Failure of central intelligence
Sreekumar’s first affidavit also records the utter failure
of both the UP state intelligence department and the central Intelligence
Bureau (IB) to forewarn local authorities about the kar sevaks’
movements. In para 18, Sreekumar states that: "It is pertinent to note
that there was no intimation from (the) intelligence branch of UP police
or central Intelligence Bureau, which has an extensive nationwide network
to collect intelligence on developments relevant to internal security,
about the return journey of these ram sevaks who had gone to
Ayodhya." (It is perhaps significant to note that during this period,
while the BJP-led NDA coalition ruled at the Centre, in UP it was Rajnath
Singh’s BJP government that was in power until March 8, 2002, following
which president’s rule was imposed in the state.)
There was also no information from the central IB or any
inputs from any other agency about the possible attack on Ram sevaks
returning from Ayodhya by fundamentalist and militant elements among the
minority community or other antisocial elements. Worse, in para 19,
Sreekumar records that the UP police did not inform the Gujarat state
intelligence department or the police about the unruly behaviour of Ram
sevaks on their return journey even though there had been an
altercation between some Ram sevaks and Muslims when the latter
tried to board the train at Rudauli railway station in UP at around 9 a.m.
on February 24, 2002. A note dated February 27, 2002, addressed to all
DGPs of the country from the IG, intelligence department, UP, about the
return journey of ram sevaks, was received a day later, post facto,
at 8.15 a.m. on February 28 – that is, after the arson incident on
the Sabarmati Express took place.
In this connection, Sreekumar states that: "Though there
were intelligence inputs pertaining to the movements of kar sevaks
to Ayodhya from Gujarat state, there was no specific information about the
return of kar sevaks from Ayodhya, from (the) UP police or central
Intelligence Bureau, which has the onerous responsibility of timely
forewarning the law enforcement officers in the state about nationwide or
interstate emerging trends so that suitable precautionary countermeasures
can be taken. The only message about the return of kar sevaks sent
by the Uttar Pradesh police was received (by the) Gujarat police only on
February 28 i.e. after the incident on February 27, 2002. No intelligence
input either from the Government Railway Police (GRP), the Godhra district
LIB or central intelligence was available about the possibility of any
conspiracy or planning by Muslim militants or any antisocial elements to
attack or cause harm to the Ram bhakts returning from Ayodhya. The
only intelligence received from the GRP indicated that the Ram bhakts,
led by Prahlad J. Patel, president of Bajrang Dal, Mehsana, (were) to
start from Ayodhya on February 26, 2002 at night and return to Ahmedabad
on February 28, 2002."
Maintenance of internal security is a fundamental if
unwritten component of the central Intelligence Bureau’s charter of
duties. And this is precisely what the central IB so singularly failed to
do. In not providing advance preventive intelligence with regard to the
Godhra incident and its aftermath, the bureau compromised internal
security and put thousands of people in mortal danger.
Standard IB practice and procedure requires that whenever
there are nationwide activities involving large numbers of organised
groups, such as the communal mobilisation of kar sevaks, IB agents
travel with these contingents. Through the detailed analysis provided in
RB Sreekumar’s first affidavit it appears that this procedure was not
followed in the case of kar sevaks travelling from Gujarat to
Ayodhya in February 2002. If this procedure had been followed, the Gujarat
police and intelligence network would have been alerted to the belligerent
behaviour of the kar sevaks, their altercation with vendors and
others at railway stations, their return to Gujarat a day earlier than
scheduled and other related information. Sreekumar’s affidavit states that
the central IB did not provide such intelligence to the local police. This
ruled out any likelihood of the Gujarat police arranging effective police
deployment at railway stations on the kar sevaks’ route.
However, given the communal mobilisation that had been
under way from early February 2002, the absence of any deployment of army
or paramilitary forces in Godhra, a communally sensitive spot, was
conspicuous and even suspicious. This is a task that rests with the
state’s home ministry. CC’s "Genocide – Gujarat 2002" issue carried
interviews with former officers of the Indian army who have, in the past,
been deployed at Godhra in far less tense situations and who expressed
outrage that inadequate troops had been deployed there.
