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Hindutva
for a Few Dollars a Day By
Biju Mathew and Vijay Prashad There
is no way to tell the arms bribery story and not offer a fundamental
criticism of the Hindu Right and its shenanigans whilst in power. Bangru Laxman
asks the intrepid tehelka.com journalists to bring him $30,000 to
their next meeting. He has already taken Rs. 1 lakh. "You can
give dollars," said the president of the BJP. "You talk to
us directly. We normally turn to (National Security Advisor) Brajesh
Mishra because he has access to the defense, foreign and other
related ministries." The tehelka.com
sting showed a web of corruption that spans the BJP, the RSS, the
Samata Party, sections of the armed forces and the illegal arms
brokers. What is Mr. Laxman, head of the so-called patriotic BJP,
doing with bribes, even more so what does it mean that he wanted the
money in dollars? Of course none
of this is new, and we really didn't need the tehelka.com
journalists to inform us about the rot of the BJP-RSS. This party of
middlemen has a long history of dalali (bribery) - Advani and others
were involved in the Hawala scam; the BJP's friends, the Hindujas
have a long string of scandals from the Bofors debacle to the recent
passport scam in England; there are a host of local scandals that
run the gamut from payoffs for business deals to Mafia-type murders
for election gain; finally, for us in the U. S., there are rumors of
dollars being smuggled into India, some via gold merchants in
Queens. BJP President Bangru Laxman caught on tape by
Tehelka soliciting bribes. What then is
this RSS-BJP "patriotism" all about? The BJP-RSS are
patriotic, but only to the Brahmin-Banya-Big Bourgeoisie, not to the
bulk of the Indian population. Those who mistook the RSS-BJP for a
patriotic party did not see that it was only the party of a certain
section of the population. It is this section that has been exposed
by the tehelka.com scandal, as it was in the hawala scam. Some people
would like to say that only a few bad apples do not condemn the
entire orchard: but we are not talking about a few apples, but the
core itself, the president of the party, the leaders of its main
alliance partner and trustees of its ideological wing. And, besides,
these few names are only those released in the first set of
tehelka.com tapes (knowing them from the cricket scandal, they will
carefully release their tapes for maximum media impact). Also, the
scandal was uncovered by two journalists who spent a mere Rs. 11
lakhs on the story. If a national inquiry were conducted on a larger
scale, it would surely have shown that the RSS-BJP patriotism was
rotten to the core, but true to those classes that benefit from its
rule.The scandal is not only in the bribes. These are nothing. A
lakh here, a lakh there. Journalist Ken Silverstein informs us that
the U. S. Congress is no better. The return on investment to U.S.
lawmakers is astounding: in 1996, Lockheed spent $5 million to lobby
Congress and earned $15 billion of tax-money to underwrite foreign
weapons sales, while in that same year, Microsoft spent under $2
million and earned tax credits worth hundreds of millions of dollars
for license sales to software programs manufactured overseas.
Washington D. C. on $10 million a day. New Delhi on $2000 a day, a
few cowries more or less. The scandal is
not just the bribes, but it is the institutional rot. Whatever the
RSS-BJP touches is fundamentally corrupted. As it came to power in
1998, the Hindu Right stuffed its people into government
bureaucracies and fired many long-time civil servants (no government
before had done such extensive house-cleaning). The scandals over
the Indian Council of Historical Research, the NCERT, and every
other government bureaucracy is by now well-known. This is just how
fascistic movements operate: they do not allow state institutions an
autonomous logic, but try to make them subservient to its own will.
The ICHR, for example, ceases to be about the discipline of history,
but it becomes about the glorification of the past as represented by
Hindutva. But the RSS-BJP did not stop at the civilian bureaucracy,
for it also put its paws into the military. The scandal over the
firing of Admiral Bhagwat, the favoritism in the promotions in all
three services and the scandalous use of military honors after the
Kargil War - all point to the widespread disruption of the military
establishment for nefarious political purposes. That the military is
now so heavily involved with the corruption is thanks to the
RSS-BJP-type regime. Major General
Manjit S. Ahluwalia, Director General of Ordinance and Supply, one
of the top men in-charge of goods, told the tehelka.com journalists
"you can't come to my house without a bottle of [Johnny Walker]
Blue Label [whiskey]." The dollars are in liquid form. On 22
Dec. 1998, the BJP welcomed 90 retired military personnel into the
party. At the event, one ex-officer noted that "the armed
forces can do anything better than others, whether administrative
work in the government or running the politics of the country."
