The theology of power
The singular concern of supremacist puritanism in contemporary Islam
is
power and its symbols
BY KHALED ABOU EL FADL
Since the early 1980s, commen-tators have argued that
Islam is suffering a crisis of identity as the crumbling of Islamic
civilisation in the modern age has left Muslims with a profound sense of
alienation and injury. Challenges confronting Muslim nations – failures of
development projects, entrenched authoritarian regimes and the inability
to respond effectively to Israeli belligerence – have induced deep-seated
frustration and anger that, in turn, contributed to the rise of
fundamentalist movements, or as most commentators have preferred to say,
political Islam. But most commentators have been caught off guard by the
ferocity of the acts of mass murder committed in New York and Washington.
The basic cruelty and moral depravity of these attacks came as a shock not
only to non-Muslims but to Muslims as well.
The extreme political violence we call terrorism is not a
simple aberration unrelated to the political dynamics of a society.
Generally, terrorism is the quintessential crime of those who feel
powerless seeking to undermine the perceived power of a targeted group.
Like many crimes of power, terrorism is also a hate crime, for it relies
on a polarised rhetoric of belligerence toward a particular group that is
demonised to the point of being denied any moral worth.
To recruit and communicate effectively, this rhetoric of
belligerence needs to tap into and exploit an already radicalised
discourse with the expectation of resonating with the social and political
frustrations of a people. If acts of terrorism find little resonance
within a society, such acts and their ideological defenders are
marginalised. But if these acts do find a degree of resonance, terrorism
becomes incrementally more acute and severe, and its ideological
justifications become progressively more radical.
Asking why
To what extent are the September 11 attacks in the US
symptomatic of more pervasive ideological undercurrents in the Muslim
world today? Obviously, not all social or political frustrations lead to
the use of violence. While national liberation movements often resort to
violence, these attacks are set apart from such movements. The
perpetrators did not seem to be acting on behalf of an ethnic group or
nation. They presented no specific territorial claims or political agenda
and were not keen to claim responsibility for their acts. One can
speculate that the perpetrators’ list of grievances included persistent
Israeli abuses of Palestinians, near daily bombings of Iraq and the
presence of American troops in the Gulf but the fact remains that the
attacks were not followed by a list of demands or even a set of
articulated goals. The attacks exhibit a profound sense of frustration and
extreme despair rather than a struggle to achieve clear-cut objectives.
Some commentators have viewed the underpinnings of the
recent attacks as part of a "clash of civilisations" between western
values and Islamic culture. According to these commentators, the issue is
not religious fundamentalism or political Islam but an essential conflict
between competing visions of morality and ethics. From this perspective,
it is hardly surprising that the terrorists do not present concrete
demands, do not have specific territorial objectives and do not rush to
take responsibility. The September 11 attacks aimed to strike at the
symbols of western civilisation and to challenge its perceived hegemony in
the hope of empowering and reinvigorating Islamic civilisation.
The "clash of civilisations" approach assumes, in deeply
prejudiced fashion, that puritanism and terrorism are somehow authentic
expressions of the predominant values of the Islamic tradition and hence
is a dangerous interpretation of the present moment. But the common
responses to this interpretation, focusing on either the crisis of
identity or acute social frustration in the Muslim world, do not
adequately explain the theological positions adopted by radical Islamist
groups, or how extreme violence can be legitimated in the modern age.
Further, none of these perspectives engage the classical tradition in
Islamic thought regarding the employment of political violence and how
contemporary Muslims reconstruct the classical tradition. How might the
classical or contemporary doctrines of Islamic theology contribute to the
use of terrorism by modern Islamic movements?
