Concerned Citizens Tribunal - Gujarat 2002
An inquiry into the carnage in Gujarat

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Sample and Spread/ Nos of Statements


Totally 2094 statements, written and oral were processed by the Tribunal.

Naroda: 49 testimonies and 73 written statements

Gulberg Society, Chamanpura: 23 testimonies and 7 written statements

Rest of Ahmedabad: 51 oral testimonies and 603 written statements

Kheda and Nadiad: 43 testimonies and written statements

Banaskantha: 6 testimonies and 20 written statements

Sabarkantha: 29 testimonies and 52 written statements

Mehsana: 9 testimonies and 10 written statements

Godhra: 20 testimonies

Panchmahal District: 63 testimonies and 34 written statements

Bharuch: 53 statements

Bharuch city: 18 testimonies and 78 written statements

Ankleshwar: 19 testimonies and 20 written statements

Rajpardi: 7 testimonies and 11 written statements

Vadodara 68 testimonies and 79 written statements

Vadodara tribal: 5 testimonies and 19 written statements

Vadodara rural: 13 written statements

Dahod: 13 testimonies and 29 written statements

This totals 1547. Another 187 copies of FIRs, panchnamas, post mortem reports were put on record and 313 detailed collective statements of damages. This totals 2094.

This sample gave us a good spread of the carnage across the state of Gujarat. Age of the witnesses also varied between 25-60 years of age. This shows a representative sample that is reasonably representative of the ground level. Over 50 per cent of the witnesses were self-employed, either skilled workers or small traders, small businessmen while at least 40 per cent were agriculturists, small and large families and landless labourers.


The data analysed deals with the issue of migrations caused by the riots. Movements of victims and survivors were analysed and an average of over 78 per cent of people affected by the violence had shifted residence as a result of the fear and terror generated by the violence at least for the first few months (at least three months). This indicates the scale of violence that was unleashed.

The scenes of the worst massacres have seen migrations that have been detailed in the Incidents of Violence—Volume I have also resulted in near-permanent migrations and shifts of population. In these locations only a bare 20 per cent of the original population has returned to their original homes. This is true of Mehsana district, Panchmahal, Anand, Dahod, Gulberg society and Naroda gaon and Patiya. The fear and terror experienced until we go to press by victim survivors of Dahod, Mehsana and Panchmahal is significant. The fact that the government has determinedly turned it’s back on rehabilitation and the fact that the perpetrators of the crimes have been named as powerful politicians still in power has contributed to the insecurity and fear experienced.

Spread of Violence

The evidence before the Tribunal speaks eloquently of the vast spread of the violence in the first 72 hours just after Godhra, that is between February 28-March 3, 02. Trends are discernible too in various districts of the pre-planning and preparations made even before the Godhra incident. The worst incidents of gruesome massacre were effected with precision in those dates though the violence simmered on for months and is continuing still.

Significant data also points to the second bout of violence between March 12-15,02 [the date of the Shlila poojan planned by the VHP at Ayodhya; then again at the end of March—April 3, 02 on the eve of the PM’s visit to the relief camps. May 02 also saw many bouts of violence in at least eight locations in Gujarat. On May 7, 2002 there were brutal killings of stray Muslims in Ahmedabad city. This was while the Tribunal hearings were on.


An analysis of the data before us clearly shows that the construct around the Godhra violence was consciously and deliberately used at the town, city and district levels to foment anger, hatred and a sense of revenge among the mobs that struck. Zerox copies of the photos of the burning coach were distributed widely. The slogans shouted by the violent mobs clearly showed that they had been deliberately instigated using Godhra as the reason and excuse.

Loss to Life

Our data shows details of the sheer brutality in the manner of killing. The computation of this data also shows that it is the manner of the killing that has made the loss to life shattering. Detailed evidence of the manner of killing and destruction of the bodies of loved ones makes the crimes even more difficult to bear. In many cases there are no traces of the dead. The Tribunal has collected data about the lists of missing persons and annexed these in Volume III. The state government has not computed any official data on the violence.

Damage to property

A detailed analysis of 2094 strong evidence points to economic destruction as emerging as a major motive in the violence. Where the mobs did not kill or maim, they had a clear-cut motive, of destruction of homes and properties. Independent computation of losses puts this at a primary loss of Rs 3,800 crores to the Muslim community of Gujarat.

Law and Order

Throughout the data analysis what emerged was either a) absence of the police from the scene of mass crime when they ought to have been present; b) actual connivance and participation in the destruction of properties and the arson. It would be safe to conclude from this data analysis that a committed and hard core of about 30 per cent police personnel in Gujarat are committed soldiers to the agents of the crime. Many of the balance are terrified and just a handful rises above these considerations and function as is required of them under the Constitution.

Over 50 per cent of the victims who’s data was processed spoke of repeated pleas for help to the police being turned down. Another 30 per cent spoke of first hand knowledge of the police telling the victim community to protect itself and not expect anything from the police. The few instances of shining valour from the police stand out but offer little hope in terms of scope and percentage.

Relief Operations

Relief operations were almost entirely manned by community leaders who organised relief camps. It was weeks before the state government began their supply. A fair amount of aid from other groups and individuals and the rest of the country came in but the state government unabashedly not only assumed no responsibility for the relief and rehabilitation, but also gave it grudgingly while heaping abuse on camps and the refugees staying there. The data analysed shows that in 60 per cent of the cases victims have stayed in camps for over two months, that mental and physical state of the survivors is fragile. With no genuine efforts are rehabilitation, despair and hopelessness was reflected in the responses of over 85 per cent of the deponents.


Social groups, and other non governmental organisations have been involved in some relief measures. However over 70 per cent of the deponents spoke of the need for more sustained need-based support

that centres around building up of livelihoods, rehabilitating communities and families in a fashion that caters to their trauma, loss and yet enables them to draw out of it. Women and children victim survivors especially expressed the need for more sustained and creative support in over 70 per cent of the statements recorded by us.


Published by: Citizens for Justice and Peace