Annexure 6
Interim Findings and
Recommendations of the Tribunal
This was sent to the Gujarat Government and the Indian
government for their reactions
Concerned Citizens Tribunal Gujarat 2002:
Tentative Conclusions and Observations
Having considered all the material that are placed
before us, and having visited and seen several places that were the scene
of violent incidents, and the relief camps where the affected lived, and
having heard a large number of victims, officials and other concerned
people, we have arrived at the following tentative conclusions.
I. Godhra
1. We visited Godhra and inspected the S-6 coach of
the Sabarmati Express, met the collector and the deputy superintendent of
police. We have also taken into account the report of the Forensic Science
Laboratory of Ahmedabad. In the incident of burning of the coach S-6, 58
persons lost their lives, of which 26 were women, 12 were children and 20
men. The evidence placed before us shows that the bodies were charred
beyond recognition. Only five bodies were identified, not on the basis of
their physical features, but on the basis of the things on their person.
There was no conclusive evidence of who the passengers were. We also found
that about 43 persons were injured, but most of them had minor injuries.
About 5 or 6 persons were hospitalised for a short period. One of them
died and the rest were discharged.
2. Having examined the evidence, the Godhra
incident of February 27, 2002 does not appear to be a pre-planned or a
premeditated one. Our examination of coach S-6, which was burnt, showed
that the fire had occurred from within and not from outside. There is no
reliable material to say as to who had set fire to the coach.
3. Yet, it appears that the state government rushed
to the conclusion that it was a deliberate and a pre-planned attack on the
kar sevaks by a particular group of Muslims. This is one of the
reasons for the spread of violence in the state.
4. There appears to be a failure of intelligence on
the part of the state law and order machinery, as is evident from an
absence of anticipation of trouble, despite the communal history of Godhra
town, and despite what had happened earlier on the Railway Station, where
the Sabarmati Express had halted on its onward journey to Faizabad/Ayodhya.
II. Post-Godhra
5. The evidence discloses that the decision to take
the bodies from Godhra to Ahmedabad was taken by the chief minister, Mr.
Narendra Modi. At the outset, the bodies were taken in a parade from
Godhra to Ahmedabad in a motor cavalcade, inciting people along the way.
Dr. Jaideep Patel, one of the main accused in the Naroda incidents, was
also traveling along with the bodies.
6. The chief minister after visiting Godhra, by the
evening of February 27, 2002 declared that a foreign hand was behind
Godhra and the state party chief of the BLP supported the VHP called
bandh the next day. This announcement of the chief minister also
appears to have contributed to the spread of violence to all of Gujarat.
7. Witnesses deposing before us testified to the
fact that the chief minister called a meeting of senior police and other
officers on that very night of February 27, 2002. At this meeting specific
instructions were given by him in the presence of state home minister on
how the police should deal with the situation on the bandh day. We
were informed that instructions were given in this meeting by the chief
minister specifically not to take action against any Hindu reaction to
Godhra. Earlier in the evening, his two cabinet colleagues, Ashok Bhatt
and Pratap Singh Chauhan, had met at Lunavada in Panchmahal District and
in this meeting, the manner and methods of unleashing violence on the
Muslims were planned in detail.
It appears from what happened in Ahmedabad and its
environs on February 28 and all over the state on March 1, 2 and 3 and
thereafter, was with the deliberate connivance and support of the
Government.
III. Official Response
8. A large number of witnesses testified that the
next day, i.e. on the day of the bandh, there was absolutely no
police bandobast. The Gandhinagar state and Ahmedabad control rooms
were taken over by two ministers i.e. Mr. Ashok Bhatt and Mr. Jadeja.
Repeated pleas for help from people were blatantly turned down. The police
commissioner of Ahmedabad, Mr. P.C. Pandey was specifically mentioned in
this connection.
9. The organised, violent incidents by large mobs,
whether they took place at Naroda, Gulberg Society, Chamanpura, Gomtipur,
Sundaramnagar, Vatwa in Ahmedabad on February 28 or in Vadodara and other
places thereafter, reveal a similar feature viz., the abdication of
responsibility by the police and the administration. The government failed
to control the violence and safeguard the lives and liberties of a large
number of people, particularly those belonging to the minority Muslim
community. In several districts, similarly, huge "tolas" (mobs)
attacked the Muslim community. Most of the victims were butchered and then
burnt. The women were disrobed and raped in public, and then slaughtered
and burnt.