Classical Islamic law and political violence
By the 11th century, Muslim jurists had developed a
sophisticated discourse on the proper limits on the conduct of warfare,
political violence and terrorism. The Koran exhorted Muslims in general
terms to perform jihad by waging war against their enemies. The Koranic
prescriptions simply call upon Muslims to fight in the way of god,
establish justice and refrain from exceeding the limits of justice in
fighting their enemies. Muslim jurists, reflecting their historical
circumstances and context, tended to divide the world into three
conceptual categories: the abode of Islam, the abode of war and the abode
of peace or non-belligerence. These were not clear or precise categories
but generally they connoted territories belonging to Muslims, territories
belonging to enemies and territories considered neutral or non-hostile for
one reason or another. But Muslim jurists could not agree on exactly how
to define the abode of Muslims versus the abode of others, especially when
sectarian divisions within Islam were involved and when dealing with
conquered Muslim territories or territories where sizeable Muslim
minorities resided.1
Furthermore, Muslim jurists disagreed on the legal cause
for fighting non-Muslims. Some contended that non-Muslims are to be fought
because they are infidels while the majority argued that non-Muslims
should be fought only if they pose a danger to Muslims. The majority of
early jurists argued that a treaty of non-aggression between Muslims and
non-Muslims ought to be limited to a 10-year term. Nonetheless, after the
10th century an increasing number of jurists argued that such treaties
could be renewed indefinitely or be of permanent or indefinite duration.2
Importantly, Muslim jurists did not focus on the idea of
just cause for war. Other than emphasising that if Muslim territory is
attacked Muslims must fight back, the jurists seemed to relegate the
decision to make war or peace to political authorities. There is a
considerable body of legal writing prohibiting Muslim rulers from
violating treaties, indulging in treachery or attacking an enemy without
first giving notice but the literature on the conditions that warrant a
jihad is sparse. It is not that the classical jurists believed that war is
always justified or appropriate; rather, they seemed to assume that the
decision to wage war is fundamentally political. However, the methods of
war were the subject of a substantial jurisprudential discourse.
Building upon the proscriptions of Prophet Muhammad,
Muslim jurists insisted that there are legal restrictions upon the conduct
of war. In general, Muslim armies may not kill women, children, seniors,
hermits, pacifists, peasants or slaves unless they are combatants.
Vegetation and property may not be destroyed, water holes may not be
poisoned and flame-throwers may not be used unless out of necessity and
even then only to a limited extent. Torture, mutilation and murder of
hostages were forbidden under all circumstances. Importantly, the
classical jurists reached these determinations not simply as a matter of
textual interpretation but as moral or ethical assertions. The classical
jurists spoke from the vantage point of a moral civilisation, in other
words, from a perspective that betrayed a strong sense of confidence in
the normative message of Islam. In contrast to their pragmatism regarding
whether a war should be waged, the classical jurists accepted the
necessity of moral constraints upon the way war is conducted.
An offence against god and society
Muslim jurists exhibited a remarkable tolerance toward the
idea of political rebellion. Because of historical circumstances in the
first three centuries of Islam, Muslim jurists, in principle, prohibited
rebellions even against unjust rulers. At the same time, they refused to
give the government unfettered discretion against rebels. The classical
jurists argued that the law of god prohibited the execution of rebels or
needless destruction or confiscation of their property. Rebels should not
be tortured or even imprisoned if they take an oath promising to abandon
their rebellion. Most importantly, according to the majority point of
view, rebellion, for a plausible cause, is not a sin or moral infraction
but merely a political wrong because of the chaos and civil strife that
result. This approach effectively made political rebellion a civil and not
a religious infraction.
The classical juristic approach to terrorism was quite
different. Since the very first century of Islam, Muslims suffered from
extremist theologies that not only rejected the political institutions of
the Islamic empire but also refused to concede legitimacy to the juristic
class. Although not organised in a church or a single institutional
structure, the juristic class in Islam had clear and distinctive insignia
of investiture. They attended particular colleges, received training in a
particular methodology of juristic inquiry and developed a specialised
technical language, the mastery of which became the gateway to inclusion.