This
undemocratic, and fundamentally fascistic, sentiment should have
been hastily condemned by the RSS-BJP, but no, the party of
"stability" and "honesty" went along with it. We
had a senseless nuclear blast, which provoked the Kargil War, and
now we have a fundamentally compromised military. The
RSS-BJP-allied government refuses to resign. It may hold onto power
in the short-run, and its friends in the United States may claim
that the entire episode is politically motivated. No one, however,
is misled that this party of "dharma" is nothing but the
pious face of dalali and hawala, of those who want to sell off the
country's assets (such as profit-making public sector concerns like
BALCO) or else bankrupt the country for multinational firms (as with
Enron). The "patriotism" of the RSS-BJP is the patriotism
of money, of the saffron dollar that is insatiable for profit and
unconcerned with the welfare of the people. Some will nod
their heads and say that "everyone takes bribes" as if
this is normal, and therefore forgivable. Others will say that only
some are involved, that Vajpayee (always Vajpayee) is above it all -
this is like saying that Ronald Reagan did not know about the
Iran-Contra affair, when in fact the point is that these people tell
us that they operate as a disciplined party that has an ideological
face. There is no way to tell this story and not offer a fundamental
criticism of the Hindu Right and its shenanigans whilst in
power. The
Saffron Dollar
Pehle
Paisa, Phir Bhagwan Yankee Hindutva responds to the non-resident
Indian's identity problem. Its rapid spread among NRIs is full of
implications for society back home. From its marginal and obscure origins in Nagpur in 1925,
Hindutva has become fairly “attractive” to large sections of the
Hindu population (and its attendant “minority” éleves). Whether
in New Delhi or New York, the global Hindu bourgeoisie has in the
past two decades accepted Hindutva ideology as an acceptable part of
its world-view. That is, whether one is actually a follower of
Hindutva or not, one tends to acknowledge its presence in terms of
its electoral strength in India (via the Bharatiya Janata Party and
Shiv Sena) and the “relevance” of its overall politico-cultural
arguments. There
appears to be a fairly universal agreement that the outfits of
Hindutva are manned by two sorts of people: the moderate
(exemplified by Vajpayee despite his own tight links with the RSS
hot-heads) and the fanatic (exemplified by B. L. Sharma ‘Prem’
and the foot soldiers who destroyed Mir Baqi’s mosque at Ayodhya).
While the Hindutva fellow-travellers find themselves ill at ease
with the rabidity of ‘Prem,’ they have no compunction about
Vajpayee and hence, the project of Hindutva. The
importance of the distinction is this: not only has the Hindutva
project been able to gain electoral support in specific regions in
India, but in the United States it has grown silently and steadily
to become a significant determinant in the lives and fashions of the
Hindu community. The support for the Hindutva ensemble in the US
comes for very different reasons than in India and these
distinctions bear investigation.
Asians
and American Racism
In
1996, Anu Goyal released a CD entitled Pehle Paisa, Phir Bhagwan
(First Money, Then God). The title functions adequately as the
slogan of the Non-Resident Indian (NRI). The 30-year career of the
Non-Resident Indian in the United States has been notable for its
silent pursuit of money alongside an apparently ‘apolitical’ and
cultural social life. Three components of American ideology provide,
in broad strokes, those ways of being for the NRI which are
authorised by American society—the Asian as Scientist, the Asian
as Citizen and the Asian as Cultured. Scientist
Asian. In 1957, the Soviets launched two Sputnik rockets and four
years later, Yuri Gagarin orbited the earth: the managers of the
American state panicked, and their principal worry was that their
youth cared little for science which was, after all, the basis for
world domination. They, therefore, reconsidered the ban on
immigration from Asia (whose socialist nations were spending much
from the public exchequer to train their young to be competent
scientists). In
1965, Washington DC opened the doors to Asian migrants who came with
advanced degrees in the technical sciences. The American state and
society welcomed the migrants on strict terms: we want your labour,
but we don’t want your lives. In other words, the migrants came to
work, not to offer alternative cultures and dreams to American
society. When they tried to decorate their new lives with cultural
artefacts, they were chastised for failing to culturally assimilate
(and blindly conform to the Protestant values of the American
state). Citizen
Asian. In 1965, Black America sent a strong message to its
oppressors: the rebellion launched in Watts, California reminded
America that its responses to the civil rights movement was tardy.