10. The typical incident in this connection, which
is now well known, is that of Mr. Ahsan Jafri, who was trying to protect
the lives of about 150 Muslims gathered in the compound of the Gulberg
society. The late Mr. Jafri, a former member of parliament, tried several
times to contact the chief minister Mr. Modi and the commissioner of
police, Mr. Pandey to deploy force immediately, to counter the
1,000-strong mob that had gathered outside the compound of the Gulberg
society. But his pleas were not responded to. All the houses in the
society were attacked excepting a bungalow belonging to a Hindu. A few
weeks prior to the incident, Mr. Jaffri had actively campaigned against
Mr. Modi in the bye-election from the Rajkot constituency. This was held
against Mr. Jafri and he was brutally done to death and all those who had
come to him to seek his protection were also slaughtered and burnt.
IV. Pre-Planned Organised Violence
11.
The scrutiny of the
evidence, which came before us, also reveals that there was systematic
preparation for unleashing the violence all over the State. The attackers
had with them the lists of persons and properties of the victims. The
lists could not have been prepared without an access to government records
and agencies like the state intelligence, the sales tax department, the
revenue department and the state electoral rolls. The Muslim localities
were identified before hand, as also the property and business houses
belonging to the Muslim community.
12. Apart from carrying petrol and kerosene and
using gas cylinders, the members of the mob used chemicals. The chemicals
had the capacity of destroying the identity of the persons burnt by
burning at high temperature and for a long period of time. There was also
evidence of the use of gelatin sticks. The inflammable materials were used
on a large-scale. All these things were not possible unless there was a
good deal of preparation much in advance, and to the knowledge of the
Government machinery.
V. The Failure of Government to Control Violence
13. While the Tribunal was examining witnesses
during the first fortnight of May 02, almost two months after the first
incidents in the State, the violence was still continuing in Ahmedabad and
at other places. We could feel the impact of violence in as much as we
also had to seek protection. This shows that the violence was not only on
a large scale, but also lasted for a long time. This was another
indication of the Government’s failure to control violence and its
incapacity to restore peace and normalcy for a long time.
VI. Lack of Prompt Relief and Rehabilitation
Programmes by Government
14. We visited several relief camps in Ahmedabad,
Godhra, Vadodara, Bharuch, and Ankleshwar and recorded the testimony of
over 1,500 victims. Over 1,50,000 persons were given shelter and
protection by relief camps, organised not by the State, but by private
groups all over the state. Even after the violence, the chief minister and
the Government of Gujarat showed a callous disregard towards relief and
rehabilitation of the victims. It was through court orders on petitions
filed by the citizens that adequate water, grain and medicines were made
available by the authorities. Despite assurances to the contrary in Court,
the Government of Gujarat continued, and continues, to coerce the relief
camps to close down without adequate rehabilitation.
15. Even medical facilities were denied to the
victims and to persons who had taken shelter in the relief camps. The
armed workers of the Hindu communal organisations were preventing the
Muslim victims from getting access to many government, semi-government
hospitals and private clinics. This also indicates the failure of the
government machinery.
16. The State government’s initial announcement
with regard to compensation to the victims of the violence showed palpable
discrimination between Hindu and Muslim victims. This was withdrawn only
after a hue and cry of the people all over the country. This indicates the
communal bias of the state government.
17. The state of Gujarat has done nothing till date
even to compute the damage to life and property. On the other hand, the
chief minister made public statements that the government will not buy
land and rebuild houses for the victims, nor will it rebuild religious
shrines. It is shocking that even six months after the violence, no
official lists of dead or missing persons have been compiled, no detailed
rehabilitation package (like at the time of the earthquake) made public,
and pathetic amounts of compensation have been doled out. There are also
no principles and guidelines laid down to compute compensation, nor has a
comprehensive rehabilitation package been declared.