Sreekumar’s first affidavit also reveals that the SIB had
alerted all police commissioners and SPs in all districts of Gujarat to
take precautionary steps to prevent likely communal clashes in their
jurisdictions. In effect, it was the perverse will of the chief minister,
imposed through a supine bureaucracy and top police leadership, which
disregarded systematic warnings from its own intelligence bureau. The SIB
had sent out as many as three separate notes in this regard on February
27, 2002 itself. In addition to these messages, on February 27, specific
information was also sent to the CP, Ahmedabad city, about the VHP’s call
for a Gujarat bandh (on February 28) to protest against the Godhra
train burning and a meeting being held by the organisation in that
connection at 4 p.m. that afternoon.
The affidavit also records that these warnings continued,
unheeded. Even after the initial outbreak of genocidal violence, the SIB
periodically provided specific data to jurisdictional police, particularly
to the CP, Ahmedabad city, where incidents of communal violence persisted.
For instance, a written report dated April 15, 2002 was sent to the CP,
Ahmedabad, by the ADGP (int.), informing him about the move by extremist
and fundamentalist elements among Muslims to resist large-scale
house-to-house search operations ("combing") conducted by the police. The
same missive also warned of the plan by radical Hindu elements to organise
a major assault in Juhapura, a predominantly Muslim colony. In another
despatch to the CP, Ahmedabad city, dated April 26, 2002, the SIB provided
information on (1) The plan by Bajrang Dal leaders to distribute lethal
weapons (2) The migration of Muslim families from certain areas in
Ahmedabad city (3) The plan by Islamic militants from within and outside
the country to distribute sophisticated weapons to local Muslim militants.
The central IB unit in Gujarat is called the Subsidiary
Intelligence Bureau, Ahmedabad. Strangely, it was Rajendra Kumar, the then
joint director, central IB, (Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau, Ahmedabad),
who, within hours of the train arson, came out with the theory of an ‘ISI
conspiracy’ behind the Godhra incident. On the afternoon of February 27,
2002 itself, the then DGP, K. Chakravarti had informed Sreekumar that
Rajendra Kumar had advised and even tried to persuade the DGP to pursue
investigations into the Godhra incident along those lines.
During the course of that year, in personal conversations
with Sreekumar too, Rajendra Kumar repeatedly stressed the urgent need for
the Gujarat police to collect evidence that would prove the ISI conspiracy
angle. When Sreekumar questioned the basis of the conspiracy theory, Kumar
could not provide any sound and acceptable material to substantiate it.
Curiously, Kumar did not send any formal reports, from the central IB to
the state IB, containing inputs on the genesis, course and perpetration of
the ISI conspiracy and the persons involved in it. Senior BJP leaders,
supported by bureaucrats like the secretary (law & order), GC Murmu, and
officers like Rajendra Kumar, were hell-bent on projecting an
unsubstantiated ‘ISI conspiracy angle’ without furnishing details or
proof.
Interestingly, on March 28, 2002, as significant political
moves were afoot to project an ISI conspiracy behind the Godhra tragedy, a
‘secret’ fax message (signed by GK Naicker, section officer, home
department) was received from the union home ministry, suggesting
"counter-aggression by radical Muslim youth organised by the banned SIMI
(Students Islamic Movement of India) in Juhapura" and that the
administration was not dealing firmly with these developments.
It has been reliably deduced that the collusion between
the central NDA and Modi’s government extended to hand-picking key
officials for key postings before the carnage. Rajendra Kumar and Narendra
Modi were old friends. The two men grew close when Rajendra Kumar, an
officer from the Indian Police Service (IPS)’s Manipur Tripura cadre, was
posted at the central IB in Chandigarh and Modi, as BJP secretary, was in
charge of Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir during the
1990s. Within the Gujarat administration it is widely believed that
Rajendra Kumar also played a key role in guiding and even prompting former
DCP of the Ahmedabad Crime Branch, DG Vanzara, to organise the
‘elimination’ of several Muslims from late 2002 onwards. Rajendra Kumar
was also instrumental in having many Muslim youth arrested under POTA and
instituting cases against them through the Ahmedabad Crime Branch. Some of
these cases were discharged by the court for want of evidence before they
reached trial.
