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It is time that the peace process in Jammu and Kashmir gets democratised, addresses issues of human rights violations transparently and resists pressures for a partitioned peace .

Recent events on the In dian subcontinent, particularly the declaration of a ‘unilateral’ ceasefire by the Indian government, the Pakistan government’s timely response in the form of the partial withdrawal of troops from the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir and the extension of the ceasefire by India to February 26, 2001 are a signal of hope that the stagnant peace process in Kashmir can be revived. Of late, New Delhi seems to be indicating its willingness to hold talks with all Kashmiri political groups including those which have been advocating separation from India. This has led to the revival of democratic activities on a limited scale in the war torn Valley.
While the pro–Pakistan groups continue to dither about joining the ceasefire, most of the pro–independence Kashmiri groups have called on all the militant/jihadi groups to stop their armed actions and join the ceasefire. The Srinagar based All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) which until now was seen by many as a front organisation of the militant outfits, has on this occasion endorsed the ceasefire and called for immediate resumption of political talks between the governments of India and Pakistan and the Kashmiris.
Going a step beyond mere endorsement of the Indian ceasefire, the APHC has offered to send a delegation to Pakistan for holding talks with the leadership of the militant/jihadi groups and the government of Pakistan in order to persuade them to stop armed actions and join the ceasefire declared by the Indian government.
Some of the notable features of the emerging situation may be summarised thus:
Ø India’s acceptance to hold peace talks in the framework of insaniyat (humanity) rather than within strict constitutional limits. (Though there is confusion as to what constitutes the framework of humanity, this was the first indication of the softening of Indian attitude.)
Ø Pakistan’s acceptance of the cease–fire and partial troops withdrawal from the Line of Control in December 2000. The Indian defence ministry has admitted that since the withdrawal of troops by Pakistan, border clashes have substantially reduced).
Ø Pakistan’s indication that it was willing to drop its insistence to be included in the initial peace negotiations in what it calls ‘India–held’ Kashmir. In fact by privileging the APCH as its preferred agency in the peace talks, Pakistan for the first time has attempted to somewhat distance itself from the militant/jihadist line of struggle in Kashmir.
Ø Both countries, especially India, have shown a willingness to pick up official level peace talks that were ruined due to the Kargil incident where Pakistan supported the invasion by Islamic militants into Kashmir in April/May 1999. India had claimed this was a betrayal of the Lahore peace negotiations.
Ø The actions by both governments have been met by a very positive response from within the civil society in both countries. It is visible in the ‘non–official’, ‘track–2’ and ‘peoples’ track’ efforts by members of the elite in both India and Pakistan in the past few months. The cease–fire offer has lent vigour to the initiatives by the Pakistan–India People’s Forum for Peace and Democracy and the South Asian Forum for Human Rights to include Kashmiri civil society elements (both sides) into the peace discourse.
In addition, US–based Kashmir groups have worked on bringing the Indian and Pakistani government to the negotiation table. Members of the Pakistan military have even approached an NGO in the US for brokering talks with India. Among the more creative ideas is to initiate a bus service between Muzaffarabad
and Srinagar in line with the famous Lahore–Delhi bus service.
Move to Realpolitik
The current events are historically important, especially after the failed truce that was initiated by Kashmir’s largest militant group Hizbul Mujahideen in July/August 2000. It seems that Indian and Pakistani governments have begun to take a more pragmatic stance to the dispute over Kashmir. It may be seen more as a move towards acceptance of the logic of realpolitik.
India, on the one side, is aspiring to become a new (regional) super-power, not just in economic, but also in geo–strategic terms. This is evident from its efforts to garner support for its application for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and its attempts to build alliance with the USA, Russia and China to isolate Afghanistan and the “strategic partnership against a common threat” with Russia on anti–terrorism. In order to achieve these goals, India would like to foster good relations with the West (for example, the US).