VII. Failure of the Criminal Justice System
18. The evidence shows that the investigation
process was totally inactive, in that,
(i) There was no recording of complaints made by
affected persons, even while the incidents were taking place;
(ii) FIRs were recorded after several days;
(iii) Even the recorded FIRs contained incorrect
versions and not the versions as reported by the complainants;
(iv) The names of the culprits, even when disclosed,
were not recorded;
(v) In fact, the complainants were told not to name the
accused, otherwise the complaints would not be recorded;
(vi) The FIRs of individual victims were not recorded
and omnibus complaints containing several incidents were recorded, which
would deny proper investigation and stall the delivery of criminal
justice;
(vii) In many cases, the panchnamas of the
scenes of offence have not been made. The forensic evidence has not been
collected;
(viii) The leaders of the mob violence have not yet
been arrested;
(ix) The police participated in the violence and, in
spite of clear and well-documented evidence against the police, no
policeman has been prosecuted or proceeded against otherwise;
(x) Search and seizure of weapons and looted material
have not been effected at all, despite direct evidence of armed mobs
committing the crimes;
(xi) Most of the prosecutors who are in charge of these
cases owe allegiance to the organisations perpetrating the crimes, with
the result the victims have no confidence in the due process of law;
From the evidence recorded, many persons, politicians
and officials among others, have been repeatedly mentioned by witnesses,
as directly taking part and inflicting violence on innocent victims and
also leading the mobs. A list of the names of some of these persons is
annexed.
VIII. The Role of the Ruling Party and Its Affiliates
19. People in a significant number of testimonies
have stated that the Bharatiya Janata Party, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Bajrang Dal and its affiliates,
which are linked with each other, have been responsible for the violence.
A systematic effort at communalising sections of the Hindu community was
on since 1986. In this process, organisations like the RSS, VHP, Bajrang
Dal with an anti-Constitutional public posturing, loaded with threats,
intimidation and violence, had been polarizing the society, communally.
This has resulted in creating a communal divide and hatred. By the time
the tragic Godhra incident took place, these organisations had assumed a
militant character, especially in Gujarat. These organisations had been
doing and continue to do, till date, with impunity, the recruiting of
members and conducting of training camps. Trishuls and swords were
and are being distributed among the persons who are enlisted as members in
these organisations. These organizations, for recruiting their members,
even issued advertisements in local newspapers, distributed leaflets and
other literature mainly with a view to provoke hatred against Muslims.
IX. Role of the Central Government
20. The Central government has failed in
discharging its Constitutional responsibility. In the face of the incident
that had taken place in Godhra on the morning of February 27, 2002, and in
view of the fact that both Godhra and parts of Gujarat were communally
sensitive places, the state government was expected to be more alert, more
dexterous and more duty conscious in maintaining law and order. Instead,
the state government had decided to abdicate its Constitutional duties and
functions by declaring a bandh. No authority with even a modicum of
a sense of responsibility to the lives, liberty and property of the people
would have, in such a situation, abdicated its function. On the other
hand, the state government directly provoked communal violence by making
such an irresponsible declaration. That was a prima facie declaration of
the intention of the state government not to govern and abide by the
provisions of the Constitution. This itself was sufficient for the central
government to immediately take steps to intervene, and save the people of
the state from the violence, which was bound to follow. There is no
evidence, that the central government, after learning of what the state
government had decided to do, had taken any steps to restrain the state
government from adopting the suicidal step, nor of any positive steps
taken by it, to save the people from the aftermath of the Godhra incident.
The people who testified before us, while indicting the state government
also questioned, with anguish, the dubious role that the central
government had played during the crucial period.
On the other hand, when the nation and the world was
condemning the violence in Gujarat, senior members of the central cabinet
made public statements defending and justifying the role of the state
government. They also gave a certificate of good conduct to the chief
minister of the state.
A final report will be prepared in due course after
getting the response from the governments, if any.
(Signed by Members of the Concerned Citizens Tribunal)
Dated this day, 25
th
of August 2002
Concerned Citizens Tribunal –Gujarat 2002; c/o Sabrang;
"Nirant" Juhu Tara Rd; Mumbai 400049 Phones: Convenor, Teesta Setalvad
022-6602288/6603927
Email: [email protected]
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