Although it is the central IB that is responsible for
reporting on internal security, Rajendra Kumar, as joint director, central
IB, has not filed any affidavits before the Nanavati-Shah Commission. This
amounts to a significant abdication of duty. It is especially significant
given the fact that the IB has filed affidavits before other commissions
investigating other catastrophes in the past, including the assassination
of Indira Gandhi, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and so on. Not
surprisingly, when on September 6, 2005 the Gujarat government served a
charge sheet on RB Sreekumar, Rajendra Kumar, who is currently joint
director, IB, at the IB headquarters in New Delhi, under the UPA’s home
ministry, offered to be a witness on behalf of the state government!
RB Sreekumar filed his second affidavit before the
commission in October 2004, after the commission’s terms of reference had
been expanded. This document contains a minefield of information
especially with regard to the internal discussions held with KPS Gill,
former DGP, Punjab, who was brought in by the NDA regime to ‘bring
normalcy to Gujarat’. The affidavit records the first meeting with the
‘supercop’ on May 4, 2002, at which, in keeping with their proclamations
to the world, blatant attempts were made by the chief secretary and
principal secretary to suggest that ‘normalcy’ had indeed returned to
Gujarat. A few officers present at the meeting, including ADGP Maniram and
Sreekumar himself, contradicted this by presenting the true picture. They
also offered their suggestions on what could be done to improve the status
quo. Among other things, Sreekumar gave Gill a copy of the report on
Ahmedabad and other communally sensitive areas that he had prepared. His
"Analysis of the Communal Situation" dated April 24, 2002, carried with it
an unsigned note containing certain points of action that could be
implemented to defuse the communally explosive situation.
The suggestions included: "(1) Restoration of the faith of
the public, particularly the minorities, in the criminal justice system
(2) Replacement of the present incumbents in executive posts at the
cutting edge level from those places where the police did not act
conscientiously during the riots (3) Effective action to unearth stock of
arms and booking of criminal and communal elements of both majority and
minority communities (4) Action through non-political spiritual and
religious leaders to de-communalise those under the spell of
fundamentalist/extremist sections (5) Action at the social level to bring
together both communities by proliferating interaction at various facets
(6) Action against radical groups (7) Measures to improve the security
ambience in the riot affected areas for facilitating the refugees to go
back to their pre-riot residential areas (8) Purposeful legal action
against publication and distribution of pamphlets/ handbills, etc/reports
in the vernacular press, etc fomenting animosity between different groups
on grounds of religion."
The report also warned that alarming tendencies could grow
and flourish (within the minorities) if such measures were not taken.
Unsurprisingly, Chief Minister Modi’s personal
intervention after this report was recorded and circulated (on May 7,
2002; see accompanying article, "Badge of Honour") and ‘supercop’
Gill’s succumbing to political pressure (May 8, 2002) thwarted
constructive suggestions from policemen like Maniram and Sreekumar. Gill,
in fact, even ‘instructed’ policemen not to try and reform politicians.
Sreekumar’s second affidavit records that, at this time,
the SIB had also issued detailed communications (through this report) on
signs that the Gujarat police should watch out for: i) some information
that about a dozen communal elements from the minority community were
trying to instigate violence (May 2, 2002); similar attempts were being
made by minority communal elements in the Panigate area of Vadodara (May
4, 2002); likelihood of violence in the Dhobhighat area of Ahmedabad (May
5, 2002); Thakor Hindus trying to foment violence in the Ranip area of
Ahmedabad city (May 6, 2002); likelihood of communal violence in the Vadaj
and Vasna areas of Ahmedabad city (May 7, 2002); certain tribal sections
being violently instigated to oppose rehabilitation of Muslims in Panwad
and Kanwat areas of Chhotaudaipur in Vadodara Rural district (May 7,
2002); plans by extremist Hindu elements to create disturbances in the
Paldi Muslim colony and peripheral areas of Ahmedabad city such as
Juhapura, Kagadiwad, etc (May 9, 2002); miscreants moving in specific
vehicles with a view to cause explosions in Danilimbda and other areas of
Ahmedabad city (May 11, 2002); communal elements trying to violently
prevent the rehabilitation of Muslims in Tejgadh and Kadwal areas of
Chhotaudaipur in rural Vadodara (May 13, 2002).
