand, Jaipur and Suchetpur
found the conduct of the police to be far from satisfactory.
1.3.3. The
Justice Jagmohan Reddy Commission of Inquiry investigating the Ahmedabad
riots of 1969 has cited more than half a dozen instances where Muslim
religious places adjoining police lines or police stations were attacked
or damaged. The argument advanced by the police officers that because
they were busy quelling riots at various other places, these police
stations were shorn of adequate strength and hence these attacks on
religious places could not be stopped, did not impress the Commission.
It made this observation because not a single Hindu place of worship
near a police station was reported to the Commission as having been
damaged or destroyed.
1.3.4.
Report of the Justice DP Madon Commission of Inquiry into the Communal
Disturbances at Bhiwandi, Jalgaon and Mahad in May, 1970: "Several
instances have been proved before the Commission in which police
officers and policemen either did not prevent Hindu rioters from
indulging in rioting, looting or arson, or showed communal
discrimination in dealing with the rioting mobs, or gave incorrect
information to the control room or lodged incorrect FIRs, in order to
make out that the persons who had rioted or were responsible for looting
or arson in particular incidents were Muslim rioters not Hindu, or
actively assisted Hindu rioters in burning and looting Muslim
properties." (See Detailed Annexures, Volume III). The
commission’s comments on the Special Investigation Squad of Bhiwandi:
"The working of the Special Investigation Squad is a study in communal
discrimination."
1.3.5.
Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Tellicherry Disturbance, 1971,
Justice (retd) Joseph Vithyathil: "236.Through the evidence of the
deputy SP, he says that while on patrol duty he had to curb many among
his rank and file who could not restrain themselves when they met
Muslims on the road. Similar evidence was given by the sub-collector and
other witnesses who have testified saying that while chasing away some
Muslims many policemen yelled at them to go to Pakistan. At Mattambaram
one or two of them got into the mosque and besides beating Usmakutty
Haji, a very respectable person, broke the tube-light and chandeliers in
the mosque. There is nothing to show that there was any justification
for this action… I am inclined to think that this was a high-handed act
done by some policemen who made use of the opportunity to exhibit their
anti-Muslim feelings."
1.3.6.
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Jamshedpur riots in April
1979, by Justice J Narain, Shri SK Ghosh and Shri SQ Rizvi: "During the
course of inquiry by the commission there were wide-ranging complaints
regarding the anti-Muslim behaviour of the Bihar Military Police(BMP)…
the facts and circumstances of the attack on the Muslim basti did
give rise to the suspicion that deliberate or otherwise, firing by the
police on the Hindus had no effect. Not a single Hindu could be
identified as having been injured or killed as a result of 108 rounds
fired by the BMP in this area over a period of 24 hours; this couples
with the fact that when the Hindu attacking mob had been driven away
from the area, 9 Muslims were found dead in their own homes… The
Commission feels that the composition, training discipline and
leadership in the BMP leaves much to be desired…"
1.3.7..
Inquiry report on Meerut Riots, September-October 1982, by Shri NC
Saxena, former director, Indian Institute of Administration, Mussourie,
to the central Minorities Commission of which he was joint secretary:
"As regards the first act of violence which led to the riots, the
district administration tried to give an impression that the riots broke
out in Meerut town because the Pujari of the disputed temple in
mohalla Shahgasa was murdered on September 6, 1982. The
aggressiveness of the Hindus, unlawful activities of the Hindu communal
group and police inaction prior to the murder of the Pujari was
not highlighted in either the reports of the district administration or
in the national newspapers… Right from the beginning the district
administration saw the communal riot as instigated by the Muslims and
the Hindu action as retaliation and therefore chose to take stern action
against Muslims only… The orders from the senior officers in the
district to the police could be summarised in one phrase, ‘Muslims must
be taught a lesson’. The PAC and the police faithfully implemented this
policy. Looting and arson, in this context, was considered legitimate
and necessary, and was therefore ignored. The district administration
was very keen to retain the PAC in the district and bitterly opposed
suggestions for getting it replaced by CRPF or BSF."
1.3.8. The
Report (majority) of the Commission of Inquiry into the Bhagalpur Riots
of October 1989, signed by Justices RCP Sinha and S Shamsul Hasan and
published in 1995, said: "The role of magistracy was no different from
that of the police. In general they were cowardly, communal and
indifferent to the sufferings of the common man… Admittedly hordes of
Hindus, the number going up to thousands, attacked the localities and
villages of Muslim inhabitants, but nobody was arrested in the process
of attacking an area... From the officers to ordinary police constables,
and the smaller functionaries of the administration, barring a few
exceptions, they were totally infected with an anti-Muslim bias. This is
evident from the fact that every unlawful act succeeded, totally
uninterrupted by any administrative interference except in one or two
cases… We would hold the SP of Bhagalpur, KS Dwivedi wholly responsible
for whatever happened before October 24, 1989, on that day and after
October 24. His communal bias was fully demonstrated by the manner in
which he arrested Muslims and by his extending no adequate protection to
them."
1.3.9.
Report of the J Ranganath Misra Commission of Inquiry into the 1984
riots in Delhi: "The riots occurred broadly on account of the total
passivity, callousness and indifference of the police in the matter of
controlling the situation and protecting the people of the Sikh
community."
1.3.10.
Sixth Report of the National Police Commission, March 1981: "(There are)
several instances where police officers and policemen have shown an
unmistakable bias against a particular community while dealing with
communal situations… (The composition of the police) is heavily weighted
in favour of the majority community."
1.3.11. In
its report, the National Integration Council, drew similar conclusions:
"The most disquieting feature in recent times is the loss of credibility
of the police in the effective tackling of communal disturbances. The
charge of partisanship was levelled against the PAC during the communal
violence at Aligarh. A police force which cannot command the trust of
all sections of the community is self-defeating… Police, like the
judiciary, must not only be impartial but must manifestly be so. We have
to build up a police system without caste and communal prejudices
affecting its role and performance, a system vigilant, alert and
impartial, capable of exercising operational freedom in the ruthless
suppression of communal riots."
1.4.The
Tribunal therefore observes that this disturbing trend of partisan,
communal and anti-constitutional police behaviour has grown over time.
Even prior to the Gujarat carnage, the police have almost always been
charged with unprofessional, partisan conduct.
1.5. The
issue of police bias has been a subject of nationwide debate in recent
years underlining the urgent need to professionalise the country’s
police force.
1.6. Despite
the well-documented findings of so many commissions of inquiry, that
reveal clear and distinct trends, despite the fact that every fresh
communal conflagration provides further proof of police bias, no
government has displayed the moral courage to legislate on a
statutory police commission with an independent structure and an
independent grievances cell to investigate complaints against police
misconduct.
1.7. It is imperative that
steps to reform the police force are placed on the national agenda for
debate and fresh legislation immediately.