The racist inertia propelled a political insurrection which was
institutionalised in the various Black leftist groups such as the
Black Panthers. One of the American state’s responses, among
others, was to decide on a policy of substituting the Black
working-class with migrants from the Third World. In
1965, two mainstream magazines underscored the ideological position
of American racism with articles describing Asians as a hardworking
and loyal population (who did not require state support), in
contrast to the Blacks, described as a lazy and rebellious
population. The articles failed to mention that the Asians were
state-selected: their indicators looked good because only educated
migrants were welcomed. Regardless, an enduring myth was created
which continues to have currency in contemporary America: that the
Asians are a “model minority”. Before long, Asians themselves
were retailing this myth. Cultural
Asian. Even a “model minority” (scientist/citizen) requires
some components of a personality, and these the Asians found in
their cultures (elements of which had already been substantially
valorised by the discipline of Orientalism). And so the NRIs present
themselves as a cultural commodity even though they themselves came
to the US without extensive training in the arts of their own
culture (that is, during their narrow-minded and extensive education
in the post-colonial educational system of India, they never gained
the nuanced idea of their cultural history). The
NRI, therefore, turns to those purveyors of ‘culture’ such as
Orientalist textbooks and its authors as well as the organisers of
the Hindu Right. The American establishment, for its part, accepts
the cultural traits of the NRI, particularly since these are deemed
to be the reasons for the NRI’s ‘superiority’ over Blacks.
This is how American racism helps in valorising the forces of
Hindutva by both the Hindu bourgeoisie and by an American society
which is superficially impressed by the antiquity of the
Subcontinent (and its philosophical heritage—notably the
monotheism of the Upanishads and of Buddhism). These
three components provide the narrow space for the NRI to negotiate a
life and livelihood. Between them, the Hindutva ensemble utilises
the everyday contradictions of American life to draw support from
amongst the NRIs. Tactics
and Strategies
Initially,
the migrants lived disorganised lives with their main locus of
social interaction being the long-distance call and their local
regional organisations (such as the Tamil Sangam, the Gujarat Samaj,
etc). Early liberal-bourgeois organisers deployed the national label
(Indo-American) to gather the disparate people together to lobby for
the spoils America (such as the 1977 inclusion of South Asians into
a category which allowed them to benefit from the State’s
largesse) and for the aggrandisement of the leaders themselves (as a
result of the community’s demonstration of its demographic-
financial power to the mandarins of the electoral system). These
urges are also present in Yankee Hindutva. Yankee
Hindutva operates through multiple organisational forms, including Gita-reading
groups, mahila sabhas, temple-based functions and pujas,
informal baby-sitting groups, cultural events of various kinds and
summer camps. Its success, however, is the result of two principal
organisations, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad of America (VHPA) and the
Hindu Students Council (HSC). A study of these two groups allows us
to understand the strategic machinations of the global Hindu Right
whose designs pose an enormous danger to the idea of a secular
society in South Asia. The
VHPA, founded in 1970, registered its first office in New York State
in 1974 as a “cultural organisation” with the aim of adding
“cultural enrichment and cultural awareness to American society,
based on time-tested Eternal Hindu values”. A former VHPA
President, Mahesh Mehta, writing in a VHPA brochure correctly
locates the initial growth of the organisation within the dynamic of
Indian immigration to North America: “The
first generation of Indians who settled in the USA in the 1960s were
mainly students...or immigrants who received visas based on their
professional status....Thus, the earlier [sic] Hindu community in
the USA consisted primarily of highly educated people, mostly
young....By the late 1970s the composition started changing due to
the arrival of dependent immigrants who started small businesses.
Although this group had disadvantages of language and lack of higher
education, they have generally been hard-working....” The
NRI wave from the 1960s is made up of professionals, products of
elite educational institutions, relatively adept at interfacing with
the dominant American society. The petty-bourgeois component (small
businessmen, traders) that arrived in the late 1970s was different:
not only did this class suffer the inequity of a hard passage into
Anglo-Saxon America, but the nature of its profession meant that it
remained distant from its professional brethren. While the
professional community is dispersed in universities and corporations
all over the US, the small businessmen often adjoin each other in
metropolitan areas or in the immediate suburbs. The
physical and cultural ghettoisation of the petty-bourgeoisie
supported the VHPA’s early growth. However, this group experienced
an early road-block: isolated and immobile as well as culturally
disadvantaged, the committed petty-bourgeoisie could not reach out
to the broader community. In the 1970s, the VHPA grew slowly and
opened only two certified offices, in Connecticut and Illinois.