This, however, cannot be done while fighting an internal war in Kashmir, or worse, a cross–border war with Pakistan. In this context the September 2000 statement of the head of the Indian army that the Kashmir problem could not be solved militarily and his endorsement to the extension of the unilateral ceasefire, despite the continuation of hostile activities by militant/jihadi groups in J&K may be seen as a move towards realpolitik.
Pakistan, across the border, with potentially similar aspirations, is struggling with a failing economy and increasing international isolation because of its politics in Kashmir (and also, in Afghanistan). Consequently, Pakistan simply cannot afford to turn down offers of ceasefire and dialogue from India. Nor can it afford in the long run to continue fighting a war in Kashmir since a continued engagement with Islamic militants supported by domestic extremist parties holds the far greater danger of fuelling social disintegration within Pakistan by increasing the gap between liberal–secular and religious–extremist forces.
Of late, ‘over–ground’ Kashmiri political groups, whether they support pro–independence or pro–Pakistan militants, seem to have changed their approach towards the civil society institutions of India and Pakistan. Some of them are actively seeking the assistance of civil society organisations from within and outside the region in their quest for a non-military solution. Such developments are not unique to Kashmir.
Under similar conditions in the Baltic republics the decision of the local authorities, de facto and de jure, to invite outside assistance had opened opportunities for domestic civil society actors to seek assistance of outside actors for a peaceful and non–violent means to resolve existing conflicts.
However, it is also apparent that almost all the non–governmental actors in Jammu and Kashmir, on both sides of the divide, are apprehensive that the two governments — both Indian and Pakistani might be moving towards a partition-based solution of the Kashmir dispute. In other words, Kashmir would be permanently divided along the Line of Control.
Almost all Kashmiris fear this prospect as they apprehend that this would lead to forced movement of populations and massive bloodshed due to ethnic, religious and sectarian violence. It is this fear, which is now forcing the Kashmiri groups to review the ethno–religious bias of the movement that began in 1990 and to reach out, instead, to broader civil society groups in India and Pakistan for support. This has opened up a real window of opportunity for democratising the peace process in Kashmir.
Impact of violence on Kashmiri society —
The trauma of violence: In the last decade Jammu and Kashmir has been transformed into a garrisoned state. With nearly half–a–million armed soldiers of different kinds deployed in the state, New Delhi has been able to hold militancy at bay. An estimated number of 60,000 persons have been killed. (The government of India, however, puts the figure at 35,000). It is estimated that over 30,000 persons are in illegal detention and about 5,000 are still missing.
Impact on family, women and children: The rising number of war widows, orphans, victims of torture and rape has led to the complete break down of Kashmiri society’s traditional support structures. The administration of Jammu and Kashmir has not been able to provide much relief. Its rehabilitation programmes, particularly for the war widows, orphans and the internally displaced, still remain on paper. The administration is yet to draw up a plan for the rehabilitation of the victims of torture and trauma.
According to a study done by the sociology department of Kashmir University, there has been a significant rise in the incidence of child labour in Kashmir valley. Nearly 30 percent of the schools and several colleges in the rural areas still remain closed. While the University of Jammu and Kashmir has just about started functioning again, a situation of uncertainty still pervades the atmosphere of the university.
Health services: The health service seems to have suffered a serious set back. Hospitals do not have adequate supply of equipment and medicine. A recent discussion this writer had with the health department officers revealed that in the entire region of Jammu and Kashmir there were only eight trained psychiatrists and clinical psychoanalysts. Several studies conducted by academics and NGOs over the last three years have already established that dependence on psychotic drugs among Kashmiris, particularly among women and young males, has increased enormously.
Democratic government in Jammu and Kashmir: The state government led by the National Conference Party of Dr. Farooq Abdullah has failed to address the real issues facing the people of Kashmir. Dr Abdullah, while trumpeting his loyalty to New Delhi, has ignored the issues of the gross abuse of human rights and the deepening economic and social crisis of Jammu and Kashmir. The lack of resources, his isolation from the Kashmiri masses and his apparent need to satisfy political allies inside and outside the government has further paralysed his corrupt and inefficient administration.
