Jammu is back in the news. The two-week lull has been broken, the
violent agitation resuming with vigour over the controversial transfer of
forest land to the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB) headed by governor of
the state. And it is now induced with more virulent forms of xenophobia
whipped up by sectarian statements and an economic blockade of the Kashmir
valley. The city of temples has been turned into a virtual battlefield
where violent agitators and the police clash, both engaged in a show of
senseless brutality.
With the new Jammu and Kashmir governor, NN Vohra, sending a formal
invitation for talks to the Shri Amarnath Yatra Sangharsh Samiti (SAYSS)
and the latter responding with a willingness to enter into negotiations,
the deadlock may finally come to an end. But the damage done is
irreparable, not just in terms of the trail of dead and injured or those
left homeless after their houses were torched by agitated mobs or the
economic losses incurred but more so in the form of the tarnished social
fabric. The hardened stances and the sectarian and communal divides that
the controversy eventually created, with no apparent scriptwriters
scripting this disastrous fallout, is a grievous matter to be reckoned
with.
Although the agitation in Kashmir began sometime in the third week of
June, simmering discontent over the transfer of land to the shrine board
has been brewing for years. At first glance the entire crisis appears to
be the result of petty politicking resorted to by almost every political
party in the state. The People’s Democratic Party (PDP), known to hijack
the slogans of the separatists to expand its own base in the valley, was
quick to respond when several separatist organisations began murmurs of
protest following the state cabinet’s decision to transfer the land. The
PDP was then a partner in the state’s Congress-led coalition government.
At a press conference held on June 15, PDP leader and then deputy chief
minister, Muzaffar Hussain Baig, while justifying the diversion of land as
a temporary move to enable the creation of facilities for pilgrims also
asserted that the Congress had been blackmailing the PDP into agreeing to
the land transfer. Fresh efforts at unity by the two warring factions of
the Hurriyat, led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and Syed Ali Shah Geelani who, on
July 19, decided to launch a joint agitation against the land transfer,
spurred the PDP into action, compelling it to politicise the issue and
come out in open revolt.
The Congress responded by supporting the transfer of land, hoping, in
the run-up to the state assembly elections, to reap the harvest of votes
in Jammu. Its main opponent in the Hindu-dominated region, the BJP, also
joined in the chorus. In the valley, the National Conference jumped into
the fray, blaming the PDP for the turnabout. For the separatists it was
time to rejuvenate their ranks after a long hiatus. And as politicking
began in the Kashmir valley, especially between the coalition partners, it
gave the BJP and its sangh parivar, joined by traders and lawyers, an
opportunity to begin mobilisation for trouble in Jammu. It was clear that
every one of these groups was motivated by petty political interests. The
divisive agenda seemed to work in the interests of every party and each
one of them milked the opportunity, unmindful of how badly this was
vitiating the atmosphere.
This is not the first time that regional and religious bias has been
invoked by politicians. But never before has the state witnessed such
turmoil in both regions, with people being mobilised in vast numbers. The
valley erupted in manifest opposition to the land deal. Jammu reacted to
oppose the sudden Kashmiri outburst. Years of mistrust coupled with
electoral politics are evident catalysts in the recent tumult. But there
are other reasons beyond these as well. With elections to the Jammu and
Kashmir state legislative assembly just a few months away, vote bank
politics may well have fuelled the fire. But the initial spark was
provided much before the various parties began playing politics.
There is a common misconception that the valley’s response to the
transfer of land was triggered by an Islamist agenda. Some intellectuals
compared unfolding events to the protests against sex scandals two years
ago or the anti-Bihari labourer slogans of last year. The opposition to
the SASB land transfer did not however fall in the same category. The
previous agitations, though invoked by some separatist groups, did not
inspire a total revolt. The agitation against the transfer of land to the
SASB has a history, one that has probably had a detrimental effect on the
Kashmiri Muslim psyche. And at the root of this wounded psyche is a man
called SK Sinha, former governor of Jammu and Kashmir, and the agenda of
the saffron brigade that has been in play since the beginning of the
1990s.
The Amarnath yatra, an ancient pilgrimage to the Amarnath cave, is said
to have begun in the latter half of the 19th century after a Muslim
shepherd named Buta Malik discovered the shrine, a cave in the southern
Kashmir Himalayas that is the site of an unusual ice stalagmite formed
naturally in the shape of a lingam. A 15-day yatra that culminates on the
occasion of Raksha Bandhan in August, the annual pilgrimage has taken
place peacefully and uninterruptedly every year since it first began.