Between 1980 and 1990, however, it established ten new offices, and
the real growth came in the late 1980s, when the movement devised a
new strategy. Hindu
Homepage
The
Hindu Students Council, as the VHPA’s student wing, and its
members’ facility with the electronic networks emerged as a unique
solution to the problem of growth and expansion. This forms the
sensational aspect of Hindutva’s North American story. The first
HSC was formed in 1987 at North-Eastern University (Boston) and by
1995, HSCs accounted for 45 chapters across the US and Canada. To
gather a dispersed population, the VHPA relied upon the university
network built by the HSC and by the use of the internet. The turn to
the university meant that the leadership of Yankee Hindutva
incorporated the professional bourgeois elements alongside the
petty-bourgeois veterans. The
typical HSC is organised and run by an immigrant graduate male
student who has some Sangh Parivar connections. However, in what is
a growing trend, many new HSCs are now being organised and run by
second generation Indian-Americans, either male or female, who have
immediate family connections in VHPA. Each HSC is organised along
strictly hierarchical lines with a President and General Secretary
at the local level who report directly to a regional coordinator
who, in turn, reports to the National Council of Chapters at HSC HQ
in Needham, Massachussets. The insistence on hierarchy reveals much,
or, as a disillusioned second generation Indian-American who once
held local leadership at Ann Arbor, Michigan said: “The top
leadership of HSC has long ceased being students....But they run the
show and work in close cooperation with their ‘superiors’ in
VHPA.” The
VHPA, therefore, functions as the primary organisation which is run
by an older generation of petty-bourgeois and professional Indian
men who control all the resources and give ideological direction to
the complex; the HSC, with some ideologically committed members at
the helm, works towards the presentation and further propagation of
the complex. The professional bourgeoisie are both mobile and widely
dispersed and its ranks offer two types of VHPA workers: the
immigrant students and the second generation Indian-Americans. Both
have different reasons for their activity which falls within the
broad ideological objectives of the Hindutva movement. Why
does this dual organisational form work so well (as is indicated by
the exponential growth of the HSC)? This requires exploring the
HSC’s ideological formations as well as the internal dynamics of
the NRI community. In the 1990s, the VHPA has adopted a low-profile
existence: it offers leadership, but rarely takes the limelight.
Instead, the VHPA innovatively utilised HSCs at university campuses
and the electronic nets as a communicative strategy to further its
programme. The logic of these two tactics bear extended explication.
The
NRIs are caught in a contradiction. At one level they yearn to be
well-integrated into American society, for it is, after all, the
American Dream of a two car garage and house (a dream monopolised by
White Americans) that brought them to this land. At another level,
they seek to retain their identity, a need that is heightened by the
contradictions of integration. The NRI’s relation to nationalism
and identity is not just a product of the nationalist construction
of India by Hindutva ideologues, but also continuously mediated by
the NRI’s link to the American Dream. From
within such a configuration of social desire, the NRIs are forced to
accommodate their nationalism and identity in such a fashion that it
always remain contained within the sphere of Anglo-Saxon cultural
hegemony. In the context of this contradiction, the electronic
networks become an important medium. The internet and its web sites,
newsgroups, mailing lists and discussion groups provide a ‘safe’
space for expressions of nationalism and identity that have no place
in corporate America. While
the nets are often heralded as ‘free’ spaces, they are also
spaces of isolation. An India-related newsgroup rarely attracts a
non-Indian (or non-South Asian); a Hinduism-related site attracts
only those interested in Hinduism or for that matter a Gujarati
Samaj mailing list only occasionally contains non-Gujaratis. Thus,
these isolated sites become spawning grounds for the technocrats who
need to re-invent their identity each night after having sold their
souls to corporate America during the day. In
the days immediately before and after the destruction of the Babri
Masjid, the nets were abuzz with discussions on Vivekananda. A few
committed ideologues flooded the nets day after day with selective
serialisations of Vivekananda and many who were, at least then, not
necessarily part of the Hindutva project in any direct sense
participated with gusto. The slow process of interpellation draws
the participant into a dynamic whereby the messages and idioms begin
“talking to you” (to the person on the net for a weekly identity
fix). At your computer, you are an Indian, escaping the homogeneity
of corporate America and talking through Vivekananda to other
faceless people who seem to encounter a similar problem. The
discussions around Vivekananda, incidentally, inaugurated the VHPA/HSC’s
most sustained road-show so far in North America—the post-Babri
Masjid celebration, the "GV2000" conference in Washington
DC, followed by the centenary celebrations of Vivekananda’s 1893
Chicago address.