Significantly, the juristic class engaged as a rule in
discussion and debate. On each point of law, there are ten different
opinions and a considerable amount of debate among the various legal
schools of thought. Various puritan theological movements in Islamic
history resolutely rejected this juristic tradition which revelled in
indeterminacy. The hallmark of these puritan movements was an intolerant
theology displaying extreme hostility not only to non-Muslims but also to
Muslims who belonged to different schools of thought or even remained
neutral. These movements considered opponents and indifferent Muslims to
have exited the fold of Islam, and therefore legitimate targets of
violence. These groups’ preferred methods of violence were stealth attacks
and the dissemination of terror in the general population.
Muslim jurists reacted sharply to these groups,
considering them enemies of humankind. They were designated as muharibs
(literally, those who fight society). A muharib was defined as
someone who attacks defenceless victims by stealth and spreads terror in
society. They were not to be given quarter or refuge by anyone or at any
place. In fact, Muslim jurists argued that any Muslim or non-Muslim
territory sheltering such a group is hostile territory that may be
attacked by the mainstream Islamic forces. Although the classical jurists
agreed on the definition of a muharib, they disagreed about which
types of criminal acts should be considered crimes of terror. Many jurists
classified rape, armed robbery, assassinations, arson and murder by
poisoning as crimes of terror and argued that such crimes must be punished
vigorously regardless of the motivations of the criminal. Most
importantly, these doctrines were asserted as religious imperatives.
Regardless of the desired goals or ideological justifications, the
terrorising of the defenceless was recognised as a moral wrong and an
offence against society and god.
Demise of the classical tradition
It is often stated that terrorism is the weapon of the
weak. Notably, classical juristic discourse was developed when Islamic
civilisation was supreme and this supremacy was reflected in the
benevolent attitude of the juristic class. Pre-modern Muslim juristic
discourses navigated a course between principled thinking and real-life
pragmatic concerns and demands. Ultimately, these jurists spoke with a
sense of urgency but not desperation. Power and political supremacy were
not their sole pursuits.
Much has changed in the modern age. Islamic civilisation
has crumbled and the traditional institutions that once sustained the
juristic discourse have all but vanished. The moral foundations that once
mapped out Islamic law and theology have disintegrated, leaving an
unsettling vacuum. More to the point, the juristic discourses on tolerance
towards rebellion and hostility to the use of terror are no longer part of
the normative categories of contemporary Muslims. Contemporary Muslim
discourses either give lip service to the classical doctrines without a
sense of commitment or ignore and neglect them all together.
There are many factors that contributed to this modern
reality. Among the pertinent factors is the undeniably traumatic
experience of colonialism, which dismantled the traditional institutions
of civil society. The emergence of highly centralised, despotic and often
corrupt governments, and the nationalisation of the institutions of
religious learning undermined the mediating role of jurists in Muslim
societies. Nearly all charitable religious endowments became state
controlled entities and Muslim jurists in most Muslim nations became
salaried state employees, effectively transforming them into what may be
called "court priests". The establishment of the state of Israel, the
expulsion of the Palestinians and the persistent military conflicts in
which Arab states suffered heavy losses all contributed to a widespread
siege mentality and a highly polarised and belligerent political
discourse. Perhaps most importantly, western cultural symbols, modes of
production and social values aggressively penetrated the Muslim world,
seriously challenging inherited values and practices, and adding to a
profound sense of alienation.
Two developments became particularly relevant to the
withering away of Islamic jurisprudence. Most Muslim nations experienced
the wholesale borrowing of civil law concepts. Instead of the dialectical
and indeterminate methodology of traditional Islamic jurisprudence, Muslim
nations opted for more centralised and often code-based systems of law.
Even Muslim modernists who attempted to reform Islamic jurisprudence were
heavily influenced by the civil law system and sought to resist the
fluidity of Islamic law and increase its unitary and centralised
character. Not only were the concepts of law heavily influenced by the
European legal tradition, the ideologies of resistance employed by Muslims
were laden with Third World notions of national liberation and
self-determination. For instance, modern nationalistic thought exercised a
greater influence on the resistance ideologies of Muslim and Arab national
liberation movements than anything in the Islamic tradition. The Islamic
tradition was reconstructed to fit Third World nationalistic ideologies of
anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism rather than the other way around.