It was only after the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992
that a lesser-known militant group threatened to stop the yatra. Other
militant groups, including the Hizb ul-Mujahideen, opposed these threats.
However, the saffron brigade, which had failed miserably in its 1991 Ekta
Yatra led by Murli Manohar Joshi and was looking for trouble in Kashmir to
suit its politics elsewhere in the country, saw the threats as a perfect
opportunity. They retaliated with calls for ‘Chalo Amarnath’,
asking pilgrims to go to the shrine in large numbers. Nothing significant
happened in immediate result but the number of pilgrims to Amarnath began
to show a steady increase each year.
In 1996, when the number of pilgrims crossed the one lakh mark and
landslides and avalanches claimed the lives of several yatris, the
government set up the Nitish Sengupta Committee to look into the causes of
such incidents and recommend measures to ensure that the pilgrimage could
be carried out smoothly. The Sengupta Committee report observed that both
from the environmental point of view and for the security of pilgrims it
was necessary to curtail the number of pilgrims who visited the shrine.
The report also suggested the establishment of a regulatory authority to
monitor the pilgrimage’s organisation and ensure adequate facilities for
the pilgrims.
That is how the legislative act came into existence whereby the Shri
Amarnath Shrine Board was in place by 2001. According to the act, the
board was to be headed by the state governor, if he or she was a Hindu. If
the governor did not happen to be a Hindu the board would be headed by any
Hindu from the state, nominated by the governor. For a seasonal yatra of
15 days, the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board Act had vested the shrine board
with sweeping powers.
In 2003 SK Sinha took over as governor of Jammu and Kashmir, shortly
after the PDP’s Mufti Mohammad Sayeed became chief minister in November
2002, supported by a coalition of allies, including the Congress. As a
Hindu, Sinha also automatically became chairman of the shrine board. In
2004, due to changes in the lunar calendar, the yatra was extended by a
few weeks. But Sinha decided to make this a regular feature, acting in
direct contravention of the Sengupta recommendations which formed the very
basis of the board’s creation.
In 2005 Sinha and Mufti were engaged in a controversy over the yatra’s
extension after Sinha proposed that the duration of the yatra be extended
to three months. Mufti was well aware of the implications of the proposed
move, both from the security and the environmental point of view; his
opposition to Sinha also stemmed from concerns about Raj Bhavan’s
interference in administrative matters and counter-insurgency networking.
Ultimately, after a few Congress ministers came out in Sinha’s support and
threatened to resign over the issue, the centre intervened and Mufti
partially yielded to the demands, agreeing to the duration of the yatra
being extended to two months.
But more is not always better. There are two routes to the Amarnath
cave, one from Pahalgam and the other from Baltal, Sonamarg. The long trek
winding up steep hills is not easily manoeuvrable. The cold and
inhospitable weather conditions are not suitable for habitation.
Occasional landslides and avalanches are an additional problem and
ensuring the security and safety of pilgrims is an arduous and
unmanageable task. Only the barest minimum facilities for pilgrims can be
provided and this only at the base camps where some form of medical care
is also possible.
Managing a two month-yatra every year was not without peril, especially
with more and more pilgrims trickling in, the number doubling almost every
year. The SASB’s cancellation of the minimal registration fee, the absence
of facilities for lakhs of people, the creation of which is next to
impossible in this terrain, and the lack of clear travel advisories to
pilgrims, many of whom arrive without even basic woollen clothing or prior
medical check-ups, has already taken its toll.
There were protests even from religio-spiritual quarters as priests
from the Dashnami Akhara in Jammu, who traditionally perform the prayers
at the Amarnath cave along with priests from Mattan in South Kashmir,
contested Sinha’s moves to extend the yatra. But Sinha was unrelenting.
The priests didn’t have much say. Thanks to the shrine board, which
gradually also robbed the yatra of its secular character, they along with
the Malik family had lost rights over any decision pertaining to the
shrine or the pilgrimage. Since Buta Malik’s discovery of the shrine in
the 1800s the Malik family has been closely associated with the Amarnath
yatra and even received a share of the donations that pilgrims made on the
journey.