It is significant to note that other senior officers of
the SIB who met Gill on May 10, 2002 and presented their own assessments
of the scenario concurred with the ADGP (int.)’s assessment of the
situation in his report of April 24. OP Mathur, IGP (administration &
security), E. Radhakrishnaiah, DyIGP (communal branch), Sanjiv Bhatt, SP
(security) and RB Sreekumar all attended the meeting. Interestingly,
Rajendra Kumar, joint director (central IB), was also present.
The disgraceful saga continues. Through May and June 2002,
as head of state intelligence, Sreekumar continued to alert his men to the
potential dangers on hand. Following Sreekumar’s detailed missives, which
included maintaining a strict watch on aggressive Hindu and Muslim
communal elements, in June 2002, PS Shah, additional secretary, home
department, asked for a report assessing the communal situation in
Gujarat. In response to Shah’s request, an assessment of the prevailing
situation was prepared (on June 15, 2002) in which it was emphasised that
the measures suggested in the April 24 communication needed to be
implemented so as to achieve total normalcy on the communal front.
Subsequently, following a further request by PS Shah, a
review of the law and order situation dated August 20, 2002 was prepared.
This report covered aspects regarding the rehabilitation of riot victims
wherein it was observed that about 75,500 persons who had migrated from
various districts in the state had not returned to their original habitats
due to a feeling of insecurity. Not surprisingly, the additional chief
secretary (home), Ashok Narayan, who was clearly a part of Modi’s core
group, had responded to this report with a report of his own dated
September 9, 2002, stating that he did not agree with most aspects of the
assessment.
A clash of wills also ensued between Sreekumar and Modi’s
willing coterie with regard to the implementation of directions by the
NHRC as contained in its report of May-July 2002. In its report titled
"Run up to the Assembly Poll – Emerging Law and Order Trends" dated August
28, 2002, the SIB, under Sreekumar’s jurisdiction, stated that the
non-implementation of the NHRC’s recommendations was also a key factor
responsible for the delay in normalisation of the communal situation. This
assessment was based on feedback from riot affected parties. Not content
with a mere assessment, Sreekumar’s report recommended certain
administrative measures. Among these was the suggestion that senior
policemen and bureaucrats should issue comprehensive instructions in tune
with various police manuals and compilations prepared by former Gujarat
policemen. He said that it was time that a brochure on step by step
measures to be taken in specific situations was issued by the state of
Gujarat and followed stringently. The brochure should, he said, be
supported by a detailed drill on actions that needed to be taken.
RB Sreekumar’s second and third affidavits before the
Nanavati-Shah Commission, filed in October 2004 and April 2005
respectively, contained several incriminating facts that exposed the
criminal and immoral conduct of the chief minister, Narendra Modi, and
some senior officers. However, the Nanavati-Shah Commission has not taken
any action following this alarming evidence. The commission did not call
Sreekumar for further enquiry, nor did it order/conduct an independent
enquiry into the allegations made and the facts revealed in his
affidavits. The commission is empowered to summon documents from state
government files before it comes to its final conclusions. It can also
order investigations. But the commission has been a silent one so far. It
has made no demands of the Gujarat government, nor has it called for any
important documents relevant to its proceedings.
The behaviour of government advocates is another aspect
that warrants attention. The conduct of Arvind Pandya, government counsel
before the commission, contravenes the fundamental process of law and far
overreaches his duties as an advocate. Pandya’s conduct, both inside and
outside the commission, raises serious ethical questions. Instead of
assisting the commission to arrive at the truth, he has been an active
agent in Modi’s machinations; he formed part of the trio who, in August
2004, openly tried to intimidate former ADGP, RB Sreekumar, ‘not to tell
the truth before the commission’. His conduct, however, has not elicited
even a mild reprimand from the commission’s learned judges.
It was Rahul Sharma and RB Sreekumar who, suo motu, guided
by their own conscience, submitted crucial documents and data from state
government records. Even the startling revelations contained in these have
not moved the Nanavati-Shah Commission to take any action or order any
enquiry.