Combat the racist conditions of American society. It
theorises the NRI’s travails in terms of its effects (cultural
crises, the glass ceiling at work) and not in terms of its causes
(racism, an extended crisis of monopoly capitalism). This is an old
strategy of the Hindu Right, which sent its missionaries to the
Caribbean, Africa and Fiji at the start of this century to enjoin
the rebellious indentured workers to turn to culture (religion)
rather than political solidarity to solve their concrete dilemmas.
Yankee Hindutva’s difference is merely in its use of the
electronic media, not in its philosophy. A
significant component of the HSC members come from the second
generation Indian-American population whose own crisis of identity
forces the Council to adopt an alternative ideological frame.
Second-generation Indian-Americans are trying to come to terms with
their hyphenated identity, and the discovery of roots forms the
basis for the entry of the HSC into the youths’ lives. Reaganite
racism rejected the idea of a diverse civilisation and enforced a
mono-chromatic vision of America (with Europe as its centre). In
response, American liberalism offered the philosophy of multi-culturalism
which proposed that each group’s culture must be accorded equal
respect. The
HSC draws from multi-culturalism to champion Hindutva ideology as
the neglected culture of the Hindu-Americans. Simultaneously, the
HSC subtly dissociates itself from the sectarianism of its parent
organisations in order to emerge in the liberal academy as benign
and beloved. The HSC and Hindutva flourish in American liberal
universities, which offer such sectarian outfits the liberty to
promote what the liberals consider the verities of a neglected
civilisation. One
component of the neglected culture is the idea that women are the
embodiment of tradition: the Hindutva ensemble deploys such
unreconstructed sexist ideas with the ‘allowance’ that women
should have a career. These unbalanced and uneven notions led the
HSC to inaugurate a project on the Status of Hindu Women whose first
outcome (a conference at MIT in 1996) ended in confusion and
rhetorical declarations (“The Hindu system suggests not only equal
rights for women but gives more respect and reverence”). Eager
to be ‘relevant’, the HSC/VHPA uses the question of women’s
liberation to obscure its own conservative agenda towards women. In
the US, Yankee Hindutva understands ‘women’ as a resource by
which the community might increase its earning capacity and its
power: this is the motivation, rather than any feminist ideal, for
the difference in the agendas of Yankee and Desi
Hindutva. When the HSC was challenged in a debate on the Internet to
dissociate itself from the statements by Swami Muktananda Saraswati
and Mridula Sharma (the Hindu Right is “opposed to women’s
liberation...we tell women to be more adjusting”), there was no
response.
Money
Talks
Besides
the electronic networks and university campuses, Yankee Hindutva
draws upon traditional organising sites such as temples, conferences
and regional economic and cultural institutions. The busloads of
young Indian-Americans arriving at the GV2000 conference for a dose
of the spiritual offers evidence for traditional mass mobilisation;
the T-shirts distributed by ISKCON (“Be Udderly Cool”, “Save a
Cow”) and the blue baseball caps with VHPA embossed in white,
offer evidence of the traditional forms of propaganda. Yankee
Hindutva is not an anachronistic project which will be worn out by
the sands of time; if that were so, its growth should not cause
fear. The ensemble is strongly linked with the movement in India and
its strategies reveal the virtuoso techniques by which it draws the
youth (by acknowledging their crises, even if its own offer of a
solution is far from adequate). The Vishwa Hindu Parishad’s
Memorandum of Association clearly demonstrates the global strategies
of what is a dynamic, global project: (a)
The Trustees may open or may help to establish Associations in
countries outside Bharat having similar aims and objects or
affiliate such associations with the Parishad. (b) The Board of
Trustees shall have the power to collect funds and donations from
Hindus residing outside Bharat or from the Associations established
or affiliated as mentioned in sub-rule (a) of this rule to hold such
funds and spend them for the objects of the Parishad. For this
purpose the Trustees may appoint any bank or person to act as their
authorised agent. The
Hindutva project is engineered by the bourgeois-technocrat, who
forms part of the new trans-national elite in our recent phase of
global capitalism. This elite is able to conduct its political work
in two nations. The Hindujas, for example, both welcome the BJP as a
positive force in Indian politics and simultaneously donate millions
of dollars to Columbia University to start a Vedic Studies program.