The yatra was once a collective affair organised by priests from Mattan
and the Dashnami Akhara in Jammu together with local people as well as the
state government. Priests from Mattan and the Dashnami Akhara performed
the prayers. The Malik family received a share of the offerings. Local
pony-wallahs carried the yatris and organised langars. And the state
government managed the security and other facilities for the pilgrims.
According to tradition, the head priest of the Dashnami Akhara carries
the holy mace all the way up to the cave. When the priest and his
entourage left Srinagar’s Lal Chowk area with the holy mace the occasion
was marked by celebrations, with both Hindus and Muslims joining in to
give them a warm send off at the Dal Gate, about two or three kilometres
away. As insurgency changed much of the social landscape in the valley,
these celebrations became less exuberant but the holy mace still left from
the Dashnami Akhara building in Srinagar’s Lal Chowk every year.
But when the pony-wallahs complained of unnecessary harassment
following the implementation of new rules that required them to pay a
licence fee (interestingly, for a yatra that lasted only a few weeks in
the year) people in the valley grew wary of Sinha’s designs. The board’s
writ however was final in all decisions pertaining to the pilgrimage even
though it did not have the infrastructure or the wherewithal to manage the
yatra on its own. The SASB came into being as a regulatory authority and
borrowed state infrastructure to provide both security and facilities for
the yatris, funds for which were allocated from the state budget every
year.
The functioning of the board was not transparent, nor could the
governor, who took refuge in his constitutional position, be held
accountable. When queries regarding the Amarnath shrine board came up in
the legislative assembly last winter Raj Bhavan refused to furnish any
information in this regard. And ever since Sinha took charge of things the
SASB has been mired in controversy. From the yatra’s duration becoming a
bone of contention in 2005 to the melting lingam the same year. The very
next year the shrine board was accused of having an artificial ice lingam
installed in the cave after procuring ice in bulk from New Delhi. The
board denied the charge although it admitted to the presence of the
artificial ice lingam. An inquiry commission under a retired high court
judge that was appointed to probe the issue bailed Sinha and the SASB out
even as its findings left much unexplained. Nevertheless, the melting
lingam appalled many yatris and reports of it being tampered with sent
many pilgrims packing.
The Amarnath cave derives its spirituality from the naturally formed
ice lingam and the icy heights of the mountains where it is located. As
head priest of the Dashnami Akhara, Deepindra Giri has been carrying the
holy mace to the cave during the yatra for several years. Giri had opposed
the yatra’s extension all along, maintaining that this would adversely
affect the environment and cause the lingam to melt. Bearing the holy
mace, Giri reaches the cave at the very end of the annual pilgrimage. He
has not seen the lingam in the past four years. Long before the holy mace
reaches the shrine the lingam is reduced to just an icy platform or
nothing at all.
So this year when it was decided that 800 kanals of forest land
would be transferred to the board, eyebrows were naturally raised.
The ‘Chalo Amarnath’ call of the saffron brigade in the 1990s
was followed by the creation of the shrine board in 2001, which took place
when the National Conference was in power in the state and the BJP-led NDA
government was in power at the centre. (The National Conference was a
coalition ally of the NDA and its current president, Omar Abdullah, was a
minister in the NDA government.) There was no resentment against the yatra
at the time. But when Sinha’s moves boded ill for the locals people began
suspecting that there was indeed a hidden agenda behind the very creation
of the board and with Sinha’s being sent in as the man in command. His
dubious role as governor of Assam during the 1990s was also frequently
discussed.
Sinha’s entire tenure as governor of Jammu and Kashmir was marked by an
intense obsession with the yatra. He had been pursuing the land transfer
matter since 2005 but the PDP had been persistent in resisting these
efforts. A high court ruling in a public interest litigation had also
recommended that land should be made available to the Amarnath shrine
board for the creation of temporary facilities for the yatris. After the
Congress took over the reins of power in November 2005, with Ghulam Nabi
Azad in charge, the issue became a sore point between the party and their
ally, the PDP, at several cabinet meetings.
The initial proposal was to ‘acquire’ 3,600 kanals of land for
the creation of facilities, including sheds and toilets, for the pilgrims.
In fact, even before the land transfer was okayed in May 2008, Sinha was
looking to spread his wings with a fresh proposal to take over control of
Sonamarg and Pahalgam from the development authorities in the two hill
resorts. Both tourist resorts serve as base camps for the Amarnath
pilgrimage. Sinha’s growing demands were making the Kashmiris increasingly
insecure.