While national liberation movements – such as the
Palestinian or Algerian resistance – resorted to guerrilla or
non-conventional warfare, modern day terrorism of the variety promoted by
Osama bin Laden is rooted in a different ideological paradigm. There is
little doubt that organisations such as the Jihad, al-Qaeda, Hizb al-Tahrir
and Jama’at al-Muslimin were influenced by national liberation and
anti-colonialist ideologies but they have anchored themselves in a
theology that can be described as puritan, supremacist and thoroughly
opportunistic. This theology is the by-product of the emergence and
eventual dominance of Wahhabism, Salafism and apologetic discourses in
modern Islam.
Contemporary puritan Islam
The foundations of Wahhabi theology were put in place by
the 18th century evangelist Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in the Arabian
peninsula. With a puritanical zeal, ‘Abd al-Wahhab sought to rid Islam of
corruptions that he believed had crept into the religion. Wahhabism
resisted the indeterminacy of the modern age by escaping to a strict
literalism in which the text became the sole source of legitimacy. In this
context, Wahhabism exhibited extreme hostility to intellectualism,
mysticism and any sectarian divisions within Islam. The Wahhabi creed also
considered any form of moral thought that was not entirely dependent on
the text as a form of self-idolatry and treated humanistic fields of
knowledge, especially philosophy, as "the sciences of the devil".
According to the Wahhabi creed, it was imperative to
return to a presumed pristine, simple and straightforward Islam, which
could be entirely reclaimed by literal implementation of the commands of
the prophet and by strict adherence to correct ritual practice.
Importantly, Wahhabism rejected any attempt to interpret the divine law
from a historical, contextual perspective and treated the vast majority of
Islamic history as a corruption of the true and authentic Islam. The
classical jurisprudential tradition was considered at best to be mere
sophistry. Wahhabism became very intolerant of the long established
Islamic practice of considering a variety of schools of thought to be
equally orthodox. Orthodoxy was narrowly defined and ‘Abd al-Wahhab
himself was fond of creating long lists of beliefs and acts which he
considered hypocritical, the adoption or commission of which immediately
rendered a Muslim an unbeliever.
In the late 18th century, the Al Sa’ud family united with
the Wahhabi movement and rebelled against Ottoman rule in Arabia. Egyptian
forces quashed this rebellion in 1818. Nevertheless, Wahhabi ideology was
resuscitated in the early 20th century under the leadership of ‘Abd al-’Aziz
ibn Sa’ud who allied himself with the tribes of Najd, in the beginnings of
what would become Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabi rebellions of the 19th and
20th centuries were very bloody because the Wahhabis indiscriminately
slaughtered and terrorised Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Mainstream
jurists writing at the time, such as the Hanafi Ibn ‘Abidin and the Maliki
al-Sawi, described the Wahhabis as a fanatic fringe group.3
Wahhabism ascendant
Nevertheless, Wahhabism survived and, in fact, thrived in
contemporary Islam for several reasons. By treating Muslim Ottoman rule as
a foreign occupying power, Wahhabism set a powerful precedent for notions
of Arab self-determination and autonomy. In advocating a return to the
pristine and pure origins of Islam, Wahhabism rejected the cumulative
weight of historical baggage. This idea was intuitively liberating for
Muslim reformers since it meant the rebirth of ijtihad or the
return to de novo examination and determination of legal issues
unencumbered by the accretions of precedents and inherited doctrines. Most
importantly, the discovery and exploitation of oil provided Saudi Arabia
with high liquidity. Especially after 1975, with the sharp rise in oil
prices, Saudi Arabia aggressively promoted Wahhabi thought around the
Muslim world. Even a cursory examination of predominant ideas and
practices reveals the widespread influence of Wahhabi thought on the
Muslim world today.
