January  2003 
Year 9    No.83
Cover Story

A deepening crisis

Both the government and the Maoists are guilty of massive h
uman rights violation in Nepal

With the breakdown of peace talks and the deployment of the army in November 2001, the armed conflict between the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) (Maoist) and the security forces which started in 1996 entered a new phase. The government declared the CPN (Maoist) a "terrorist" organisation, the security forces were given wide powers under "anti-terrorism" legislation, a state of emergency was declared and the police and paramilitary Armed Police Force (APF) were brought under the army’s operational command.

Since then, the people of Nepal have experienced unprecedented levels of political violence. By the end of October 2002, according to figures made public by the ministry of home affairs and the Royal Nepal Army, the number of people killed in the conflict since November 2001 had reached 4,366. This compares to around 2,700 people killed in the previous five years. According to the same sources, 4,050 of the 4,366 were "Maoists".

Amnesty International believes that at least half of these killings may have been unlawful. The vast majority of the victims were civilians targeted for their real or perceived support to the CPN (Maoist); others were Maoists deliberately killed after they were taken prisoner or killed instead of being arrested. In addition, torture is widespread and at least 66 people are reported to have "disappeared" since November 2001 after they were seen being taken into custody by the security forces. The total number of "disappearances" reported to Amnesty International in the context of the "people’s war" is over 200.

Human rights abuses by the Maoists have included deliberate killings of an estimated 800 civilians considered "enemies of the revolution", hostage–taking for ransom, torture of people taken captive and deliberate killings of members of the security forces after they were taken captive. The Maoists have also been responsible for recruiting children into their ranks and using them in combat situations.

The rapid deterioration in the human rights situation is situated against the background of a mounting political crisis in the country and embedded in a pervasive climate of impunity.

Impunity is a longstanding problem in Nepal. Successive governments’ willingness to condone the actions of the security forces, even when they have committed gross human rights violations, was underlined by the incorporation of Section 20 in the TADA. This section gives immunity from prosecution to members of the security forces "or any other person" for "any act or work performed or attempted to be performed by him in good faith under the Act".

Even before this legislation was introduced, the authorities’ persistent failure for years to act against those responsible for grave human rights violations has raised major questions about the commitment to or concern for human rights, even though there is a chapter in the Constitution of Nepal protecting fundamental rights and Nepal is a party to all major human rights treaties.

It is clear that especially when faced with the widespread impunity and the authorities’ lack of willingness to remedy this, existing institutions in Nepal such as the Supreme Court and the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) are not able to address the deepening human rights crisis. There is a need for international assistance to provide increased human rights protection and create a law enforcement system capable of addressing reports of human rights violations with greater transparency and accountability.

Background

The "people’s war" was declared by the CPN (Maoist) on 13 February 1996. According to a statement issued by the party at the time, it aims to establish a "New Democracy" and constitutes a "historical revolt against feudalism, imperialism and so–called reformists".

In view of the radical nature of the main demands of the Maoists, in particular the establishment of a republic and a constituent assembly, it has been difficult for successive governments to enter into a meaningful dialogue with the Maoists. Between July and late November 2001, three rounds of talks were held between the Maoists and representatives of the government of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba. In late November 2001, the negotiations broke down. Several observers have since criticised the government’s lack of analysis and strategy during this short period of negotiations.

In the nearly seven years since the start of the "people’s war", the Maoists have gained control over large areas of the countryside, especially in the Mid–Western region. Fighting in the context of the "people’s war" has further escalated after the declaration of the state of emergency, with heavy casualties reported among army and police personnel. According to government figures released in October 2002, 873 police personnel, 97 members of the APF and 219 army personnel had been killed since the start of the "people’s war".

Nearly one year after the army was deployed, most observers agree that military operations have had limited impact. The Maoists remain in control of several districts in the Mid–Western region, where they have put in place ‘’people’s governments’’ running parallel to the government’s local administration at district levels. In many other districts, similar bodies continue to function at ward and village levels and the security forces’ control is limited to towns and major roads.

The Maoists have been enjoying considerable support among the unemployed, women, people belonging to traditional "lower" castes, marginalised ethnic groups and poor people in rural areas. This support has to be understood in conjunction with the widespread dissatisfaction with the pervasive climate of corruption and the failure of successive governments since 1990 to alleviate the entrenched poverty of Nepal’s rural population or to introduce far–reaching land reform long demanded by the poor.