It is not known whose agenda Sinha was pursuing. But that he had the
partial if not full backing of the centre all along was fairly evident,
even as power changed hands from a BJP-led NDA government to a
Congress-led UPA government in New Delhi. Despite Mufti Mohammad Sayeed’s
objections and a prolonged confrontation in 2005 over the yatra’s
duration, the then chief minister was ultimately forced to give in to
Sinha’s demands at the centre’s insistence. By this time the Congress was
in the saddle in New Delhi. After Ghulam Nabi Azad took over as chief
minister of the coalition government, talk was rife in official circles
that Azad was using Sinha as a counterweight against Mufti.
But how does the constitutional head of a state become such a
superpower without the backing of someone at the power centre? For three
years, right up to March 2008, the PDP had resisted all efforts to
transfer the land to the SASB, as is evident from reports about
confrontations between the coalition members on the issue. What happened
between March and May 2008 to prompt the PDP to abandon its stand, this
moreover at the fag end of Sinha’s career?
SK Sinha’s tenure as governor formally ended on June 2 but it was
extended by a few weeks, days in which public resentment against the land
transfer was building. Congress spokesperson Jayanti Natarajan maintained
– only after Sinha’s exit from Jammu and Kashmir – that he was a communal
man, pointing out his equally reprehensible role in Assam. That it took
more than four years for the Congress to recognise Sinha’s troublesome
qualities is difficult to digest. Was the Congress oblivious of his past
record, his obvious right-wing leanings? If such facts were known they
were conveniently ignored for some reason or the other, making the
constitutional head of Jammu and Kashmir all-powerful and seemingly
unquestionable.
In any event, the view that the land transfer formed part of a design
to bring about a demographic change in Kashmir did not have its roots in
Islamic fundamentalism. It was the product of Sinha’s sinister moves which
bred suspicion. Whether or not there was any design to bring about such a
change in so inhospitable a terrain, there were certainly legitimate
reasons for insecurity and anger.
It has been contended that 800 kanals of land was not enough
space in which to effect any kind of demographic change in a place where
99 per cent of the population was Muslim. One is indeed aware that 800
kanals of land managed by the Amarnath shrine board, headed by a
non-state subject, would perhaps be insufficient to bring about any
demographic change. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind the
sequence of events that gave rise to the scepticism and insecurity of the
Kashmiris and to place the blame where it should rightfully lie – on
Sinha’s shoulders.
Call it a temporary diversion or call it a permanent transfer of land,
on the psyche of a people who had earlier agitated against offering vast
tracts of land in Gulmarg to hoteliers and corporations from outside the
state it created an identical negative impact. Thanks to his past actions
Sinha was already regarded with considerable suspicion and his new moves
were now seen as part of a deliberate agenda against the locals. Eight
hundred kanals of land may not be enough to settle even a small
number of non-state subjects. But under a constitutional head of state who
had become too demanding it could well have been the beginning of such a
settlement. After all, the Gaza strip was created bit by bit, not
overnight.
The psychological impact of such fears and the pent-up anger of the
people – long years of suppression, human rights abuse, increasing
alienation and a growing disillusionment with the peace process – led to a
spontaneous agitation in the valley. In fact, the final spark was not
provided by Islamists, petty politicking between different parties, the
unity moves of the two Hurriyat factions or their creation of the Action
Committee against Land Transfer. The final spark was lit by the chief
executive officer of the SASB, Arun Kumar.
At a press conference on June 17, responding to Muzaffar Hussain Baig’s
claims that the PDP had been arm-twisted into okaying the deal, Arun Kumar
stated that the land transfer was ‘permanent’. Kumar’s press conference
assumed significance in that his offensive remarks became the final
provocation, setting the tone for a massive agitation in Kashmir. It was
not just the ‘permanent land transfer’ he referred to, remarks that he
later tried to distance himself from. It was also his provocative
comparison between the Haj pilgrimage and the Amarnath pilgrimage and his
insistence that the SASB would make the Amarnath yatra a permanent feature
to accommodate the increasing number of Hindus in the world. Arun Kumar’s
outburst strengthened the fears and insecurities of a people whose
obsession with the history of Palestine invoked fears that this was the
first step towards the creation of a Gaza strip here.