A management consultant in Maryland posts two letters addressed to
him on the internet to demonstrate his sympathies for the Hindutva
project: one from Ashok Singhal on Goverment of India letterhead (Singhal
was Home Minister for 14 days this year) and the other from Jay
Dubashi, the BJP’s economic wizard. How
does this ‘obscure’ consultant get such access to power? As a
member of the trans-national elite, he is perhaps not altogether
‘obscure’, for his American location makes him powerful in
India. The financial clout of the Hindutva forces in the US can be
understood if one looks at the growth in its income figures over the
last five years. Between 1990-92 the average income of the VHPA was
$385,462. By 1993, its income had gone up to $1,057,147. Over
the years, the VHPA has discreetly transferred money into India. It
is common knowledge that during the wave of Shilapujan ceremonies
across the globe, millions of dollars in cash and kind reached
India. It is also common knowledge that VHP and BJP functionaries
carry back huge sums of money in cash or kind after each visit to
the US. We do not know the sums involved. One
aspect of the financial relations of the VHPA to the Subcontinent
can be documented: the VHPA runs two programmes, the Vanvasi Seva
and Support a Child, which transfer money to non-governmental front
organisations in South Asia. Compared to the volume of industrial
investment flowing into India, the figures of half a million under
the Seva programme appear to be insignificant. However, that half
million enters the country in a sector which draws money from
neither the Indian State nor multi-national capital. This sector is
made up of organisations which battle for the spoils of the liberal
elements in the advanced industrial countries as well as the
domestic bourgeoisie. The
Hindutva groups are immediately among the elite of these groups
given their pipeline of funds and these groups are, therefore, able
to exert their influence among subaltern populations. In addition to
the financial significance of the American groups, the NRIs offer
their Indian allies legitimacy. Imperial domination began a
tradition in India of valorising anything ‘foreign’; the BJP
frequently refers to its American allies in order to reaffirm its
legitimacy as the party that appeals to even those who live
overseas. Hindu
Wave In the post-Ayodhya period, Indian-American groups in North
America fought a defensive battle to reconstitute secularism on a
firm footing: groups from New York to California held discussions,
hosted speakers from India and exhibitions from the activist group
SAHMAT, and organised the tour of the play Tumhari Amrita
(with Shabana Azmi and Farooq Shaikh). In a flurry of activity, the
various secular and democratic groups overturned the notification of
VHPA as a “cultural organisation” for charity purposes by the
telephone company AT& T, and travelled to Washington DC for a
successful protest against the intolerance represented by GV2000. The
secular groups conducted these actions with inadequate resources,
for which an endless supply of energy substituted. They challenged
the Hindutva Wave and drove many Indian-Americans towards a
reconsideration of their previously unreconstructed allegiance to
the ensemble of the Hindu Right. At the time of the Latur
earthquake, it was the Left among Indian-Americans who raised money,
and during the entire Narmada Bachao Andolan struggle, it was again
the Left which offered its support to the activists on the ground.
Such actions bespeak a noble struggle to preserve the best of the
Subcontinent. However,
the secular groups are confined to major cities and university
towns. They are run by deracinated elements of the diaspora
(graduate students and faculty) or by unrepresentative members of
the petty-bourgeoisie (who carry memories of work with the Left
parties in India). If the isolation of the groups is one problem, a
second problem is their inability to respond to the genuine crises
among the NRIs, which is what enables the Yankee Hindu Right to
flourish. The Hindutva Wave can only be overcome if combat is waged
against the conditions which sustain it as much as against its own
inadequate approach to those conditions. B. Mathew and V. Prashad teach at Rider College, New Jersey and Trinity
College, Connecticut, respectively. Source: http://www.littleindia.com/India/apr2001/hindutva.htm |
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