With his third affidavit, Sreekumar encloses more stunning
evidence. A tape recorded conversation with Dinesh Kapadia, undersecretary
of the Gujarat government, and an equally revelatory set of conversations
with GC Murmu (secretary, law & order), both of whom were trying to
persuade and then intimidate an honest officer into perjuring himself
before a commission of enquiry. These meetings, which took place on August
21 and August 24, 2004, constitute the most blatant attempts by officers
of the Gujarat state and even its own lawyer, to subvert the commission by
intimidating officers.
At the first meeting Kapadia observes that newspaper
reports conveyed the impression that Sreekumar was pro-Muslim and
anti-Hindu. Sreekumar replies that he stood for the Indian Constitution
and the ideals of citizenship. Kapadia then changes track, accusing him of
being biased against the government and the ruling party. Sreekumar
replies that it was not a question of community, party, office or regime.
As a police officer, he failed to see the difference between majoritarian
or minoritarian communalism. The undersecretary listens to Sreekumar
earnestly explaining his position about the hate filled mindset that has
resulted in such violence. Kapadia then asks him to ‘moderate his
position’, requesting that ‘some circumspection be shown’. He also
suggests that Sreekumar be ‘totally objective’ by ‘withholding ideology’.
Responding to this, Sreekumar draws a clever comparison between Bhavnagar
and Jamnagar, where violence was controlled, and other parts of Gujarat,
including Ahmedabad, where it was not.
Kapadia then tries to be more specific, saying that it was
Modi, not the Gujarat police, who was the target of criticism everywhere.
Kapadia says: "What if…Narendra Modi is removed? This Supreme Court,
media, all elements making hue and cry, will become silent." He stresses,
"You may place this on record. If Narendra Modi is removed, all these
elements, self-proclaimed champions of secularism, will be totally silent.
The main target is Modi." Kapadia then goes on to laud Sreekumar’s honesty
and integrity but suggests that the commission is not the forum for
interventions. He further adds that although many police officers were
quite critical of the government, this had not appeared in public. He
states that the then CP, Ahmedabad, PC Pande, was the model of
officialdom. PC Pande, in fact, told the Nanavati-Shah Commission that he
did "not recollect, remember and recall many relevant things" pertaining
to the time he was commissioner.
After a while Sreekumar becomes quite blunt, stating that
his loyalty is only to the Constitution. Kapadia replies that revealing
the truth before the commission would be futile: "These commissions are
paper tigers." Sreekumar retaliates, saying "Truth is truth". To this,
Kapadia replies, "It is against the public interest."
The subsequent meeting with Murmu was in response to a
direct summons. Murmu is accompanied by state government pleader before
the commission, Arvind Pandya, who begins the conversation. Pandya remarks
that he is surprised by the attention that Sreekumar’s affidavits have
attracted considering that when the first affidavit was filed in 2002, it
was one of 5,000 documents and no one noticed it. Trivialities about
Sreekumar’s early years in the service are then discussed. Pandya carries
on talking, questioning Sreekumar as if he were before Justice Nanavati,
cautioning him "not to be very quick or very hasty in answering questions"
and instructing him to "stall, and say ‘I don’t understand the
question’."
Pandya tries to further the theory of a conspiracy behind
the Godhra incident (which Sreekumar has already denied in his affidavits)
and basically instructs him to toe the chief minister’s line.
As is obvious, Sreekumar does not succumb to these
pressures.
He has placed tape recordings and transcripts of both
these conversations before the Nanavati-Shah Commission but no action has
been taken so far. During his testimony and subsequent cross-examination
before the commission, crucial questions are not put to him by either the
government advocates or those representing victims or NGOs. This was and
is a glaring deficiency.
It is in his third affidavit before the commission that
Sreekumar places these details on record. The state responds by filing, on
September 6, 2005, a set of nine charges against Sreekumar, simultaneously
initiating a departmental enquiry against him. The charges for misconduct
relate mainly to his depositions before the Nanavati-Shah Commission.
These include the fact that he maintained a private diary of official
behaviour which he then claimed was an official diary, conduct that is
unbecoming of an officer. Second, that he had not obtained permission to
do this. Third, that the unofficial diary contained secret information
that had been clandestinely released to the press. Finally, the charges
allege that Sreekumar had failed to obtain permission to place certain
documents before the commission. Sreekumar has challenged this action
before the Central Administrative Tribunal and arguments by both parties
have just concluded.