(Interestingly, Arun Kumar’s rather mysterious role in the land
transfer matter also comes into focus on an earlier occasion when the
initial proposal for the allocation of 3,600 kanals of land was
sent to the state forest department in 2005. His wife, Sonali Kumar, who
happened to be forest commissioner at the time, gave the proposal the
green light. When Mufti learnt of this he cancelled the order on the
grounds that it had not received the mandatory clearance from the cabinet
and also that the transfer of forest land would amount to violation of a
Supreme Court directive.)
By June 19, violent protests, brutally dealt with, had begun in the
Kashmir valley. On June 27, a Friday, a complete bandh was observed in the
valley to oppose both the transfer of land and the killing of two persons
in police firing during protests in downtown Srinagar. At Friday afternoon
prayers in various mosques across Kashmir imams and separatist leaders
exhorted people to gather in public protest against the land transfer.
Thousands of people all over the valley descended on the streets. In
Srinagar alone, the summer capital of the state, more than one lakh people
took part in various peaceful demonstrations. In view of the earlier
deaths in police firing, the police and security forces had perhaps
decided to avoid any direct confrontation with the protesters and allowed
them to assemble freely.
Most of them converged at Lal Chowk, some hoisting green flags at the
historic crossing’s Clock Tower. Slogans of ‘azadi’ dominated the
scene. But pro-Pakistan and religious slogans were also heard. The
agitation against the Amarnath land transfer had become an occasion for
political revolt, suppressed by years of indifference and to some extent
by the attenuation of the separatist leadership. But when slogans of ‘hum
kya chahte hain… azadi (What do we want… freedom)’ turned into
‘azadi ka matlab kya… La ilaha il Allah (What is freedom…
Allah)’ the reaction was just the opposite in the Jammu region where an
agitation waited in the wings for a collapsing state administration.
When some Kashmiri youth hoisted green Islamic flags at Srinagar’s
historic Lal Chowk and the electronic media gave copious coverage to the
incident the masses in Jammu, unmindful of the history of events,
perceived it as a war between two religions, not as a people’s war for
their land or even as a people’s struggle to decide what happens on their
land. In the 1990s massive agitations had rocked the Hindu-dominated town
of Katra in the Jammu region, base camp for the Vaishno Devi pilgrimage,
against the Vaishno Devi Shrine Board’s move to build a motorable road to
the shrine. The decision was not in the public interest and the protests
were both supported and justified. Yet when protests took place in Kashmir
for similar reasons they were given a religious colour. The green flags
and Islamic slogans only contributed to this religious paranoia.
On June 25, NN Vohra took over as the new governor of Jammu and
Kashmir. A few days later, on June 28, the PDP pulled out of the coalition
government, leaving a one-legged Congress at the helm. The next day Vohra
wrote to the chief minister, saying that the SASB was not interested in
pursuing the land transfer if the state government could give assurance
that it would provide suitable facilities for the yatra. Two days later
the cabinet of a minority government met to cancel the land transfer
order.
There were two reasons why the order had to be revoked and it was
obvious that the state government had been pressurised to do so by the
centre. First, the land agitation had strengthened the hands of the
separatists and New Delhi believed that any further delay would fritter
away the gains of the peace process. This was not the first agitation
against government policies in the valley but the fact that it was fast
assuming the shape of a revolt, especially at a time when the Indian
government was hoping to cash in on the decreased militancy-related
violence and the weakening of separatist leaders, had sounded alarm bells.
And second, the dawning realisation that the decision to transfer the land
had been unsound along with recognition of the damage that Sinha and the
land deal had wrought.
But the Congress government failed to offer any explanation, either for
its initial order on the land transfer or the subsequent need for its
cancellation. Because the Congress was busy politicising the issue and
busy getting even with the PDP, both washing their dirty linen in public,
the government had no explanations to offer the people, either in Kashmir
or Jammu, the constituency that the Congress had been eyeing. This seems
to have acted as a catalyst for the agitation in the state’s winter
capital.
The cancellation of the land transfer order had an adverse fallout in
the Jammu region where the sangh parivar, prompted by its mentor, Lal
Krishna Advani, was already up in arms against what they had begun to call
‘surrendering to separatists and anti-nationals’. In Kashmir, the
religious slogans, green flags and pro-Pakistan slogans were, as always,
expressions of an anti-India sentiment. But the public outcry, the anger
had both a history and justification. In Jammu, the sangh parivar sought
to legitimise the agitation on the grounds that this was an expression of
‘Jammu sentiment’ – a euphemism for Hindu sentiment.