But Wahhabism did not spread in the modern Muslim world
under its own banner. Even the term "Wahhabism" is considered derogatory
by its adherents since Wahhabis prefer to see themselves as the
representatives of Islamic orthodoxy. To them, Wahhabism is not a school
of thought within Islam but is Islam. The fact that Wahhabism
rejected a label gave it a diffuse quality, making many of its doctrines
and methodologies eminently transferable. Wahhabi thought exercised its
greatest influence not under its own label but under the rubric of
Salafism. In their literature, Wahhabi clerics have consistently described
themselves as Salafis and not Wahhabis.
Beset with contradictions
Salafism is a creed founded in the late 19th century by
Muslim reformers such as Muhammad Abduh, al-Afghani and Rashid Rida.
Salafism appealed to a very basic concept in Islam: Muslims ought to
follow the precedent of the prophet and his companions (al-salaf al-salih).
Methodologically, Salafism was nearly identical to Wahhabism except that
Wahhabism is far less tolerant of diversity and differences of opinion.
The founders of Salafism maintained that on all issues Muslims ought to
return to the Koran and the Sunnah (precedent) of the prophet. In doing
so, Muslims ought to reinterpret the original sources in light of modern
needs and demands without being slavishly bound to the interpretations of
earlier Muslim generations.
As originally conceived, Salafism was not necessarily
anti-intellectual but like Wahhabism, it did tend to be uninterested in
history. By emphasising a presumed golden age in Islam, the adherents of
Salafism idealised the time of the prophet and his companions, and ignored
or demonised the balance of Islamic history. By rejecting juristic
precedents and undervaluing tradition, Salafism adopted a form of
egalitarianism that deconstructed any notions of established authority
within Islam. Effectively, anyone was considered qualified to return to
the original sources and speak for the divine will. By liberating Muslims
from the tradition of the jurists, Salafism contributed to a real vacuum
of authority in contemporary Islam. Importantly, Salafism was founded by
Muslim nationalists who were eager to read the values of modernism into
the original sources of Islam. Hence Salafism was not necessarily
anti-western. In fact, its founders strove to project contemporary
institutions such as democracy, constitutions or socialism into the
foundational texts and to justify the modern nation state within Islam.
The liberal age of Salafism came to an end in the 1960s.
After 1975, Wahhabism was able to rid itself of its extreme intolerance
and proceeded to co-opt Salafism until the two became practically
indistinguishable. Both theologies imagined a golden age within Islam,
entailing a belief in a historical utopia that can be reproduced in
contemporary Islam. Both remained uninterested in critical historical
inquiry and responded to the challenge of modernity by escaping to the
secure haven of the text. Both advocated a form of egalitarianism and
anti-elitism to the point that they came to consider intellectualism and
rational moral insight to be inaccessible and thus corruptions of the
purity of the Islamic message. Wahhabism and Salafism were beset with
contradictions that made them simultaneously idealistic and pragmatic and
infested both creeds (especially in the 1980s and 1990s) with a kind of
supremacist thinking that prevails until today.
Between apologetics and supremacy
The predominant intellectual response to the challenge of
modernity in Islam has been apologetics. Apologetics consisted of an
effort by a large number of commentators to defend the Islamic system of
beliefs from the onslaught of orientalism, westernisation and modernity by
simultaneously emphasising the compatibility and supremacy of Islam.
Apologists responded to the intellectual challenges coming from the West
by adopting pietistic fictions about the Islamic traditions. Such fictions
eschewed any critical evaluation of Islamic doctrines and celebrated the
presumed perfection of Islam. A common apologist argument was that any
meritorious or worthwhile modern institution was first invented by
Muslims.
According to the apologists, Islam liberated women,
created a democracy, endorsed pluralism, protected human rights and
guaranteed social security long before these institutions ever existed in
the West. These concepts were not asserted out of critical understanding
or ideological commitment but primarily as a means of resisting western
hegemony and affirming self-worth. The main effect of apologetics,
however, was to contribute to a sense of intellectual self-sufficiency
that often descended into moral arrogance. To the extent that apologetics
were habit forming, it produced a culture that eschewed self-critical and
introspective insight, and embraced the projection of blame and a
fantasy-like level of confidence.