The conflict has had many adverse effects on the overall development of the country. Tourism, one of the main sources of income, has collapsed. The Maoist strategy of targeting infrastructure, including airports, bridges, power plants and telecommunication centres combined with numerous roadblocks and checkpoints set up by the security forces presented major obstacles to economic development. In the rural areas, especially in the western part of the country, there is also an increasing fear of famine. A combination of drought with government restrictions on supply of food and medicines to areas controlled by the Maoists on the one hand and restrictions imposed by the Maoists on the transport of food to district headquarters on the other, has led to increasing concern among development and aid organisations. These factors have also led to the internal displacement of thousands of people, many of whom have moved to town areas and are staying with relatives. Other people have moved across the border to India.

The political situation deteriorated rapidly after Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, on 22 May 2002, asked King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev to dissolve the House of Representatives and call elections. Elections were scheduled for 13 November 2002. However, the Maoists declared they would boycott the elections and stepped up their attacks on members of mainstream political parties. The Maoists also called a nationwide strike to coincide with the parliamentary elections.

In mid–July 2002, the government of Sher Bahadur Deuba dissolved all district development committees, municipalities and village development committees, the local elected bodies and replaced them with government employees. This move was widely criticised, including by donor governments. Without a budget and amid threats to their lives from the Maoists, services were grinding to a halt and the political vacuum widened.

Despite being brought under a uniform command, the security forces remain under–resourced to deal with a typical Maoist insurgency strategy. They continued to incur heavy casualties. On 8 September 2002, 49 policemen were killed, many of them after they were lined up and shot in the head during an attack by Maoists on a police post at Bhiman in the eastern Sindhuli district. The next day, during a Maoist attack at Sandhikharka, headquarters of Arghakhanchi district, according to government sources, 65 security forces personnel were killed. The government responded by announcing that it would call an all-party meeting to consider the reintroduction of the state of emergency that had lapsed on 28 August 2002. However, amid increasing disagreement among the political parties about the ways to address the deteriorating security situation, no all–party meeting was called.

In this context, on 4 October 2002, the then care–taker Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba asked the King to postpone parliamentary elections by a year. However, the King sacked the Prime Minister on grounds of "incompetence", dissolved the existing cabinet and postponed parliamentary elections for an indefinite period.

On 11 October 2002, the King appointed Lokendra Bahadur Chand as interim Prime Minister and swore in five ministers. All were appointed in their private capacity and not as representatives of political parties. The King acted under Articles 27(3) and 127 of the Constitution. The latter gives the king the power to "issue necessary orders" to remove any difficulties that arise in bringing the Constitution into force. The move by the King was condemned by the six mainstream political parties as "unconstitutional" and "undemocratic".

Since being appointed Prime Minister, Lokendra Bahadur Chand has repeatedly stated that "the doors for talks are open". In a statement issued on 4 December 2002, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias Prachanda, the leader of the CPN (Maoist) announced the establishment of a committee to hold talks with "all political forces, including the current ruler of the old regime, provided that a conducive environment is ensured." The statement, however, reiterated that the key demands of the Maoists remained unchanged. These are the convention of an all–party conference, to be followed by the formation of an interim government and the staging of elections for a constituent assembly to draw up a new Constitution. Given the stand-off between the government and the mainstream political parties, it appeared unlikely that these demands could be met.

There is an urgent need to put in place strong, independent and credible mechanisms to investigate and prosecute alleged human rights abuses, including extrajudicial executions and disappearances, attributed to the police and other State agents. In the eyes of the general public, the independence and objectivity of investigations into extrajudicial executions attributed to the police are seriously compromised by the fact that the process of inquiry is entirely entrusted to the law-enforcement authorities themselves.

Much of the political violence in Nepal has its roots in grievances caused by the enormous socio–economic problems affecting large parts of the country, especially remote areas which are difficult to reach and lack communications. The government recognises this, and has initiated a number of development projects in many of the most disadvantaged areas… These efforts also need to be geared towards addressing the human rights aspects of development, such as the continuing use of bonded labour, the caste system and the marginalised position of women ruled by traditional values and customs. The support for radical political schemes will undoubtedly continue if these fundamental problems are left unaddressed. 

(Extracts from the December 19, 2002 report of Amnesty International report on Nepal).