Peoples’ sentiments, nurtured on the theory that Jammu has always been
discriminated against, were easily whipped up in the panic inspired by the
‘unity’ that the Kashmiri leadership, including mainstream political
parties, displayed on the issue. Not many who came out on the streets in
protest knew the basis for the agitation. The popular sentiment was
anti-Kashmir and anti-Muslim, fed by myths that Hindu land had been taken
away by Muslims, which the sangh parivar had so cleverly perpetuated.
It took three days for Congress ministers to respond to the agitation
in Jammu where they adopted a more diffident position, claiming that the
land had been transferred because the former governor wanted it but the
transfer order had been cancelled because the new governor didn’t. Two
days later the chief minister, Ghulam Nabi Azad, addressed a hurried press
conference where he insisted that ‘this was a win-win situation for
Jammu’. The lack of any explanation about what the land transfer
signified, what its repercussions would have been, why it was opposed in
the Kashmir valley and how the cancellation of the order would impact or
not impact the yatra, created conditions conducive to the fertility of
sangh parivar propaganda, something that these groups had long been
waiting for. Azad’s remarks on the day the land transfer order was
cancelled – that the agitation in Kashmir was against a non-issue – itself
legitimised the agitation in Jammu where demands were made for revocation
of the cancellation of the previous order i.e. restoring the land to the
SASB.
The government had virtually no story to tell. Or perhaps it lacked the
desire to do so. But the media did. Every local electronic media channel
in Jammu was awash with stories. They ran an almost round the clock ‘soap
opera’ showcasing unknown individuals from the saffron brigade mouthing
their propaganda, raising slogans or burning effigies. Meagre protests
being held in small mohallas appeared to be getting a live
telecast. These were the only voices people heard and their only source of
information or rather, disinformation.
That the protests in Jammu were not marked by spontaneity but by a
steady build-up is evident from the fact that in the first few days of the
agitation only a few protesters, supporters of the sangh parivar, were out
on the streets. Gradually, the numbers started swelling into thousands,
with people from the suburbs of Jammu city coming out to participate in
the violent protests. Three Hindu-dominated districts in the region were
badly affected. Rajouri town and Bhaderwah were also on the boil. Many of
the areas that erupted in violence had no previous history of any
organised forms of protest. It was clear that the efforts of the local
electronic media had worked to complement mass mobilisation campaigns by
the Bajrang Dal, the VHP and the RSS.
Before the Amarnath controversy the BJP stood fractured and weakened.
But the more rabid groups in the sangh parivar had been quietly
consolidating their positions; over the past few years some of their
national-level leaders had made frequent visits to Jammu for this purpose.
Fringe groups like the various factions of the Shiv Sena used the
agitation as a means to drum up support. And with some Delhi-based
Kashmiri Pandit groups and the Panun Kashmir working overtime to brand the
Kashmir agitation as Islamist, groups driven by the Hindutva ideology saw
the Pandit migrant camps as fertile hunting ground.
Many Pandits in the migrant camps who cherished the renewed hope that
they could soon return to the Kashmir valley grew sceptical after the
agitation in the valley began. The mass processions in Kashmir were far
too reminiscent of the 1990s. Contrary to popular belief, it was not the
selective killings of Pandits, reports of which have always been wildly
exaggerated, that drove the Pandits out of the valley then. It was in fact
an outburst similar to the one we are witnessing today that was largely
responsible for the Pandits’ insecurity, sentiments that the then governor
exploited in order to encourage a mass exodus of Pandits from Kashmir.
Having quietened over the years, it is this bottled up anger in the
Pandits that resurfaced and it is this anger that the sangh parivar is
exploiting today. Within days of the agitation several Hindutva groups
were enriched with new cadres, including many from the Pandit camps.
Jammu, which had not succumbed to any provocations in the last two
decades, was on the boil. In the past, communal harmony had been ensured
by the peoples’ bid to protect not only the secular fabric of the region
but also the economic interests of traders and the business community who
form an important component of the local population, particularly in Jammu
city. But this time propagandists had been working overtime to cash in on
the Hindu sentiment in Jammu, creating insecurities within its Muslim
population even as the attacks on Gujjars and the anti-Muslim discourse
further vitiated the atmosphere. The secular voices had all but
disappeared, swept along by the sudden frenzy or lost in deafening
silence.