New Delhi has further weakened the authority of the Abdullah led government in by constantly throwing feelers to the militants and their over–ground allies for ‘talks’. This sidelining of the so–called elected government in Kashmir is at the core of New Delhi’s military strategy of only dealing with the militants. It empowers militancy, on one hand; and on the other, it sharpens the inner struggle within the disparate militant groups for supremacy.
The resultant ‘political deadlock’ elevates ‘ceasefire’ to the top of any agenda for talks. All other issues get swept into the wastepaper basket, as the privileges that would accrue to the party agreeing to ‘cease–fire’ become the main issues for the dialogue. An examination of the so-called ‘accords’ that the Indian State has signed with the former militants in Nagaland, Mizoram, Assam, Gorkhaland and Punjab simply prove the point.
The importance of ceasefire: This is not to say that ‘ceasefire’ is not a desirable objective. It is. Without a halt to hostile activities the peace process cannot even start. But what is equally important is transparency of the peace process. The unilateral ceasefire offered by the government of India is a very welcome development. But this must move now towards a bilateral process. The need of the hour is to allow the APHC to visit Pakistan so that they can hold talks with the leadership of militant/jihadi groups based there and also, the government of Pakistan. This is of critical importance if the ceasefire is to become effective, because a unilateral ceasefire, which is essentially a military manoeuvre, cannot be sustained indefinitely.
The agenda of the talks must soon be enlarged to address the basic issues facing the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The Vajpayee government has said that it is willing to talk to all peoples in J &K. This is not only desirable but also essential for democratising a sustainable peace process. The values of justice, human rights, transparency and accountability need to be privileged in any settlement if it is to be sustainable. The civil society actors and peace activists of India and Pakistan shall have to ensure that the voices of the victims are heard and that the peacemakers do not ignore their grievances as well as the ends of justice.
A warning about a portion–based solution
After India’s 1998 nuclear misadventure and Pakistan’s impetuous follow up, the governments of both the countries have come under sever pressure from the US. The leaders of both governments have been involved in secret parleys with the US and other Western powers in order to keep their regimes alive. During the war in Kargil, both India and Pakistan ultimately ran to the US for help.
The US is pursuing its policy of ‘waging peace’ as part of its objective of global domination. It wants ‘peace’ for a stability of market and the smooth flow of capital, goods and services on its own terms. The Palestine peace process shows that the US is not concerned about justice. The West and US brokered programme of ‘partition and make peace’ in Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia and Kosovo has failed to bring peace to former Yugoslavia.
The British had done the same on the subcontinent. The result was the killing of a million people and the uprooting of another 15 million. We are still paying for that ‘portioned’ peace/independence. Kashmir is a tragic consequence of that process. Of late, many in India and Pakistan are seemingly coming round to accept the view that the only solution to this intractable dispute over Kashmir is the portioning of the territory on the basis of what exists on ground.
What exists on the ground on both the Indian and Pakistani side is wrong. It has divided families, friends and communities. It has divided the people of Kashmir, destroyed their culture and turned them against each other. It has forced hundreds of thousands of people to migrate across the ‘line of death’ and outside. It has created an atmosphere where torture, rape and killings have become routine. It has also been responsible for the perpetration of autocratic and manipulative regimes in the divided territories. Any solution, which perpetrates such a situation, cannot last. The killings that are continuing in the Valley, despite the unilateral ceasefire, will not stop. An unjust solution of the Kashmir dispute will reinforce militarism, jingoism and suppression of democratic freedom of all peoples of India and Pakistan, not just that of the Kashmiris.

(Film maker and human rights activist, the writer is a leading player in the Pakistan–India People’s Forum for Peace and Democracy and the South Asia Forum for Human Rights - SAFHR).