In many ways, the apologetic response was fundamentally
centred on power. Its main purpose was not to integrate particular values
within Islamic culture but to empower Islam against its civilisational
rival. Muslim apologetics tended to be opportunistic and rather
unprincipled and, in fact, they lent support to the tendency among many
intellectuals and activists to give precedence to the logic of pragmatism
over any other competing demands. Invoking the logic of necessity or
public interest to justify courses of action, at the expense of moral
imperatives, became common practice. Effectively, apologists got into the
habit of paying homage to the presumed superiority of the Islamic
tradition but marginalised this idealistic image in everyday life.
Post-1970s Salafism adopted many of the premises of the
apologetic discourse but it also took these premises to their logical
extreme. Instead of simple apologetics, Salafism responded to feelings of
powerlessness and defeat with uncompromising and arrogant symbolic
displays of power not only against non-Muslims but also against Muslim
women. Fundamentally, Salafism, which by the 1970s had become a virulent
puritan theology, further anchored itself in the confident security of
texts. Nonetheless, contrary to the assertions of its proponents, Salafism
did not necessarily pursue objective or balanced interpretations of
Islamic texts but primarily projected its own frustrations and aspirations
upon the text. Its proponents no longer concerned themselves with
co-opting or claiming western institutions as their own but defined Islam
as the exact antithesis of the West, under the guise of reclaiming the
true and real Islam. Whatever the West was perceived to be, Islam was
understood to be the exact opposite.
Alienation from tradition
Of course, neither Wahhabism nor Salafism is represented
by some formal institution. They are theological orientations and not
structured schools of thought. Nevertheless, the lapsing and bonding of
the theologies of Wahhabism and Salafism produced a contemporary
orientation that is anchored in profound feelings of defeat, frustration
and alienation not only from modern institutions of power but also from
the Islamic heritage and tradition. The outcome of the apologist, Wahhabi
and Salafi legacies is a supremacist puritanism that compensates for
feelings of defeat, disempowerment and alienation with a distinct sense of
self-righteous arrogance vis-à-vis the nondescript "other" – whether the
other is the West, non-believers in general or even Muslims of a different
sect and Muslim women. In this sense, it is accurate to describe this
widespread modern trend as supremacist, for it sees the world from the
perspective of stations of merit and extreme polarisation.
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, several
commentators posed the question of whether Islam somehow encourages
violence and terrorism. Some commentators argued that the Islamic concept
of jihad or the notion of the dar al-harb (the abode of war) is to
blame for the contemporary violence. These arguments are anachronistic and
orientalist. They project western categories and historical experiences
upon a situation that is very particular and fairly complex. One can
easily locate an ethical discourse within the Islamic tradition that is
uncompromisingly hostile to acts of terrorism. One can also locate a
discourse that is tolerant toward the other and mindful of the dignity and
worth of all human beings. But one must also come to terms with the fact
that supremacist puritanism in contemporary Islam is dismissive of all
moral norms or ethical values regardless of the identity of their origins
or foundations. The prime and nearly singular concern is power and its
symbols. Somehow, all other values are made subservient. n
(Dr Khaled Abou El Fadl, professor of Law, is the Omar and
Azmeralda Alfi Distinguished Fellow in Islamic Law at the UCLA School of
Law, USA.)
ENDNOTES
1. Khaled Abou El Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim
Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the
Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries", Journal of
Islamic Law and Society 22/1 (1994).
2. Khaled Abou El Fadl, "The Rules of Killing at War:
An Inquiry into Classical Sources", The Muslim World 89 (1999).
3. Muhammad Amin Ibn ‘Abidin, Hashiyat Radd al-Muhtar,
Vol. VI (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi, 1966), p. 413; Ahmad
al-Sawi, Hashiyat al-Sawi ‘ala Tafsir al-Jalalayn, Vol. III
(Beirut: Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al-Arabi, n.d.), pp. 307-308. See also
Ahmad Dallal, "The Origins and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought,
1750-1850", Journal of the American Oriental Society 113/3 (1993).
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