The Shri Amarnath Yatra Sangharsh Samiti, a protest group formed in the
course of the Jammu agitation, demanded revocation of the cancellation of
the land transfer order. The SAYSS consisted of a group of saffron brigade
members, the Jammu Bar Association, a few intellectuals, traders and
business groups and even included a Muslim group who joined in perhaps to
ensure the safety of members of their community. The dominant voice in the
SAYSS was that of the sangh parivar who has been rebuffing all voices
within the committee that are in favour of a peaceful agitation.
The committee sought to dismiss any allegations that the agitation was
communal in nature, stating that its grievances were directed against the
Kashmiri leadership. However, the continuing dichotomy – whether their
protest was an expression of ‘Jammu’ sentiment or ‘Hindu’ sentiment –
remains unexplained. How was Jammu sentiment associated with a piece of
forest land? And as long as yatris were being taken care of – either by
the SASB, which has never had the infrastructure or the wherewithal to
take up this gigantic task, or the state government – how could Hindu
sentiment be affected?
For people misled by myths it was difficult to sift fact from fiction
or differentiate between Hindutva and Hindu sentiments. Hinduism, a
complete philosophy of pacifism, karma and coexistence, is in no way
safeguarded by a small piece of land controlled by a shrine board.
Religious sentiments are linked to the preservation of shrines, their
spirituality (in this case to the ice lingam which melts away every year
due to the flawed policies of the SASB) and their sanctity. Religious
sentiments have little to do with the arrangements for pilgrimages which
are managed, as always, by the state government with the shrine board
acting in a supervisory capacity. But the agitation was built on
systematic misconceptions, the dissemination of rumours and the incitement
to hatred against the Kashmiris, which is more reflective of Hindutva than
of Hinduism. It is time for the people of Jammu to understand the
difference and to resist the stirrings of this dangerous propaganda.
At the same time, the Kashmiris must recognise that although religious
slogans are popular expressions of resentment and alienation against India
they can create insecurities in the minds of people in the state who
belong to other communities. Valley-centric politics has long revolved
around mosques and religious slogans, not just in the last two decades but
well before that, even in the time of Sheikh Abdullah whose obsession with
Hazratbal politics was conspicuous. In fact, the use of mosques to
mobilise people for political purposes or protests has become an accepted
part of life. There is no need to justify this. If the state’s pluralist
fabric has to be kept intact in a harmonious mould it is time to shun
politics that can create insecurities and divisions.
Violent street protests are still a ritual in Jammu even as the SAYSS
has agreed to enter into talks to resolve the issue. The month-long
agitation has cost businessmen thousands of crores of rupees in Jammu city
alone. Health care and education have been severely hit. And the violence
and hatred of recent weeks will undoubtedly have a significant
psychological impact in the long run. But the most harmful outcome of
recent events is the damage done by the creation of communal and regional
divides that do not augur well for the social fabric of the state or for
eventual peace.
It is vital that secular individuals and groups across the board come
forward to dispel all manner of propaganda and to work together to prevent
a repeat of what Jammu and Kashmir has witnessed in the past six weeks or
more. And at this juncture it would be wise to examine and reflect on what
has been happening here and why before we even attempt to create a space
for wounds to heal.
Ten days later: Dangerous divide
The rift is complete, the regional divide in Jammu and Kashmir getting
even more pronounced with the communal fallout. Seventy-five hutments
belonging to Muslim Gujjars have been torched in Samba, Kathua and Akhnoor,
Rajouri, Poonch, Doda, Bhaderwah and Kishtwar. These areas, where the
demographic balance between Hindus and Muslims is fragile, have been
marked by tensions.
On August 12, a serious communal clash broke out in Kishtwar, replete
with violence, torching of properties and the death of two in police
firing. Tempers are still high. Many Muslim families from various parts of
the region who have settled in Jammu city have shifted to their ancestral
homes though there are no specific incidents of harassment. But reports of
Muslim drivers being harassed by mobs on the Jammu-Poonch and Jammu-Srinagar
highways have begun to haunt them.
The SAYSS however denies the communal fallout, arguing that Muslim
groups support them and have even been joining in the protests. The flip
side of the story is the allegations of forced participation. The Muslim
Federation, which supports the SAYSS, has constantly taken up issues of
harassment on a communal basis and its insecurity with the SAYSS
leadership. But has it in turn been pressurised into ‘counter propaganda’
launched by Kashmiri leaders? Going beyond the stated position that
‘this agitation is not communal but we are all together’, the SAYSS has
done precious little to prevent any damage to the secular fabric. It has
not even condemned the incidents of communal violence that have come to
light.
What adds to the insecurities of Muslims are statements by the SAYSS
leaders that smack of an extremist Hindu right-wing agenda. A case in
point is the ‘Quit Jammu’ slogan by the BJP. The party’s leaders declared
that ‘supporters of Geelani, Abdullahs and Muftis’ living in Bhatindi, a
colony that came up on illegally encroached forest land during National
Conference rule, should quit Jammu. Following criticism, they sought to
describe it as a campaign against illegal encroachments and not one
fostered by communal design. But the communal overtones are unmistakeable.
Bhatindi has a vast Muslim population, including a few Kashmiris. Several
residents of Jammu, including Hindus and Sikhs, have also settled in
Bhatindi or own land here. Among them is a distinguished BJP leader.
So why were the Kashmiris among them made particular targets? And why
were several other mushrooming, illegally encroached colonies conveniently
ignored? Another glaring example is the manner in which several
constituents of the ‘secular’ SAYSS sought to condemn the damage to
properties belonging to Hindus in Kishtwar. How is it that their
secularism did not prompt them to condemn the damage to Muslim-owned
properties and the killing of two Muslims in the same incident? Still more
conspicuous are the reports that armed cadres of the RSS, the VHP and the
Bajrang Dal have sneaked into Jammu from outside the state. Though the
administration officially denies such reports, some police officers, on
conditions of anonymity, confirmed the cadres’ presence in the Kashmiri
Pandit-dominated areas of Jammu.
Clearly, the divide is well pronounced. Jammu versus Kashmir is
becoming Hindu versus Muslim. But contrary to what the SAYSS claims, it is
the Kashmiri Muslim who is the main target and not the Kashmiri ruling
elite. And although it now seeks to distance itself from its earlier
statements, it was the SAYSS which had announced at several press
conferences that it was starting an economic blockade of Kashmir valley.
The incidents of harassment of Muslim drivers on highways, especially
Kashmiri Muslims, some of whom were badly beaten up and their vehicles
burnt down, tell the real story. For a few days the economic blockade was
complete, with no trucks moving on the roads and a limp administration
unable to keep the national highway clear of disruptions by mobs. It was
only after the army was called out in Jammu that disruptions were eased
and traffic on the highway marginally improved.
However, supplies continue to be affected due to a continuous bandh in
Jammu since July 24, affecting the movement of local trucks between Jammu
and Srinagar, which is the major source of supplies to all regions in the
state. As is obvious, the situation is extremely grave. Most areas of the
state, including Kashmir valley, are cut off during winter months and
supplies have to be stocked well before October, especially for the two
districts of Ladakh where the only road link closes by September end.
Threats of an economic blockade thus created a heightened insecurity
among Kashmiris and the two Hurriyat factions, supported by traders,
responded with a ‘Chalo Muzaffarabad’ call on August 11. The
administration bungled with their inaction. No curfew was imposed before
the march. When a sea of humanity, led by Hurriyat leaders, Shabir Shah
and Sheikh Abdul Aziz, descended on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road the
security forces began firing indiscriminately, killing six persons,
including Aziz, and injuring 100 people. Over 24 persons were killed over
the next three days. There was mayhem in the valley. Crowds defied curfew
to protest. Many said that the situation was a roll-back to 1990.
In fact, it is far worse. Then it was passion and anger against the
Indian state that brought out the gun. In August 2008 it is the anger and
venom of an unarmed public against not just the Indian state but extremist
Hindus, the Hindutvavadis and dangerously, the Jammu region too.
The perils in this are long-term. Communal violence may not be so
apparent today but hatred and venom, deepened by myths and rumours on both
sides, with demands for a division of the state on communal lines, may
prove more lethal.
Jammu and Kashmir is sitting on a ticking time bomb. When will it
explode? If divisions are allowed to grow and remain unaddressed we may
well have reached the point of no return. The unity of the state and
communal harmony within it is imperative, for its plurality thrives on the
overlapping of cultures and interdependent economies. The centre, which
has been dragging its feet with a futile attempt at an all-party
parliamentarian delegation, must act fast. The silence from the prime
minister and the UPA leadership is deafening.
There can be no settlement without involving both sides. There must be
dialogue facilitated between agitating groups so that misconceptions and
myths can be cleared and the dispute resolved.